Cited by

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 12-612; ¶ 11 (2002)

Fiduciary Duty ¶19 Appellants argue that Abrehet Wise, the law firm, and the individual attorneys “breached fiduciary duties owed to the [Maine] children.” They contend that, “[e]ven if a question existed regarding their status, it was not Appellees’ role to decide that question, much less to act adverse[ly] to their fiduciaries

§ 12-612(A); ¶ 14 (2002).

¶ 13 (2002) (noting that in most cases, the statutory plaintiff “is the surviving spouse or child and is also a beneficiary,” capable of both litigating the action and receiving the proceeds).

C. Statutory Beneficiaries ¶31 Plaintiffs argue that even if Humphrey’s and Quinn’s claims are statutorily barred, the 2010 notice and subsequent complaint were statutorily compliant as to Beneficiaries because “each beneficiary’s claim, including when it accrued, must be separately evaluated” a

While we remain bound by the jury’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, see, we are not bound by “conclusions of law nor by findings that combine both fact and law,” –69, ¶ 10 (2002) (citation omitted).

¶ 10 (2002); –53, ¶ 18 (App. 1998).

Wilmot v. Wilmot , , 568, ¶ 10

Because questions of law are reviewed de novo, e.g., Wilmot v. Wilmot, 203 Ariz. 565, 569 ¶ 10, the grant of a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo.

And, the plain language of § 14-3952(1) provides that a compromise that has not been executed by all of the persons with beneficial interests in the estate is void.3 See, e.g., In re Estate of Sullivan, 724 N.W.2d 532, 535-36 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (analyzing identical provision to § 14-3952); (discussing § 14-3952(1) by analogy and noting it requires consent of all beneficiaries and claimants by formal agreement); (Kan.

But “we ‘draw our own legal conclusions from [the] facts found or implied in the judgment.’ ” See id., , *407 , -11 (2002) (trial court’s interpretation and conclusions of law reviewed de novo).

But “we „draw our own legal conclusions from [the] facts found or implied in the judgment.‟” See id., -11 (2002) (trial court‟s interpretation and conclusions of law reviewed de novo).

424, 429 , (“[P]laintiff has the burden of proof in establishing damages ____”); ¶ 22 , (“The judge should instruct the jury to ‘find the amount of damages sustained by each beneficiary.’ ” (quoting Nunez v. Nunez, 25 Ariz.App.

Our courts have consistently construed this to mean that there is “one action for damages with one plaintiff and one judgment.” ¶ 11, (same); (stating “there is ‘one action’ for damages occasioned by a wrongful death,” and there is “but one plaintiff, one of the persons designated by statute”).

505, 508, ¶ 11 , (same); Nunez v. Nunez, 25 Ariz.App.