Young v. Beck

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc

AMY YOUNG, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CV-10-0230-PR
Plaintiff/Appellee, )
) Court of Appeals
v. ) Division One
) No. 1 CA-CV 09-0188
KENNETH L. BECK and BARBARA BECK, )
husband and wife, ) Maricopa County
) Superior Court
Defendants/Appellants. ) Nos. CV2007-015269
) CV2007-015556
)
) O P I N I O N
__________________________________)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Glenn M. Davis, Judge

AFFIRMED
________________________________________________________________

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One
224 Ariz. 408, 231 P.3d 940 (App. 2010)

AFFIRMED
________________________________________________________________

BEALE MICHEAELS & SLACK PC Phoenix
By K. Thomas Slack
Tracy Gromer
Attorney for Amy Young

EHMANN DECIANCIO PLLC Tempe
By Joel DeCiancio
Christopher Robbins

And

DIANE M. LUCAS PC Phoenix
By Diane M. Lucas
Michael S. Ferraro
Attorneys for Kenneth L. Beck and Barbara Beck

HUMPHREY & PETERSEN PC Tucson
By Andrew J. Petersen
Attorney for Amicus Curiae Arizona Association of Defense
Counsel

HARALSON MILLER PITT FELDMAN & MCANALLY PLC Tucson
By Stanley G. Feldman

And

GALLAGHER & KENNEDY P A Phoenix
By C. Lincoln Combs
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Arizona Association for Justice
and Arizona Trial Lawyers Association
________________________________________________________________

P E L A N D E R, Justice

¶1 We adopted the family purpose doctrine nearly a

century ago in Benton v. Regeser, 20 Ariz. 273, 179 P. 966

(1919). In this case we address its continued validity and

application. We consider whether the Legislature has

statutorily abrogated the doctrine and, if not, whether this

Court should abolish it. Finally, we consider whether the

doctrine was properly applied in this case.

I.

¶2 The material facts are not in dispute. Kenneth and

Barbara Beck furnished a sport utility vehicle to their

seventeen-year-old son, Jason. He was the primary driver of

that vehicle and used it for travel to and from school, church,

and work. With his parents’ permission, Jason could also drive

the vehicle for social and recreational purposes. After Jason

was involved in an accident while driving the vehicle, however,

2

the Becks specifically instructed him not to “taxi” his friends

or drive their girlfriends home.

¶3 About a month later, Jason asked to use the vehicle to

drive to a friend’s house after work. Jason’s mother permitted

him to do so, with the understanding that Jason would drive to

his friend’s house, spend the night there, and then drive home

the next day. Jason did not request or receive permission to

use the vehicle for any other purpose.

¶4 After going to his friend’s house, however, Jason

drove around with several friends as they threw eggs at houses

and parked cars. Jason then drove his friend’s girlfriend home,

and while on his way to drop off another friend, collided with a

vehicle driven by Amy Young, who was seriously injured.

¶5 Young sued Jason and also named the Becks as

defendants, alleging they were liable for Jason’s negligence

under the family purpose doctrine. On cross-motions for summary

judgment regarding the doctrine’s applicability, the superior

court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Young. The

parties later entered into a “high-low” settlement, under which

the Becks agreed to pay Young one of two specified damage

amounts, depending on whether the summary judgment ruling was

affirmed or reversed on appeal.

¶6 In the court of appeals, the Becks argued that the

family purpose doctrine did not apply because Jason violated

3

their restriction against “transporting of friends.” Young v.

Beck, 224 Ariz. 408, 411 ¶ 11, 231 P.3d 940, 943 (App. 2010).

Alternatively, the Becks contended that the doctrine should be

abolished. Id. at 413 ¶ 19, 231 P.3d at 945. The court of

appeals rejected those arguments and affirmed the superior

court’s ruling, holding the Becks vicariously liable for Jason’s

negligence. Id. at 412-14 ¶¶ 15, 19, 22, 231 P.3d at 944-46.

¶7 We granted review because the continued vitality of

the family purpose doctrine is of statewide importance. We have

jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona

Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-

120.24 (2003).

II.

¶8 The family purpose doctrine “subjects the owner of a

[vehicle] to vicarious liability when the owner provides an

automobile for the general use by members of the family . . .

and when the vehicle is so used by a family member.” Dan B.

Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 340, at 935 (2001); see also Young,

224 Ariz. at 410 ¶ 8, 231 P.3d at 942 (“[Under the doctrine,] a

head of household who furnishes or maintains a vehicle for the

use, pleasure, and convenience of the family is liable for the

negligence of family members who have the general authority to

drive the vehicle while it is used for family purposes.”); Brown

v. Stogsdill, 140 Ariz. 485, 487, 682 P.2d 1152, 1154 (App.

4

1984) (same).

¶9 This Court adopted the doctrine in Benton, which

upheld a judgment holding a parent vicariously liable for his

minor son’s negligent driving. Finding the doctrine supported

by “sound reason” and “the great weight of authority,” we framed

the rule as follows:

[A parent] who furnishes an automobile for the
pleasure and convenience of the members of his family
makes the use of the machine for the above purposes
his affair or business, and . . . any member of the
family driving the machine with the [parent’s]
consent, either express or implied, is the [parent’s]
agent.

Benton, 20 Ariz. at 278, 179 P. at 968.

III.

¶10 Arizona courts have applied the family purpose

doctrine in various contexts in the nine decades since Benton.

See A.R.S. § 1-201 (stating, with certain qualifications, “[t]he

common law . . . is adopted and shall be the rule of decision in

all courts of this state”). The Becks argue, however, that the

Legislature abrogated the doctrine by amending the Uniform

Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (“UCATA”), A.R.S. § 12-2506,

in 1987. See 1987 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 1, § 2 (1st Reg.

Sess.). As amended, UCATA abolishes joint and several liability

in most circumstances and establishes a system of comparative

fault, making “each tortfeasor responsible for paying his or her

percentage of fault and no more.” State Farm Ins. Cos. v.

5

Premier Manufactured Sys., Inc., 217 Ariz. 222, 225 ¶ 12, 172

P.3d 410, 413 (2007) (quoting Dietz v. Gen. Elec. Co., 169 Ariz.

505, 510, 821 P.2d 166, 171 (1991)). Section 12-2506(A)

provides as follows:

In an action for personal injury, property damage or
wrongful death, the liability of each defendant for
damages is several only and is not joint, except as
otherwise provided in this section.

¶11 Section 12-2506(D) sets forth three exceptions to

UCATA’s general rule of several-only liability:

The liability of each defendant is several only and is
not joint, except that a party is responsible for the
fault of another person, or for payment of the
proportionate share of another person, if any of the
following applies:

1. Both the party and the other person were acting in
concert.

2. The other person was acting as an agent or servant
of the party.

3. The party’s liability for the fault of another
person arises out of a duty created by the federal
employers’ liability act, 45 United States Code § 51.

¶12 Citing § 12-2506(D)(2), the Becks argue that “the

family purpose doctrine can survive under UCATA only if family

members are agents or servants of the head of the family,” and

“Jason was not the agent, employee, or servant of his parents.”

They contend that, although Benton initially based the doctrine

on an agency concept, Arizona courts have since repudiated the

doctrine’s agency foundation.

6

¶13 We generally do not find that a statute changes common

law unless “the legislature . . . clearly and plainly

manifest[s] an intent” to have the statute do so. Wyatt v.

Wehmueller, 167 Ariz. 281, 284, 806 P.2d 870, 873 (1991); see

also Pleak v. Entrada Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 207 Ariz. 418, 422

¶ 12, 87 P.3d 831, 835 (2004) (“Absent a clear manifestation of

legislative intent to abrogate the common law, we interpret

statutes with every intendment in favor of consistency with the

common law.”) (quotation omitted). This approach “encourages

legislators to avoid leaving something as important as the

existence or nonexistence of common-law rights to inference or

implication.” Hayes v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 274, 872

P.2d 668, 678 (1994).

¶14 Our court of appeals has often noted that the family

purpose doctrine departs from traditional agency law.1 See

Young, 224 Ariz. at 411 ¶ 12, 231 P.3d at 943 (“The doctrine has

never purported to rely on a true agency relationship.”);

1
For example, under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, “the
head of a household who permits members of the family to use his
automobile is not liable for such use except when members use it
on his affairs and as his servants.” Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 238 cmt. c (1958); cf. Reed v. Hinderland, 135 Ariz.
213, 219, 660 P.2d 464, 470 (1983) (rejecting former rule that
“mere ownership of a vehicle raised a presumption that the
driver is the agent or servant of the owner,” and holding that
“mere presence of the owner in an automobile driven by another
does not create any presumption of a master-servant
relationship”).

