Cited by

¶ 5 (2002) (recognizing that “[t]he [L]egislature created [a] cause of action” in a statute which uses the phrase “may file an action”); Delgado v. Manor Care of Tucson AZ, LLC, ¶ 17 (2017) (same).

(“Arizona has a substantial population of elderly people, and the legislature was concerned about elder abuse.” ()).

"make clear that an APSA case may be based on a medical malpractice act .

McGill v. Albrecht, was decided, APSA applied to “incapacitated or vulnerable adult[s].” see also 1998 Ariz. Sess.

–31 ¶ 20, –90 (2002) (declining to read a gross-negligence standard of care into a statute where legislature created that standard in other statutes but did not in the statute at issue).

¶ 16, which clarifies when abuse is actionable under APSA.

-31, ¶ 20 , -90 (2002) (stating that a court cannot conclude the legislature meant to require a showing of gross negligence when it did not include the specific language it included in other statutes); Padilla v. Indus.

County of Pima, , ¶ 22 , (medical negligence may be the basis for an APSA action).

¶ 11 , (explaining that § 1-214(B) is “a permissive statute” and allows courts to interpret the singular as the plural “when such an interpretation will enable us to carry out legislative intent.”).

Although the respondent judge correctly acknowledged, based on our supreme court’s P.3d 384 (2002), that an APSA claim may be based on allegations of medical negligence, he nevertheless concluded that regardless of the medical-negligence underpinnings of some of Blackburn’s claims, § 12-2604 does not apply in this case because the complaint was brought pursuant to APSA.

530-31 ¶ 20, -90 (2002) (rejecting claim that APSA requires proof of gross negligence, noting that “[t]he legislature surely knows how to require a showing of gross negligence, having used that term in a great number of statutes”).

-31, -90 (2002) (refusing to read “gross negligence” into a statute because “[t]he legislature surely knows how to require a showing of gross negligence, having used that term in a great number

-31, ¶ 20 , -90 (2002) (finding the legislature "surely knows how to require a showing of gross negligence [in an APSA case], having used that term in a great number of statutes."

at 151, ¶ 9 , 150 P.3d at 238 ; ¶6 , Corbett, 213 Ariz. at 629, ¶ 34 , 146 P.3d at 1038 ; ¶ 19

v. Albrecht, ¶ 6 , (footnote omitted).

¶¶ 13-15 , (holding that the APSA is to be interpreted broadly to effectuate its remedial purpose and a late-appointed personal representative can pursue an elder abuse claim on behalf of the estate in spite of limitations placed on personal representative in the probate code); -31, ¶¶ 19, 21 , 389-90 (2002) (holding that the legislature intended to provide elderly population greater protection than already provided under other civil remedies, and APSA claims and medical malpractice claims are n

-31, ¶20 , -90 (2002) (rejecting argument that the legislature intended a showing of gross negligence when the statute spoke only of negligence because the “legislature surely knows how to require a showing of gross negligence, having used that term in a great number of statutes”); State v. Ault, 1

See In re Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton, -57 , -88 (1997); ¶ 6 , (regarding increased remedies).

P.3d 384 (2002), arguing that, because “liability under APSA arises from the relationship between a vulnerable adult and her care provider,” they cannot be liable under APSA.

¶ 6 , (holding APSA not limited by any other civil remedy); Denton, 190 Ariz. at 155 , 945 P.2d at 1286 (holding elder abuse victims may recover damages for pain and suffering endured notwithstanding the death of the victim).