DocketDrift

Real-time tracking of state judicial trends.

Explore

Outcomes

Public record · Human review · No verdicts asserted

Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Waterfall Economidis v. Pima County Arizona, 99 P.3d 15.

26 citing documents.

  • State of Arizona v. Oscar Pena Trujillo 462 P.3d 550 Ariz. 2020
    n sentence based on a determination that the defendant violated his supervised release); Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013) (applying Apprendi to “any fact that increases the mandatory minimum” prison sentence); S. Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343, 348, 350, 360 (2012) (applying Apprendi to facts necessary to increase the amount of a criminal fine); ¶ 12 (2004) (holding that Apprendi applies to aggravating factors necessary to increase the range of prison sentence above th
  • State v. Kornack Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
    ¶ 6 (2003) (“A trial court has broad discretion to determine the appropriate penalty to impose upon conviction, and we will not disturb a sentence that is within statutory limits, as petitioner’s is, unless it clearly appears that the court abused its discretion.”); ¶ 11, n.3 (2004) (“the Sixth Amendment limit on judicial discretion applies only to factfinding ‘that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 4 STATE v. KORNACK Decision of the Court maximum
  • State v. Pintarich Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
    ¶ 17 (2005) ( ¶ 12 (2004)).
  • State v. Sanders Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    Finally, the State pointed out that Sanders had received a presumptive sentence, and thus no violation of Apprendi had occurred.
  • State v. Dagenais Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    “For approximately a quarter of a century, Arizona’s statutory scheme has prescribed sentencing ranges for different classes of offenses, with multiple factors determining the range that applies.” -33, ¶ 25, -62 (App. 2003), vacated on other grounds, ¶ 13
  • State v. Yazzie Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Cheramie 171 P.3d 1253 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
    ¶24 In Apprendi the United States Supreme Court held “that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution require a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, any fact that would ‘expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict’ alone.” , quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 , 120 S.Ct.
  • State v. Brown 129 P.3d 947 Ariz. 2006
    4 (McMullen) (“McMullen II”), ¶ 12, 2 We declined to address the “myriad other questions” potentially raised by Apprendi and Blakely and remanded the case to the superior court.
  • State of Arizona v. Jay David Ramsey, Sr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
  • State of Arizona v. Juan Manuel Molina Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
    (the “maximum sentence” under Apprendi is the presumptive sentence); (same, with analysis).
  • State v. Glassel 116 P.3d 1193 Ariz. 2005
    State v. Brown (McMullen), ¶ 12, (holding that, under Arizona law, the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes in a case in which no aggravating factors have been proved to a jury - 49 - beyond a reasonable doubt is the presumptive sentence).
  • State v. Fell 115 P.3d 594 Ariz. 2005
    Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny make plain “that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution require a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, any fact that would ‘expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict’ alone.” State v. Brown (McMullen), 209 Ariz. 200, 202 ¶ 7, (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494).
  • State v. Martinez 115 P.3d 618 Ariz. 2005
    State v. Brown (McMullen), 209 Ariz. 200, 203 ¶ 12
  • State v. Febles 115 P.3d 629 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
    For example, before Blakely , this court held that Apprendi did not apply to a sentence that did not exceed the “statutory maximum.” , vacated by , this court held that Apprendi did not require a jury trial to establish aggravating factors because the use of such factors did not result in a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum.
  • State v. Brown 115 P.3d 128 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
  • State v. Johnson 111 P.3d 1038 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
  • State of Arizona v. Jesus Antonio Aleman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
    Henderson, 100 P.3d at 913-14 (in Arizona, the presumptive 12 ¶23 Relying on Apprendi and Blakely, Aleman contends the trial court exceeded its authority by imposing aggravated sentences based on facts not fou
  • State v. Cleere 109 P.3d 107 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
    -14 (App.2004); n. 1 , , 459 n. 1 (App.2004).
  • State v. Estrada 108 P.3d 261 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
    See State v. Brown (McMullen), ¶ 11 , (“Section 13-702(A) allows an increase of [the] presumptive sentence to [the] maximum ...
  • State v. Alire 105 P.3d 163 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
    n. 5 , , 19 n. 5 (2004); see also Resendis-Felix, 209 Ariz. at 294, n. 1 , 100 P.3d at 459 n. 1.
  • State v. Pena 104 P.3d 873 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
    “For approximately a quarter century, Arizona’s statutory sentencing scheme has prescribed sentencing ranges for different classes of offenses, with multiple factors determining the range that applies.” -33, ¶ 25 , -62 (App.2003), vacated on other grounds, ¶ 16
  • State v. Munninger 104 P.3d 204 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
  • State v. Timmons 103 P.3d 315 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
    Further, at the time of Timmons’s sentencing, “ , *396 later vacated by our supreme court, , had ruled Apprendi inapplicable to aggravating circumstances under A.R.S.
  • State v. Gatliff 102 P.3d 981 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
  • State v. Resendis-Felix 100 P.3d 457 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
  • State v. Resendis-Felix 100 P.3d 457 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
    Resendis-Felix counters that he did not waive the claim because he could not have made a knowing waiver of his rights under Blakely before Blakely was decided; that, at the time of his sentencing, , later vacated by our supreme court, , had ruled Apprendi inapplicable to aggravating circumstances under A.R.S.