Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Brown, 129 P.3d 947.

36 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Dave Allen Laporte Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2026
State v. Edwards Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
State v. Edwards Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
P. 17.1(b); ¶ 15 (2006).
Wells Fargo v. Terrenate Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Wells Fargo v. Terrenate Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Perez-Tapia Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Perez-Tapia Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); ¶ 15 (2006); see also Ariz. R. Crim.
State v. Martin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Martin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶¶ 16–18 (2006) (holding that a defendant is entitled to a jury 2 STATE v. MARTIN Decision of the Court trial on the aggravating factors because he expressly reserved that right).
State v. Moreno Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Moreno Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶¶ 16-18, STATE v. MORENO Decision of the Court 947, 951 (2006) (defendant entitled to jury trial on aggravating factors because he expressly reserved right to challenge aggravating factors in plea agre
State v. Smith Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Smith Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court FILED: JT 4 Smith’s affirmed in pertinent part, is misplaced.
Rezaik v. Farmers Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Rezaik v. Farmers Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
¶ 13, (because judicial estoppel is an equitable concept, its application is within the court’s discretion and court may exercise its discretion not to apply the doctrine) (citation omitted); Flood Control Dist.
State v. Enriquez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Enriquez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶ 24, ¶ 26, (citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 297, 310 (2004)) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment right to jury trial with respect to an aggravating factor necessary to impose a sentence remains inviolate unless .
State v. Kummer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Kummer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
ight to a jury determination of the facts beyond a reasonable doubt, [Kummer] was not advised of his constitutional rights.” A defendant has the constitutional right to have “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum,” including allegations of aggravating circumstances, “‘submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’” ¶ 19, (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 4 STATE v. KUMMER Decision of the Court (2000)).
State of Arizona v. Manuel Ovante, Jr. 291 P.3d 974 Ariz. 2013
State of Arizona v. Manuel Ovante, Jr. 291 P.3d 974 Ariz. 2013
¶ 26, 129 (citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004)).
Flood Control District v. Paloma Investment Ltd. Partnership 279 P.3d 1191 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
Flood Control District v. Paloma Investment Ltd. Partnership 279 P.3d 1191 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
State v. MENDOZA-TAPIA 273 P.3d 676 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
State v. MENDOZA-TAPIA 273 P.3d 676 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
¶ 28 , (if jury finds one statutorily enumerated aggravating factor, defendant exposed to maximum punishment).
State v. Innes 260 P.3d 1110 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
State v. Innes 260 P.3d 1110 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
¶ 15 , Bu-trick, 113 Ariz. at 565-66 , 558 P.2d at 910-11 .
State v. Baker 170 P.3d 727 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Baker 170 P.3d 727 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
¶¶ 26, 29 , (remanding for a sentencing hearing because *123 defendant did not appropriately waive his right to a jury trial on aggravating factors); , (reversing and remanding for new trial because record did not affirmatively
Picaso v. Tucson Unified School District 154 P.3d 364 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
Picaso v. Tucson Unified School District 154 P.3d 364 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
(“ 'Judicial estoppel is an equitable concept, and its application is therefore within the court’s discretion.” '), quoting 31 C.J.S.
State of Arizona v. Cesar Francisco Rubiano 150 P.3d 271 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
State of Arizona v. Cesar Francisco Rubiano 150 P.3d 271 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711 (1969) (record must show guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made); Kercheval, 274 U.S. at 223, 47 S. Ct. at 583 (“[A] plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the 8 consequences.”); (same); see also Ariz. R. Crim.
Scott Douglas Nordstrom v. State of Arizona 142 P.3d 1247 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
Scott Douglas Nordstrom v. State of Arizona 142 P.3d 1247 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
¶¶ 14-18, (pre-Blakely waiver of jury trial did not waive the right to a jury determination of aggravating circumstances).
State v. Dettman 719 N.W.2d 644 Minn. 2006