Rivera-Longoria v. Slayton

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc

MARTIN RIVERA-LONGORIA, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CV-10-0362-PR
Petitioner, )
) Court of Appeals
v. ) Division One
) No. 1 CA-SA 10-0068
THE HONORABLE DAN SLAYTON, JUDGE )
OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE ) Coconino County
STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the ) Superior Court
County of Coconino, ) No. CR2008-0785
)
Respondent Judge, )
)
) O P I N I O N
STATE OF ARIZONA, through DAVID )
W. ROZEMA, Coconino County )
Attorney, )
)
Real Parties in Interest. )
)
__________________________________)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
The Honorable Dan Slayton, Judge

REMANDED
________________________________________________________________

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One
225 Ariz. 572, 242 P.3d 171 (2010)

VACATED
________________________________________________________________

KEITH A. HAMMOND, P. C. Flagstaff
By Keith A. Hammond
Attorney for Martin Rivera-Longoria

DAVID W. ROZEMA, COCONINO COUNTY ATTORNEY Flagstaff
By Jonathan C. Mosher, Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for State of Arizona and David W. Rozema
ARIZONA PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS' ADVISORY COUNCIL Phoenix
By Elizabeth Ortiz
Attorney for Amicus Curiae Arizona Prosecuting
Attorneys' Advisory Council
________________________________________________________________

B A L E S, Justice

¶1 When an indictment or information has been filed, Rule

15.8 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes

sanctions if a prosecutor imposes a plea deadline and fails to

disclose certain information to the defense at least thirty days

before the offer lapses. We today hold that Rule 15.8 does not

apply when a prosecutor withdraws an open-ended plea offer. In

that situation, Rule 15.7 governs the imposition of sanctions

for any failure to make required disclosures.

I.

¶2 In September 2008, Martin Rivera-Longoria was indicted

on one count of child abuse. After disclosing more than 1,100

pages to the defense, the State extended a plea offer in May

2009 without imposing a deadline for its acceptance. At a

hearing held to ensure that Rivera-Longoria understood the

offer’s terms and the potential sentence if he proceeded to

trial, Rivera-Longoria rejected the offer. In July, his counsel

asked the prosecutor if the offer remained open. The prosecutor

said the offer was still available, but might not be after the

case was reassigned to another prosecutor in August. The new

prosecutor subsequently notified Rivera-Longoria that the offer
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was no longer available. Beginning in October 2009, the State

disclosed more than 11,000 additional pages of discovery.

¶3 Rule 15.8 allows the superior court to preclude

certain evidence not disclosed to a defendant at least thirty

days before a plea deadline if the failure to disclose

materially affected the defendant’s decision regarding the plea

offer and the prosecutor declines to reinstate the lapsed offer.

Rivera-Longoria moved under Rule 15.8 to preclude any evidence

disclosed after July 29, 2009. The trial court denied the

motion.

¶4 Rivera-Longoria filed a special action in the court of

appeals, which accepted jurisdiction and granted relief in a

divided opinion. Rivera–Longoria v. Slayton, 225 Ariz. 572, 242

P.3d 171 (App. 2010). Reasoning that “the State effectively

imposed a deadline on the offer by withdrawing it,” id. at 574 ¶

11, 242 P.3d at 173, the court of appeals held that Rule 15.8

applied. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to allow the

trial court to determine whether the State had failed to make

required disclosures earlier, whether any such failure had

materially affected Rivera-Longoria’s decision to reject the

offer, and, if so, what sanctions would be appropriate if the

State then declined to reinstate the plea. Id. at 576 ¶ 16, 242

P.3d at 175. The dissent concluded that Rule 15.8 should not

apply here, arguing that imposing sanctions for the prosecutor’s
3
failure to disclose evidence before withdrawal of a plea offer

would violate separation of powers principles. Id. at 576 ¶¶

17-19, 242 P.3d at 175 (Thompson, J., dissenting).

¶5 We accepted review because the application of Rule

15.8 to open-ended plea offers is a recurring issue of statewide

importance. The Court has jurisdiction under Article 6, Section

5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24 (2009).

II.

A.

¶6 Disclosure in criminal cases is governed by Rules 15.1

through 15.8 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. In

2003, the disclosure rules were substantially amended based on

the recommendations of a committee that included judges,

prosecutors, and defense attorneys. The 2003 amendments sought,

among other things, to align the disclosure rules more closely

“with the realities of modern practice,” and to recognize “the

defense attorney’s need for basic information early in the

process in order to meaningfully confer with the client and make

appropriate strategic decisions.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1, cmt.

to 2003 amend.

