Cited by

¶ 40 (2000) (recognizing that evidence of a fact is not considered cumulative “where .

¶ 33 (2020); –77 ¶¶ 17–18 (2000).

“The exception requires proof of three elements: (1) a startling event, (2) a statement made soon after the event to ensure the declarant has no time to fabricate, and (3) a statement which relates to the startling event.” ¶ 20 (2000).

¶ 38 (2008) (-81, ¶ 39 (2000)) (We review hearsay violations for harmless error, and error is harmless “when the reviewing court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not impact the verdict.”).

-81, ¶ 39 (2000); ¶ 29 (App. 2021) (finding no reversible error “where the erroneously admitted evidence is entirely cumulative of other properly admitted evidence”).

Erroneously admitted evidence is cumulative not simply when “other evidence exists to support a conviction,” but when it “supports a fact otherwise established by existing evidence,” meaning that it was “superfluous and could not have affected the verdict.”

Torres, 252 Ariz. at 31 ¶ 12 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); ¶ 13 (2000) (“Our criminal standard for superseding cause will henceforth be the same as our tort standard.”).

¶12 In a criminal case, erroneously admitted evidence is harmless if “the reviewing court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 4 STATE v. VILLAGOMEZ Decision of the Court did not impact the verdict.” Bocharski, 218 Ariz. at 486, ¶ 38 ( ¶ 39 (2000)).

Chase’s “testimony [regarding the breath-test results] was highly incriminating, had a clear bearing on the charges against [Mowers], and likely affected the verdict.” ¶ 44 (2000).

“Because a jury is free to credit or discredit testimony, we cannot guess what they believed, nor can we determine what a reasonable jury should have believed.” ¶ 34 (App. 2003) ( ¶ 46 (2000)).

¶33 The jury instruction is facially contradictory because the jury had to consider A.D.’s age to decide whether she was a child.2 But “we will not reverse a conviction unless the instructions, taken as a whole, misled the jurors.” –27 ¶ 35 (2015) ( ¶ 37 (2010)); –77 ¶ 17 (2000) (“[E]rror in a jury instruction is reversible if the instruction, taken as a whole, supports a reasonable presumption that the jurors would be misled.”).

-77, ¶¶ 16-17 (2000) (finding no reversible error where there was “no evidence that the jury was misled” by the erroneous instruction).

sts from which a reasonable jury could find that he agreed to sell or transport dangerous drugs, and intended to assist the commission of such an offense when he transported heroin and methamphetamine from Castro’s apartment.5 (holding an “unlawful agreement can be inferred from the parties’ overt conduct”), ¶ 12 (2000).

the same as our tort standard.” ¶ 13 (2000) (citing Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz Cty.

*959 State v. Bass , , 575-76 ¶¶ 11-13, ; see also State v. Vandever , , 208 ¶ 8, , 475 (App. 2005) (explaining that a third-party driver's conduct was not an intervening event when the collision "was clearly a foreseeable event within the scope of the risk" created by the defendant's illegal conduct

-77, ¶¶ 15-18 (2000) (any confusion jury might have had following oral instruction was remedied by written instruction; absent supporting evidence, mere speculation of confusion insufficient to support conclusion jury was confused).