7

Jacobson v. Superior Court (Steinhoff), 154 Ariz. 430, 431, 743

P.2d 410, 411 (App. 1987) (observing that the doctrine’s

“insecure[]” grounding “in agency principles . . . is the purest

of fictions”); Pesqueira v. Talbot, 7 Ariz. App. 476, 479, 441

P.2d 73, 76 (App. 1968) (noting “the agency for pleasure

precepts of the family purpose doctrine do not square with

established principles of agency law”) (quotation omitted).

¶15 But when we adopted the doctrine in Benton, we did so

on the premise that “any member of the family driving the

machine with the father’s consent, either express or implied, is

the father’s agent,” and we held that “the minor son was the

agent of his father in driving the [family vehicle] at the time

of the accident.” 20 Ariz. at 278-79, 179 P. at 968.

Similarly, in Mortensen v. Knight, we noted that “the family

purpose doctrine is the settled law of this jurisdiction” and

that “[a]gency, not ownership, is the test of liability.” 81

Ariz. 325, 332, 333, 305 P.2d 463, 468 (1956).

¶16 In view of this history and the express exception in

§ 12-2506(D)(2) for “agent or servant” relationships, we cannot

conclude that the Legislature intended to abolish the family

purpose doctrine when it amended UCATA in 1987, abolishing joint

and several liability. Certainly nothing in UCATA manifestly

indicates such a legislative intent. Nor is it clear that § 12-

2506(D) prescribes an exclusive list of situations in which

8

vicarious liability (as contrasted with joint and several

liability) may be imposed.

¶17 In Wiggs v. City of Phoenix, we noted that “[j]oint

liability and vicarious liability are related but separate

doctrines,” and that “[t]he joint liability that was abolished

by A.R.S. § 12-2506[] was limited to that class of joint

tortfeasors whose independent negligence coalesced to form a

single injury.” 198 Ariz. 367, 371 ¶ 13, 10 P.3d 625, 629

(2000). We therefore concluded that UCATA did not abolish the

common-law, non-delegable duty doctrine, which imposes vicarious

liability on an employer in certain circumstances for an

independent contractor’s negligence. Id. at ¶ 14. Noting that

parties whose liability is only vicarious “have no fault to

allocate,” we interpreted the “agent or servant” provision in

§ 12-2506(D)(2) as simply making “express that which is

implicit—the statute does not affect the doctrine of vicarious

liability.” Id. at ¶ 13. Because the family purpose doctrine

is a form of vicarious liability, Wiggs strongly suggests that

the Legislature did not abolish the doctrine in UCATA.

¶18 Premier Manufactured Systems, on which the Becks rely,

does not alter that conclusion. Premier concluded that

defendants against whom strict product liability was alleged

could not be held jointly and severally liable after UCATA’s

1987 amendment. 217 Ariz. at 224 ¶ 1, 172 P.3d at 412. We

9

distinguished Wiggs, reasoning that in strict product liability

actions, “the various participants in the chain of distribution

are liable not for the actions of others, but rather for their

own actions in distributing the defective product.” Id. at 226

¶ 20, 172 P.3d at 414.

¶19 In contrast, the family purpose doctrine imputes

liability not because of the head of the family’s independent

fault or breach of a legal duty, but because of “the agency

relationship that is deemed to exist between the head of the

household and the driver of the family car.” Camper v. Minor,

915 S.W.2d 437, 448 (Tenn. 1996) (concluding that statute

abolishing joint and several liability did not abrogate the

family purpose doctrine); see also Jacobson, 154 Ariz. at 433,

743 P.2d at 413 (noting that the “doctrine does not rest on a

classical theory of agency” but rather serves “a practical

purpose” of “provid[ing] reparation for an injured party from

the closest financially responsible party to the wrongdoing

minor”). Thus, UCATA’s 1987 amendment did not abrogate the

family purpose doctrine.

