Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Hughes v. Jorgenson, 50 P.3d 821.

72 citing documents.

Michael Redhair v. Kinerk, Beal, Schmidt, Dyer & Sethi, P.C. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
Michael Redhair v. Kinerk, Beal, Schmidt, Dyer & Sethi, P.C. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
statute that provides a one-year 6 limitation period for other types of actions.4 (legislature’s insertion of notice-of-right-to-jury-trial language into substantive driving-under-the-influence-of-intoxicant statute demonstrated legislative intent); (acknowledging principle of statutory construction that statutory scheme is considered as a whole to determine legislative intent).
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. 181 P.3d 219 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. 181 P.3d 219 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court should not look beyond the language, but rather “simply ‘apply it without using other means of construction,’ assuming that the legislature has said what it means.” , quoting UNUM Life Ins., , 26 P.3d at 513 .
State v. Aguilar 178 P.3d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State v. Aguilar 178 P.3d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
Co., , (“When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court should not look beyond the language, but rather ‘simply “apply it without using other means of construction,” assuming that the legislature has said what it means.’ ”), , quoting UNUM Life Ins.
Cundiff v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 174 P.3d 270 Ariz. 2008
Cundiff v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 174 P.3d 270 Ariz. 2008
A. ¶8 This case requires us to construe the language of the UMA.2 When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court should not look beyond the language, but rather “simply ‘apply it without using other means of construction,’ assuming that the legislature has said what it means.” Hughes v. Jorgenson, 203 Ariz. 71, 73 ¶ 11, (quoting UNUM Life Ins.
In Re Andrew C. 160 P.3d 687 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
In Re Andrew C. 160 P.3d 687 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Ross 151 P.3d 1261 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Ross 151 P.3d 1261 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
¶ 11 , (mternal quotations and citations omitted).
Committee for Preservation of Established Neighborhoods v. Riffel 141 P.3d 422 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Committee for Preservation of Established Neighborhoods v. Riffel 141 P.3d 422 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
¶ 11 , (“assuming that the legislature has said what it means”).
Emmett McLoughlin Realty, Inc. v. Pima County Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
Emmett McLoughlin Realty, Inc. v. Pima County Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
The term “substantial interest” is defined as “any pecuniary or proprietary interest, either direct or indirect, other than a remote interest.” § 38-502(11)
State v. Nelson 90 P.3d 206 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
State v. Nelson 90 P.3d 206 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. 78 P.3d 1056 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. 78 P.3d 1056 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
But if a statute’s language is clear, we simply apply it without reference to any tools of statutory construction, “assuming that the legislature has said what it means.” Hughes v. Jorgen *339 son
State v. Fell 52 P.3d 218 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
State v. Fell 52 P.3d 218 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002