Cited by

Comm’n, (noting that a failure to report forthwith may be excused if the delay did not prejudice the employer or if the worker had no way of knowing that an injury occurred or related to employment); see also S.H.

Comm’n., ¶ 9 (2002) (“The findings must be specific, not only to 6 CHENOWETH v. R. BEHMER/COPPERPOINT Decision of the Court encourage [ALJs] to consider their conclusions carefully, but also to permit meaningful judicial review.”).

Comm’n, ¶ 9 (2002) (holding that an ALJ’s findings “must be specific, not only to encourage judges to consider their conclusions carefully, but also to permit meaningful judicial review”); Perry v. Indus.

Comm'n , , 347 ¶ 9, , 344 (2002) (holding that an ALJ's findings "must be specific, not only to encourage judges to consider their conclusions carefully, but also to permit meaningful judicial review"); Perry v. Indus.

Comm’n of Ariz., ¶ 9 (2002) (“The findings must be specific, not only to encourage [the factfinder] to consider [its] conclusions carefully, but also to permit meaningful judicial review.”), with material factual conflicts resolved, and in a manner that supports the conclusion, see Shelby Sch.

Comm’n, ¶ 9 (2002) (stating that an ALJ “must make factual findings that are sufficiently comprehensive and explicit for a reviewing court to glean the basis for the [ALJ’s] conclusions”); Wammack v. Indus.

¶11 Sheraton argues that, as a matter of law, the fourteen- or fifteen-day delay between the claimant’s injury and her report to Aldana cannot be forthwith and cites Douglas Auto &

Comm'n, ¶ 9 (2002) (citations omitted).

Comm’n, ¶ 5, (quoting former A.R.S.

However, findings are sufficient if we can “glean the basis for the [ALJ’s] conclusions.” Douglas Auto & Equip, v. Industrial Comm’n, , , ¶ 9 (2002).