¶20 We also reject the Becks’ contention that the

Legislature preempted the family purpose doctrine in the

Financial Responsibility Act, which requires all vehicle owners

to carry liability insurance and all policies to provide

liability coverage for not only the owner but also all

10

permissive drivers. See A.R.S. §§ 28-4009, -4135. As the court

of appeals correctly observed, that Act contains no “language

indicating legislative intent to abrogate, replace, preempt, or

limit the family purpose doctrine.” Young, 224 Ariz. at 414

¶ 20, 231 P.3d at 946. Requiring all Arizona vehicle owners to

carry liability insurance coverage with minimum limits is not

inconsistent with imposing vicarious liability under the family

purpose doctrine. Cf. Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hartley, 204

Ariz. 596, 597 ¶¶ 1, 5, 65 P.3d 977, 978 (App. 2003) (holding

that A.R.S. § 28-3160, which imputes certain driving misconduct

of a minor to the person who signs the minor’s driving

application, did not abrogate or limit liability arising under

family purpose doctrine).

IV.

¶21 We next consider the Becks’ argument that this Court

should abandon the family purpose doctrine. The Becks contend

the doctrine lacks a viable legal basis or public policy

justification, is “grossly unfair to any parent [of] a young

driver,” and functions as “solely a penalty against wealthy

parents.”

¶22 “Just as the common law is court-made law based on the

circumstances and conditions of the time, so can the common law

be changed by the court when conditions and circumstances

change.” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 152 Ariz. 9, 17

11

n.21, 730 P.2d 186, 194 n.21 (1986) (quoting Fernandez v. Romo,

132 Ariz. 447, 449, 646 P.2d 878, 880 (1982)); see also Estate

of DeSela v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, CV-10-0172-PR,

2011 WL 134917, at *4 ¶ 15 (Ariz. Jan. 18, 2011) (noting that

“the common law should adapt when circumstances make it no

longer just or consistent with sound policy”). But stare

decisis commands that “precedents of the court should not

lightly be overruled,” and mere disagreement with those who

preceded us is not enough. State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399,

416, 844 P.2d 566, 583 (1992) (quoting State v. Crowder, 155

Ariz. 477, 483, 747 P.2d 1176, 1182 (1987) (Moeller, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Rather, “[w]e will

overturn long-standing precedent only for a compelling reason.”

State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147, 159 ¶ 52, 140 P.3d 930, 942

(2006); see also White v. Bateman, 89 Ariz. 110, 113, 358 P.2d

712, 714 (1961) (noting our prior case law “should be adhered to

unless the reasons of the prior decisions have ceased to exist

or the prior decision was clearly erroneous or manifestly

wrong”).

¶23 Whatever the original soundness of the family purpose

doctrine’s use of agency principles, “it is now usually

recognized that the doctrine represents a social policy

generated in response to the problem presented by massive use of

the automobile.” Dobbs, § 340, at 935. The doctrine’s primary

12

justification is to provide “for an injured party’s recovery

from the financially responsible person—the family head—deemed

most able to control to whom the car is made available.”

Jacobson, 154 Ariz. at 431, 743 P.2d at 411; see also Young, 224

Ariz. at 410 ¶ 8, 231 P.3d at 942 (same). As Benton explained,

when a vehicle “is placed in the hands of his family by a

[parent], for the family’s pleasure, comfort, and entertainment,

. . . justice should require that the owner should be

responsible for its negligent operation.” 20 Ariz. at 278, 179

P. at 968 (quotations omitted).

¶24 The Becks contend that the doctrine’s compensatory

purpose was rendered moot by the Financial Responsibility Act.

See A.R.S. §§ 28-4009, -4135. Just as we are not persuaded that

those statutes abrogated the family purpose doctrine, see supra

¶ 20, we also are not convinced that a law requiring minimum

liability coverage of only $15,000 per person and $30,000 per

occurrence guarantees that victims of serious accidents caused

by young, inexperienced, and financially insecure drivers will

be fully compensated.2 Nor is it clear that the doctrine’s

2
The Becks also point out that motorists may now protect
themselves by purchasing uninsured (UM) and underinsured (UIM)
coverage in their automobile insurance policies. See A.R.S.
§ 20-259.01. In originally enacting and repeatedly amending the
UM/UIM statute, however, the Legislature never mentioned, let
alone expressed a clear intent to abrogate, the family purpose
doctrine.

