Cited by

¶ 10 (2002) (refusing to apply statute governing ballot measure petitions to candidate nomination petitions); ¶ 12 (2019) (declining to “conflate[] the process for recalls with those for initiatives and referenda”).

¶ 10 (2002) (refusing to apply statute governing ballot measure petitions to candidate nomination petitions); ¶ 12 (2019) (declining to “conflate[] the process for recalls with those for initiatives and referenda”).

(declining to reach the issue).

Cf., ¶ 10 (2002) (Where items are “expressly listed in series in a statute, we presume the legislature intended to exclude items of the same class that are not listed.”).

“In interpreting statutes, we look to the plain language as the most reliable indicator of meaning.” ¶ 9 (2002) ().

¶ 9 (2002) (“In interpreting statutes, we look to the plain language as the most reliable indicator of meaning.”).

“[W]e look to the plain language as the most reliable indicator of meaning.” ¶ 9 (2002) (citation omitted).

Nowhere in the language of the statute does it limit the “cost information” to the “party first putting the property into service.” If the Legislature had wanted *345 to limit “cost” to the original construction cost, it was more than able to do so, , 118 ¶ 11, (stating that if the Legislature had intended a statute to encompass more than indicated in plain language, the Legislature could have done so), like it did in A.R.S.

¶¶ 10–11, (explaining that a statute authorizing signors only of initiative, referenda, or subdivision formation petitions to withdraw their signatures did not permit signors of nomination petitions to do the same).

“[W]e look to the plain language as the most reliable indicator of meaning.” ¶ 9

Accordingly, “we look to the plain language as the most reliable indicator of meaning,” and “give effect to each sentence and word so that provisions are not rendered meaningless.” ¶ 9 , Comm.

ges be filed “within ten days, excluding Saturday, Sunday and other legal holidays, after the last day for filing nomination papers and petitions.” We construed that language as “giv[ing] an elector ten business days after the petition filing deadline to challenge the validity of signatures on nomination petitions.” ¶ 15

“In interpreting-statutes, we look to the plain language as the most reliable indicator of meaning.” ¶ 9 , ¶ 10

¶ 10, (explaining that when a statute expressly lists certain items, we presume that the legislature intended to exclude similar items that are not listed).

¶ 8 “In interpreting statutes, we look to the plain language as the most reliable indicator of meaning.” ¶ 9 , ¶ 10

P.3d 338 (2002); Fragoso v. Fell, No. 2 CA-SA 2005-0001, 2005 WL 1097302 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 10, 2005); Koller v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., P.2d 128 (App. 1999); Schwab Sales, Inc. v. GN Constr.