Cited by

order) (vacating the court of appeals’ holding that the DCAC statute applied to a defendant convicted of luring who had targeted an officer posing as a minor under the age of fifteen); ¶ 13 (2006) (relying on “[t]he use of the phrase ‘the minor’ in subsection (C)” to conclude that subsection (A) “is violated only when an actual minor is lured” “unless subsection (B) applies”); ¶ 3 (App. 2011) (“[I]t is immaterial that Villegas believed he was targeting a fo

“If a defendant can admit to all the allegations charged in the indictment and still not have committed a crime, then the indictment is insufficient as a matter of law.” ¶ 4 (2006).

more properly focused on section (R) of the statute, which distinguishes between completed/first degree offenses and preparatory/second degree offenses, as opposed to section (T) which defines dangerous crimes against children as those listed and which were committed against a minor who was under fifteen years of age.” And because luring under § 13-3554 is a completed offense, the respondent concluded that § 13-705(S) does not apply.

¶ 18 (2006) (acknowledging that “the crime [of luring] is complete when a person offers or solicits sexual conduct with a minor,” without defining when a separate and distinct luring crime begins).

¶ 9 (2006) (holding courts must interpret statutes “so that no provision is rendered meaningless, insignificant, or void”).

and still not have committed a crime.” ¶ 4 (2006).

“As the name implies, a preparatory offense is committed in preparation for committing a completed crime.” ¶ 18 (2006).

See, ¶ 9, (applying the principle of interpreting a document “so that no provision is rendered meaningless, insignificant, or void[,]” to interpretation of a statute); Aztar Corp. v. U.S. Fire Ins.

n.1 , , 875 n.1 (2006) (under previous version of statute limiting completed offense of luring to minors and peace officers posing as such, defendant could not be charged with luring reporter posing as minor).

A preparatory offense is one committed “in preparation for committing a completed crime.” ¶ 18 (2006).

Attempt requires only that the defendant intend to engage in illegal conduct and that he take a step to further that conduct.” ¶ 20

Our first step is to look at the language of the statute as it is the “best indicator of that intent.” ¶ 8

We do not interpret any words in a statute to be meaningless or trivial, but rather give operation and effect to each one.

§ 13-1001(A)(2) (attempt encompasses “any step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in commission of an offense”); (“an attempt to commit an offense does not require that all the elements be present for the commission of the offense,” but “requires only that the defendant intend to engage in illegal conduct and that he take a step to further that conduct”); 669 P.2d

¶15 “An attempt is substantively different from a completed crime” and “requires only that the defendant intend to engage in illegal conduct and that he take a step to further that conduct.” ¶ 20, (citing A.R.S.

“If a defendant can admit to all the allegations charged in the [complaint] and still not have committed a crime, then the [complaint] is insufficient as a matter of law.” ¶ 4

¶¶ 12-15 , -77 (2006) (irrespective of defendant’s subjective belief, under previous version of luring statute, defendant cannot be charged with completed offense if victim neither child nor peace officer), superseded by statute, 2007 Ariz. Sess.

¶ 8 , (“When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court need go no further to ascertain the legislative intent.”).