13

policy goals of providing compensation to such accident victims

and encouraging parents to ensure that their children operate

motor vehicles safely and obediently are any less important

today than ninety-two years ago. See, e.g., People v. Badke,

865 N.Y.S.2d 488, 494 (Suffolk County Ct. 2008) (“The loss of

life resulting from inexperienced teen drivers is a national

problem of epidemic proportions.”).

¶25 The Becks also describe the doctrine as an

“anachronism” that a “great majority” of jurisdictions have

rejected. A number of courts (but none recently) have declined

to adopt the family purpose doctrine.3 But many states continue

to apply the doctrine either as a matter of common law4 or

3
See, e.g., Watkins v. Clark, 176 P. 131, 131 (Kan. 1918)
(punishing defendant/parent under family purpose doctrine is not
justified because a car is “not a dangerous instrumentality
which the defendant let loose in the community”); Jones v.
Knapp, 156 A. 399, 401 (Vt. 1931) (refusing to apply doctrine
because such liability must depend on “settled common-law
principles of master and servant or principal and agent”); Sare
v. Stetz, 214 P.2d 486, 494 (Wyo. 1950) (declining to adopt
doctrine because of its divergence from “clearly established”
agency rules and noting that policy was better left to the
legislature).
4
Fourteen states, including Arizona, currently recognize a
common-law family purpose doctrine. See Hasegawa v. Day, 684
P.2d 936, 939 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983), overruled on other grounds,
Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1992); Cogan v. Chase
Manhattan Auto Fin. Corp., 882 A.2d 597, 602 (Conn. 2005); Cox
v. Rewis, 429 S.E.2d 314, 316 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Keeney v.
Smith, 521 S.W.2d 242, 243 (Ky. 1975); Leonard v. Wilson, 468
N.W.2d 604, 606 (Neb. 1991); Madrid v. Shryock, 745 P.2d 375,
377 (N.M. 1987); Loy v. Martin, 577 S.E.2d 407, 410 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2003); Malchose v. Kalfell, 664 N.W.2d 508, 513 (N.D.

14

through statutes holding parents liable for the negligent

driving of their children.5 Thus, contrary to the Becks’

assertion, Arizona is neither alone nor clinging to an

antiquated doctrine.

¶26 We are not here “writing on a clean slate,” but rather

on an established common law backdrop. See State v. Lara, 171

Ariz. 282, 285, 830 P.2d 803, 806 (1992). Nor has the family

purpose doctrine “been eroded by the development of Arizona’s

common law.” Estate of DeSela, 2011 WL 134917, at *3 ¶ 11. If

2003); Barber v. George, 927 P.2d 140, 141 (Or. Ct. App. 1996);
Thompson v. Michael, 433 S.E.2d 853, 855 (S.C. 1993); Camper,
915 S.W.2d at 447-48; Kaynor v. Farline, 72 P.3d 262, 270 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2003); Ward v. Baker, 425 S.E.2d 245, 249-50 (W.Va.
1993). In Florida, an automobile owner is vicariously liable
for damages caused by any permissive user. See Hertz Corp. v.
Jackson, 617 So.2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1992).
5
At least nine jurisdictions have a statutory version of the
doctrine or a broader law that imposes vicarious liability on
vehicle owners for the negligence of all permissive users. See
Cal. Veh. Code § 17708 (West 2010) (holding parents or guardians
jointly and severally liable for negligence of minor drivers);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 6105 (West 2010) (holding owner of
vehicle liable for damages caused by permissive driver who is a
minor); D.C. Code § 50-1301.08 (2010) (holding owner of vehicle
liable for negligence of any permissive user); Iowa Code
§ 321.493(2)(a) (2010) (same); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186.590(3)
(West 2010) (holding owner liable for negligence of any
permissive user who is a minor); Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.401(1)
(West 2010) (holding owner liable for negligence of any
permissive user and family members are presumed to be permissive
users); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 169.09(5a) (West 2010) (holding owner
liable for negligence of all permissive users); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 41.440 (2010) (holding owner of vehicle jointly liable for
negligence of any family member using car with permission); N.Y.
Veh. & Traf. Law § 388(1) (McKinney 2005) (holding owner liable
for negligence of any permissive user).

