Cited by

“A court may order severance of parental rights under certain circumstances, so long as the parents whose rights are to be severed are provided with ‘fundamentally fair procedures’ that satisfy due process requirements.” ¶ 24, (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754).

When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply its plain language and need not engage in any other means of statutory interpretation.’”

Sec., ¶ 12, and by a preponderance of the evidence that severance is in the best interests of the child, ¶ 41

ld’s Best Interests ¶15 Mother next argues severance was not in Child’s best interests because Mother is “currently participating in services designed to demonstrate her sobriety and parenting abilities.” As Mother acknowledges, however, “the best interests inquiry focuses primarily upon the interests of the child, as distinct from those of the parent.” ¶ 37

Sec., ¶ 12, and a preponderance of the evidence shows that termination is in the child’s best interest, Father argues that ADES’s September 21, 2013, notice of appeal divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction to consider ADES’s motion for reconsideration filed the same day, which precludes this Court from considering ADES’s subsequent appeal from the denial of the motion for reconsideration.

Clear and convincing evidence “indicates that ‘the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain’” and “places a heavier burden upon one party to prove its case to a reasonable certainty.” -85, ¶ 25, -19 (2005).

highly probable or reasonably certain.’” -19 (2005), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 577 (7th ed. 1999).

¶¶ 22, 24 , Maricopa Cnty.

§ 8-537(B) (West 2013); -82, ¶ 7 , -16 (2005).

Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 283 ¶ 14

But if a statute’s terms are ambiguous, “‘we determine legislative intent by looking first to the text and context of the statute.’” Id., quoting Baker, 269 P.3d at 1213

“If a statute is ambiguous, such as when terms are undefined, ‘we determine legislative intent by looking first to the text and context of the statute.’” Id., ¶¶ 14-15

In balancing these interests, the court may order severance as long as it provides “fundamentally fair procedures.” ¶ 24 , (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754 , 102 S.Ct.

§ 8-533(B); On the first day of the contested severance hearing, ADES moved to amend its motion to terminate parental rights to include, as a ground for severance as to both children, that they had been in a court-ordered, out-of-home placement for nine months or longer.

¶ 24 , Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-501904

If a statute is ambiguous, such as when terms are undefined, “we determine legislative intent by looking first to the text and context of the statute.” ¶¶ 14-15