¶7 The state’s disclosure obligations are staggered. In

felony cases, at the arraignment or preliminary hearing

prosecutors must disclose certain law enforcement reports and

expert analyses “that were in the possession of the attorney
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filing the charge at the time of the filing.” Ariz. R. Crim. P.

15.1(a). In superior court cases, within thirty days after

arraignment, the prosecution must disclose additional “material

and information” listed in Rule 15.1(b) that is “within the

prosecutor’s possession or control.” Id. 15.1(b). Separate

disclosure requirements exist for prior felony convictions of

state witnesses, id. 15.1(d), and for other information

specifically requested by the defendant. Id. 15.1(e). After

the defense has disclosed its intended witnesses, the state must

disclose its rebuttal witnesses. Id. 15.1(h).

¶8 Rule 15.6 imposes a continuing duty to disclose and

generally directs that all required disclosure be completed

seven days before trial. The trial court may modify the time

for disclosure or order additional disclosure. Id. 15.1(c),

(g). If the state fails to make a required disclosure, the

court may impose appropriate sanctions, which include precluding

evidence or declaring a mistrial. Id. 15.7(a).

¶9 Rule 15.8 sets forth the state’s disclosure

obligations in specified circumstances involving plea

agreements. This rule provides:

If the prosecution has imposed a plea deadline in a
case in which an indictment or information has been
filed in Superior Court, but does not provide the
defense with material disclosure listed in Rule
15.1(b) at least 30 days prior to the plea deadline,
the court, upon motion of the defendant, shall
consider the impact of failure to provide such
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 disclosure on the defendant’s decision to accept or
reject a plea offer. If the court determines that the
prosecutor’s failure to provide such disclosure
materially impacted the defendant’s decision and the
prosecutor declines to reinstate the lapsed plea
offer, the presumptive minimum sanction shall be
preclusion from admission at trial of any evidence not
disclosed at least 30 days prior to the deadline.

Id. 15.8.

B.

¶10 We granted review to decide whether the prosecution

“imposed a plea deadline” for purposes of Rule 15.8 when it

withdrew an offer that did not specify a deadline for its

acceptance. The State, however, argues more broadly that Rule

15.8 is unconstitutional as a violation of separation of powers.

Because defendants have no constitutional right to plea bargains

and the executive has the prerogative of deciding whether to

offer a plea, see State v. Morse, 127 Ariz. 25, 31-32, 617 P.2d

1141, 1147-48 (1980), the State contends that Rule 15.8

improperly infringes on executive powers by authorizing the

preclusion of evidence if the prosecutor declines to reinstate a

plea offer.

¶11 We reject the State’s constitutional challenge to Rule

15.8. The Rule does not require a prosecutor to offer a plea

agreement or prevent a prosecutor from withdrawing an offer.

Rather, it imposes disclosure obligations if the prosecution

imposes a plea deadline. If certain evidence is not timely

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disclosed at least thirty days before the deadline, Rule 15.8

provides for sanctions only if two things happen: the court

determines the failure to disclose materially affected the

defendant’s decision regarding the plea offer and the prosecutor

declines to reinstate the lapsed offer.

¶12 The State correctly notes that defendants do not have

a federal constitutional right to disclosure of information

before entering into a plea bargain. See United States v. Ruiz,

536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002). But a defendant’s federal rights do

not delimit this Court’s power to adopt procedural rules

governing disclosure in criminal cases. Cf. State ex rel.

Napolitano v. Brown, 194 Ariz. 340, 342, 982 P.2d 815, 817

(1999) (noting that Arizona Constitution “vests the power to

make procedural rules exclusively in this court”).

¶13 Rule 15.8 was adopted to ensure that, once charges

have been filed in superior court, basic discovery will be

provided to the defense sufficiently in advance of a plea

deadline to allow an informed decision on the offer with

effective assistance of counsel. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.8, cmt.

to 2003 amend. The rule does not “subordinate the prosecutor’s

plea bargaining authority to the discretion of the courts.”

State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 417 ¶ 42, 10 P.3d 1193, 1204

(App. 2000). The prosecution retains discretion to determine

whether to make a plea offer, the terms of any offer, the length
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of time an offer will remain open, and the other particulars of

plea bargaining.