15

the Legislature wants to abrogate the doctrine, it may do so

explicitly. Cf. Galloway v. Vanderpool, 205 Ariz. 252, 257

¶ 19, 69 P.3d 23, 28 (2003) (recognizing that Legislature can

amend statutes and is an “appropriate forum to argue that public

policy considerations favor abandoning the rule announced” in

prior court decisions).

¶27 In sum, although policy arguments can be made for and

against the doctrine, it is firmly entrenched in our common law

and has been repeatedly applied by Arizona courts. Given the

doctrine’s long history, social utility in compensating injured

victims, and conflicting policy considerations, we find no

compelling reason to abrogate the doctrine. Nothing indicates

that the rule has overburdened our courts or produced manifestly

unjust results.

V.

¶28 Finally, we consider the Becks’ argument that the

superior court misapplied the doctrine because, on the

undisputed facts, summary judgment should have been entered for

them instead of Young. Liability under the doctrine arises

(1) when there is a head of the family, (2) who maintains or

furnishes a vehicle for the general use, pleasure, and

convenience of the family, and (3) a family member uses the

vehicle with the family head’s express or implied permission for

a family purpose. Brown, 140 Ariz. at 487, 682 P.2d at 1154;

16

Pesqueira, 7 Ariz. App. at 480, 441 P.2d at 77.

¶29 The first two requirements are not at issue here. The

Becks contend, however, that Jason’s use of the vehicle when the

accident occurred was neither “for a family purpose” nor with

their “express or implied permission.” The Becks argue that,

“[i]f the individual ‘pleasure and convenience’ of the driver is

a ‘family purpose,’ then the element of ‘family purpose’ is

rendered meaningless.” According to the Becks, the doctrine

does not apply as a matter of law because Jason was driving the

vehicle for his own pleasure and convenience and in violation of

their specific restrictions on its use. We disagree.

¶30 In Benton, we held that the doctrine applied because,

when the accident occurred, the defendant’s son was driving the

family vehicle “in the very business for which the [parent] kept

and maintained the vehicle, viz., the pleasure and convenience

of the members of [the] family.” 20 Ariz. at 278, 179 P. at

968. The doctrine does not require that the vehicle be

furnished for a parental or communal errand. See Brown, 140

Ariz. at 489, 682 P.2d at 1156 (“[T]he fact that the

[driver/son] was using the vehicle solely for his own purpose

and pleasure at the time of the accident would not automatically

rule out the application of the family purpose doctrine.”);

Pesqueira, 7 Ariz. App. at 481, 441 P.2d at 78 (holding that

daughter who was involved in accident while traveling to and

17

from work was serving a family purpose). Rather, when a car is

driven for the pleasure and convenience of a family member, a

family purpose generally is served. See, e.g., Cohen v.

Whiteman, 43 S.E.2d 184, 187 (Ga. Ct. App. 1947) (concluding

doctrine could apply when son was using family car for his own

“pleasure and comfort”); Gray v. Amos, 869 S.W.2d 925, 927-28

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (same); William L. Prosser, The Law of

Torts 484-85 (4th ed. 1971) (noting “family purpose” includes

“mere driving for the pleasure of an individual” family member).

¶31 Moreover, the doctrine does not require that a parent

give permission for every possible route taken or deviation made

by a family member while operating the vehicle. See, e.g.,

Driver v. Smith, 339 S.W.2d 135, 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959)

(holding doctrine could apply when daughter, at time of

accident, disobeyed parents’ instruction not to drive outside

city limits); Jennings v. Campbell, 6 N.W.2d 376, 379-80 (Neb.

1942) (holding doctrine does not require plaintiff to prove that

driver of family car had owner’s authority to drive at exact

time and place of accident). Therefore, a deviation from the

terms of consent will not necessarily relieve a head of the

family from liability. See Evans v. Caldwell, 190 S.E. 582, 583

(Ga. 1937) (noting that when the general purpose for which

family vehicle is furnished is for family member’s convenience

and enjoyment, with parent’s express or implied permission,

18

parent’s limitation on vehicle’s use “to a particular

destination and return . . . is not a limitation on the purpose

for which the car is being used”).

