Cited by

D. ¶30 Laches is an equitable defense that serves as the “counterpart to the statute of limitations.” –83 ¶ 6 (2000).

¶11 Kaufman cites the general principle that laches will “bar a claim when the delay is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party.”

-83, ¶ 6 (2000) (noting laches is "an equitable counterpart to the statute of limitations, designed to discourage dilatory conduct").

See League of Ariz. Cities & ¶ 6 (2009) (“Laches will generally bar a claim when the delay [in filing suit] is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party.” ( ¶ 6 (2000))).

“Laches will generally bar a claim when the delay [in filing suit] is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party.” League of Ariz. Cities & ¶ 6 (2009) ( ¶ 6 (2000)).

¶9 The laches doctrine is an equitable defense “designed to discourage dilatory conduct.” –83, ¶ 6 (2000).

It “will generally bar a claim when the delay [in filing suit] is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party.” ¶ 6 (2000).

¶ 6 (2000); (addressing laches in the context of a constructive trust claim).

13 MANICOM v. CITIMORTGAGE, INC. Opinion of the Court the delay is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party’ even where the applicable statute of limitations has not yet expired.” In re Indenture of Trust Dated January 13, 1964, (citation omitted).

Generally, laches will “bar a claim when the delay [in filing suit] is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party.” League of Ariz. Cities & ¶6 , (alteration in original) ( ¶ 6 , ).

Laches is the “equitable counterpart to the statute of limitations, designed to discourage dilatory conduct.”

Laches is the “equitable counterpart to the statute of limitations, designed to discourage dilatory conduct.”

That doctrine “will generally bar a claim when 8 RASH v. TOWN OF MAMMOTH Opinion of the Court the delay [in filing a lawsuit] is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party.”

§ 19- 124(B), omission of significant contextual information may be misleading and thus violate the statute, CGM, 199 Ariz. at 73 ¶ 10, 13 P.3d at 1190; ¶ 4, ¶¶ 4-5

(laches bars claim when delay unreasonable and results in prejudice).

¶ 22 “Laches will generally bar a claim when the delay [in filing suit] is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party.” -83, ¶ 6 , -1200 (2000).

[2] Although the superior court's ruling also appears to reflect considerations that are typically associated with laches, ¶ 6 , -1200 (2000) (stating laches "is an equitable counterpart to the statute of limitations" and "will generally bar a claim when the delay is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party"), the parties do not argue, and we do not decide, whether the doctrine of laches is applic

¶ 6 “Laches will generally bar a claim when the delay [in filing suit] is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party.” ¶ 6

(two-month delay barred claims because litigants in election cases must pursue such cases with all deliberate speed to preserve quality of judicial decision making); ¶¶ 17-18, -70 (1998) (finding unreasonable six-week delay even th

¶ 8, (no prejudice to Legislative Council when simply required to delete language that is partial).

35, 36, ¶6 , -1200 (2000).