Cited by

¶ 44 (2010) (holding that a decision would not be retroactive if it would produce substantially inequitable results).

A. Public Purpose ¶20 Our Supreme Court has adopted a “broad view” of the public purpose requirement in the Gift Clause context, and has “repeatedly emphasized that the primary determination of whether a specific purpose constitutes a ‘public purpose’ is assigned to the political branches of government, which are directly accountable to the public.” ¶ 28 (2010).

l’s request to prohibit CDC from exercising its power to litigate necessarily includes a request to prohibit payment for such litigation.” Id.; see also Fund Manager, 161 Ariz. at 354–55 (explaining that the Attorney General “is acting pursuant to a specific grant of statutory authority” in challenging constitutionality of statute that entails improper expenditure of funds); ¶ 22 (2010) (holding that, in the context of the constitution’s gift clause, a “forbidden subsidy” is demonstrated by the

xpenditure will be upheld if (1) it has a public purpose and (2) the consideration the governmental entity receives “is not grossly disproportionate to the amounts paid to the private 5 SCHIRES, et al. v. CARLAT, et al. Decision of the Court entity.” Cheatham, 240 Ariz. at 318 ¶ 10 ( 348 ¶¶ 7, 22 (2010)).

¶ 10 (2010); (applying prior-construction canon); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 322–23 (2012) (discussing prior-construction canon).

–52 ¶¶ 44–49 (2010) (prospective application is appropriate when a ruling overturns settled precedent, establishes a new legal principle, or would produce inequitable results if retroactively applied).

In doing so, we frequently may find that our constitution provides greater protections of individual liberty and constraints on government power because of provisions that do not exist in its national counterpart, see, –49 ¶¶ 10–22 (2010) (analyzing the “Gift Clause” under article 9, section 7 of the Arizona Constitution which forbids corporate subsides), or because we more strictly construe such protections that exist in both constitutions.

348 ¶ 22, Wistuber, 141 Ariz. at 349 , 687 P.2d at 357 .

¶ 11-12, (describing commonalities between Gift and Taxation Clauses).

See Ariz. Const. art. 10, §§ 1-11 (prescribing management of state trust lands); ¶ 23, 349 ¶ 29, 165 (2010) (acknowledging that city council could 8 reasonably conclude increased tax base benefits public).