¶32 To hold otherwise would enable parents to immunize

themselves from liability by imposing general, unrealistic, or

unenforced limitations on their child’s use of the vehicle. See

Driver, 339 S.W.2d at 143 (“[I]f at the time of the accident it

should be assumed that [the daughter/driver] was exceeding her

authorized speed limit certainly it could not be contended that

such disobedience relieved the father of liability.”). “As

between the owner of the vehicle and the person injured by the

negligent operation thereof, it is the duty of the owner to see

that his private limitations on its use are followed.” Phillips

v. Dixon, 223 S.E.2d 678, 682 (Ga. 1976).

¶33 Here, it is undisputed that the Becks maintained and

furnished the vehicle for Jason’s general use and that, on the

night of the accident, Jason’s mother permitted him to use the

vehicle for certain purposes. Although the permission did not

extend to transporting friends, the courts below correctly

concluded that Jason’s deviation from his parents’ limitation on

his use of the vehicle did not entitle the Becks to summary

judgment on Young’s family purpose doctrine claim. See

Richardson v. True, 259 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Ky. 1953) (noting that,

once having consented to use of vehicle for family purpose,

19

parent is not relieved from liability merely because family

member was using vehicle for unauthorized purpose or in a

forbidden manner at time of accident); Heenan v. Perkins, 564

P.2d 1354, 1356 (Or. 1977) (same); Crowder v. Carroll, 161

S.E.2d 235, 237-38 (S.C. 1968) (rejecting parent’s contention

that doctrine did not apply as a matter of law because at time

of accident son was driving family vehicle contrary to parent’s

express instructions); Gray, 869 S.W.2d at 927-28 (same); Kaynor

v. Farline, 72 P.3d 262, 271 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (same).

¶34 Based on the undisputed facts of this case,6 we agree

with the trial court and court of appeals that the doctrine

applies and that Young was entitled to summary judgment on that

issue. See First-City Bank & Trust Co. v. Doggett, 316 S.W.2d

225, 230 (Ky. 1958) (noting that when “the essential facts are

not in dispute, the question really becomes one of the scope and

extent of the family purpose doctrine as a rule of law, and

therefore is a question of law for the court”). The Becks

allowed Jason to drive the vehicle on the night in question (and

thus he had the vehicle with their express permission), and he

was transporting himself (which, under Benton, constituted a

6
The Becks stipulated in their “high/low” settlement
agreement that the relevant facts “are not materially disputed”
and that “[t]he issue to be determined on appeal is a purely
legal issue regarding application of the family purpose doctrine
to the facts of this case.”

20

family purpose). Accordingly, we reject the Becks’ assertion

that the family purpose doctrine is inapplicable as a matter of

law in this case.7

VI.

¶35 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the court of

appeals’ opinion and the superior court’s partial summary

judgment in favor of Young on the family purpose doctrine’s

applicability.

_____________________________________
A. John Pelander, Justice

7
We agree with the court of appeals that the doctrine is not
“without limits.” Young, 224 Ariz. at 413 ¶ 18, 231 P.3d at
945. We thus do not adopt a “Hell or High Water Rule,” which
“conclusively presume[s] that if the vehicle was originally
placed in the possession of [a] bailee by another having proper
authority, then, despite hell or high water, the operation of
the vehicle is considered to be within the scope of the
permission granted, regardless of how grossly the terms of the
original bailment may have been violated.” Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State Auto. & Cas. Underwriters, 108
Ariz. 113, 115, 493 P.2d 495, 497 (1972). Given the posture of
this case and the arguments made, however, we do not have
occasion here to consider whether the doctrine should be
prospectively limited (e.g., by adopting the approach espoused
in the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 238) or whether
different circumstances (e.g., a dispute over whether the child
had the parent’s permission to use the vehicle) would present
triable issues of fact. See, e.g., Leonard, 468 N.W.2d at 606
(finding a triable question of fact for the jury regarding
whether a child was driving an automobile with her parent’s
express or implied permission at the time of the accident). Nor
have the Becks ever suggested that application of the doctrine
to the undisputed facts could or should not be determined as a
matter of law in this case.

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CONCURRING:

_____________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice

_____________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Vice Chief Justice

_____________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice

_____________________________________
Michael D. Ryan, Justice (Retired)

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