Cited by

¶ 19 (2005) (concluding that “the Sixth Amendment does not require that a jury find an aggravating circumstance before a natural life sentence can be imposed”).

But “the absence of any legislative declaration about retroactivity does not end our inquiry.” ¶ 22 (2005).

¶31 “[T]he absence of any legislative declaration about retroactivity does not end our inquiry.” ¶ 22 (2005).

§ 1-244; ¶¶ 21–23 (2005) (finding changes to sentencing circumstances a substantive change to the law requiring an express declaration of retroactivity).

¶ 18, n.7 (2005) ("an abuse of discretion will, as a practical matter, rarely be found" when court sentences defendant within statutorily authorized range); see also A.R.S.

MARTINEZ Decision of the Court ¶15 Finally, we reject Appellant’s contention the trial court erred by sentencing him to the presumptive term.5 Generally, a defendant “shall receive a specific term of imprisonment”—the presumptive—that “may be either increased or reduced based upon findings of specific aggravating or mitigating circumstances.” ¶ 13, (internal citations and quotations omitted).

rding the lack of 8 Regarding its choice between a parole-eligible and a natural life sentence for the murder conviction, the court found “the fact that [Appellant] went back and lived in [the Home] for two to three weeks to me tips the balance [to imposing natural life].” Although natural life is technically not an “aggravated” sentence that requires specific findings, ¶¶ 12-15, a court is required to “consider” the aggravating and mitigating circumstances listed in A.R.S.

“Such regulations of the mode in which the facts constituting guilt may be placed before the jury, can be made applicable to prosecutions or trials thereafter had, without reference to the date of the commission of the offence charged.” Id.; ¶ 22 , (quoting Aranda v. Indus.

¶12 In finding SB 1449 unconstitutional, P.2d 1287 (1999), P.3d 902 (App. 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 210 Ariz. 554

[7] , , support the State's contention that Chap.

-61, ¶¶ 24-25 , -01 (2005).

Shortly thereafter, the legislature enacted § 13-703.01(Q),1 thereby “restrict[ing] the application of the holding in Viramontes to those cases arising before the effective date of the new statute.” see also 2003 Ariz. Sess.

statutory interpretation[,] the burden is highest.” Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 201 ¶ 38, 68 P.3d at 427; ¶ 26, (Hurwitz, J.) (“[O]ur deference to precedent is strongest when prior decisions construe a statute.” (quoting Galloway, 205 Ariz. at 256 ¶ 16, 69 P.3d at 27)).

Even if a statute does not expressly provide for retroactivity, it may still be applied [retroactively] if merely procedural because litigants have no vested right in a given mode of procedure.” quoting Aranda v. Indus.