Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Carrillo v. Houser, 232 P.3d 1245.

33 citing documents.

State v. Mitcham 535 P.3d 948 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
State v. Mitcham 535 P.3d 948 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
§ 28-1321(A) (implied consent law); ¶ 1 (2010).
Diaz v. Hon. bernini/state/tucson City Prosecutor 435 P.3d 457 Ariz. 2019
Diaz v. Hon. bernini/state/tucson City Prosecutor 435 P.3d 457 Ariz. 2019
The purpose of § 28-1321 is to “remove from Arizona highways those drivers who may be a menace to themselves and others because of intoxication.” ¶ 13 (2010) (quoting Sherrill v. Dep’t of Transp., ).
State of Arizona v. Courtney Noelle Weakland 434 P.3d 578 Ariz. 2019
State of Arizona v. Courtney Noelle Weakland 434 P.3d 578 Ariz. 2019
In doing so, we rejected the argument that continued use of the admin per se admonition reflected "recurring or systemic negligence" in the wake of Carrillo v. Houser
Soza v. Marner 430 P.3d 1265 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
Soza v. Marner 430 P.3d 1265 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
¶ 11 A decade later, in Carrillo v. Houser , , ¶ 4, our supreme court revisited the implied consent statutes, concluding that § 28-1321"generally does not authorize law enforcement officers to administer [a] test without a warrant unless the arrestee expressly agrees to the test."
Drunasky v. Adot Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Drunasky v. Adot Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
§ 28– 1321(A); –64 ¶ 2 (2010).
Diaz v. Bernini 419 P.3d 950 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
Diaz v. Bernini 419 P.3d 950 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
Carrillo v. Houser , , ¶ 19
State v. Weakland 418 P.3d 446 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
State v. Weakland 418 P.3d 446 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
Citing Carrillo v. Houser , , she contends our courts had "established that the admin per se warning misstated the law" and that allowing the state to rely on the exception in view of that uncertainty in the law would "incentivize rather than deter unlawful police behavior."
State v. Don Jacob Havatone 389 P.3d 1251 Ariz. 2017
State v. Don Jacob Havatone 389 P.3d 1251 Ariz. 2017
465-66 ¶ 13, -48 (2010); see also McNeely, 133 S.Ct.
Brown v. McClennen ex rel. County of Maricopa 373 P.3d 538 Ariz. 2016
State of Arizona v. Francisco L Encinas Valenzuela 371 P.3d 627 Ariz. 2016
Jason S Brown v. Hon. mcclennen/state Ariz. 2016
Jason S Brown v. Hon. mcclennen/state Ariz. 2016
¶ 19, (interpreting the implied consent law for motorists).
Brown v. McClennen ex rel. County of Maricopa 373 P.3d 538 Ariz. 2016
467 ¶ 19, (interpreting the implied consent law for motorists).
State of Arizona v. Francisco L Encinas Valenzuela 371 P.3d 627 Ariz. 2016
Nevertheless, “the statute generally does not authorize law enforcement officers to administer the test without a warrant unless the [operator] expressly agrees to the test.” , 463 ¶ 1
State v. Okken 364 P.3d 485 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Okken 364 P.3d 485 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶ 12 But “[t]he ‘consent’ by motorists referenced in subsection (A) does not always authorize warrantless testing of arrestees.” ¶ 10
State v. Havatone Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Havatone Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Nissley 362 P.3d 493 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
SVENDSEN v. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 323 P.3d 1179 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
SVENDSEN v. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 323 P.3d 1179 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
Although express agreement may be given by “words or conduct,” “[f]ailing to actively resist or vocally object to a test does not itself constitute express agreement.” -49 (2010).
State of Arizona v. Hon. butler/tyler B. 302 P.3d 609 Ariz. 2013
State of Arizona v. Hon. butler/tyler B. 302 P.3d 609 Ariz. 2013
State of Arizona v. Tyler B. 290 P.3d 435 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
State of Arizona v. Tyler B. 290 P.3d 435 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
¶¶ 11, 18, 1248 (2010) (“[A]n arrestee’s failure to expressly agree constitutes a refusal,” and “[t]he implied consent .