Cited by

constructive notice, negligence per se and res ipsa loquitur.” ¶4 After full briefing and oral argument, the superior court found sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably infer that Ms. Martin 1On appeal from the grant of summary judgment, this court “view[s] the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” ¶ 12 (2003).

The complaint further alleged that because of Dixon’s improper service,2 a default judgment was 1 “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, ‘viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.’” ¶ 31 (App. 2014) ( ¶ 12 (2003)).

of Supervisors of Yavapai Cty., ¶ 8, ( ¶ 12, ).

11 ¶ 12, (summary judgment); (directed verdict/judgment as a matter of law).

iance because the ten-day period “did not begin to run until Madison Square received the contractually-required notice of a request for disbursement from CCATM.” ¶13 However, disbursement of the funds was not conditioned upon “receipt of notice” or “receipt from CCATM.” The Escrow Agreement simply required, by its plain language, that Madison “receive the request.” ¶ 18 (2003) (declining to interpret option agreement, which stated it “shall terminate if not exercised in writing,” to incorporate

“Similarly, the determination of whether equitable relief is available and appropriate is subject to our de novo review.”

We review a grant of 11 FELIPE, et al. v. THEME, et al. Opinion of the Court summary judgment de novo, “viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” ¶ 12

This court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo, “viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” ¶ 12, (citation omitted).

¶ 12, (internal citation omitted).