Cited by

¶ 10 (2022); ¶ 5 (2024), and unless ambiguous, apply it without resorting to other means of textual construction, ¶ 6 (2008); In re Drummond, 257 Ariz at 18, ¶ 5.

“When the language of a provision is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without resorting to other means of constitutional construction.” ¶ 6 (2008).

“When the language of a provision is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without resorting to other means of constitutional construction.” ¶ 6 (2008).

“Ambiguity occurs when uncertainty exists about the meaning or interpretation of a provision’s terms.” ¶ 6 (2008) (citing Hayes v. Cont’l Ins.

cf. Heath v. Kiger , , 495 ¶ 12, , 693 (2008) ("[C]ourts should avoid hypertechnical constructions that frustrate legislative intent."

¶22 While consideration of the history and purpose of the AMMA is not necessary to apply its plain language, ¶ 9 (2008) (), an construed together as though they constitute one law.”) ( ¶ 10 (App. 2005)); see also A.R.S.

A defendant like Morreno who was released on his own recognizance on a prior charge “has been ‘admitted to bail’ for purposes of [the On-Release provision].” ¶ 1 (2008).

The AMMA’s purpose is “to protect patients with debilitating medical conditions, as well as their physicians and providers, from arrest and prosecution, criminal and other penalties and property forfeiture if such patients engage in the medical use of marijuana.” Arizona Publicity Pamphlet, Ballot Propositions & Judicial Performance Review 73 (2010); (“To determine the intent of the electorate, courts may also look to the publicity pamphlet distributed at the time of the election.”).

We interpret constitutional provisions by determining the “‘intent of the electorate that adopted it.’” See Lee, 245 P.3d at 922

497, ¶ 16, , 695 (2008).

To determine the meaning of a constitutional provision, we must determine “„the intent of the electorate that adopted it.‟”