¶14 The State argues that Rule 15.8, at least as

interpreted by the court of appeals, may require it to keep an

offer open indefinitely or face preclusion of evidence at trial.

This assertion misapprehends the Rule. Potential sanctions are

triggered only if the state fails to provide “material

disclosure listed in Rule 15.1(b)” at least thirty days before a

plea deadline. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.8. Rule 15.1(b) concerns

“material and information within the prosecutor’s possession or

control.” Id. 15.1(b); see also id. 15.1(f). In addition, Rule

15.6 requires the prosecution to “seasonably” make additional

disclosures when new or different information is discovered.

Id. 15.6(a). These provisions indicate that Rule 15.8

disclosure obligations relate to Rule 15.1(b) evidence that is

within the prosecutor’s possession or control when the offer

lapses.

¶15 The state does not face Rule 15.8 sanctions if it

declines to reinstate a lapsed offer after obtaining new

information subject to disclosure under Rule 15.1(b) and Rule

15.6. Nor must a prosecutor extend an outstanding offer’s

deadline for another thirty days when, after Rule 15.1(b)

disclosures have been timely provided, new information comes

within the prosecutor’s “possession or control.” Id. 15.1(b).
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In that situation, if the prosecutor promptly supplements the

prior disclosures before the deadline lapses, the disclosures

will be “seasonably” made under Rule 15.6.

¶16 A prosecutor who wishes to avoid potential sanctions

under Rule 15.8 need only provide the material disclosure

identified in Rule 15.1(b) at least thirty days before a plea

offer deadline and promptly disclose any additional information

under Rule 15.6 before the deadline lapses. These provisions do

not constitute an unconstitutional encroachment on executive

powers under the criteria listed in State ex el. Woods v. Block,

189 Ariz. 269, 276, 942 P.2d 428, 435 (1997).

C.

¶17 We turn to whether the court of appeals erred in

interpreting Rule 15.8 to apply to an open-ended offer that is

withdrawn. Rule 15.8 applies only “[i]f the prosecution has

imposed a plea deadline.” Applying principles of statutory

construction to interpret court rules, we give clear language

its usual, ordinary meaning unless doing so creates an absurd

result. Preston v. Kindred Hosps., 226 Ariz. 391, 393 ¶ 8, 249

P.3d 771, 773 (2011).

¶18 The term “deadline” is ordinarily understood as a

“time limit, as for payment of a debt or completion of an

assignment.” American Heritage Dictionary 466 (4th ed. 2006).

Deadlines in this sense prospectively identify the period in
9
which a person or entity must take some action. Deadlines

“loom” because they can be identified before they expire. Under

this well-accepted usage, the prosecution imposes a “deadline”

for purposes of Rule 15.8 when it identifies the date by which

the defendant must accept a plea offer.

¶19 This interpretation of “deadline” finds support in

other language in Rule 15.8 and other disclosure rules.

Sanctions under Rule 15.8 apply only if “the prosecutor declines

to reinstitute the lapsed plea offer.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.8.

The word “lapsed” suggests that Rule 15.8 concerns plea offers

that expired after an identified date. Cf. American Heritage

Dictionary 987 (4th ed. 2006) (defining “lapse” to mean, among

other things, “[t]o be no longer valid or active; expire”).

Rule 15.6 similarly uses “deadline” to refer to a particular

date by which certain disclosures must be completed. See Ariz.

R. Crim. P. 15.6(c)–(d).

¶20 Recognizing that the word “deadline” typically refers

to the date or time by which something must be done, the court

of appeals reasoned that “deadline” could also be understood to

include the time when the prosecution withdraws an open-ended

offer. Rivera-Longoria, 225 Ariz. at 574 ¶ 10, 242 P.3d at 173.

Although a defendant no longer can accept an offer once it is

withdrawn, we do not agree that withdrawing an offer without an

express deadline is the same as imposing a deadline. A “plea
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deadline” and a “withdrawal of an offer” are not analogous: a

deadline prospectively identifies a date by which a defendant

may accept or reject a plea offer, while the withdrawal of an

offer eliminates the defendant’s option to accept or reject the

plea. Equating the withdrawal of an offer with the imposition

of a deadline would also effectively extend Rule 15.8 to all

plea offers, since the prosecutor always could potentially

withdraw an open-ended offer. This interpretation is contrary

to the conditional language of Rule 15.8, which does not say

that the rule applies to all offers, but instead applies only

“[i]f the prosecution has imposed a plea deadline.” Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 15.8.

¶21 The court of appeals also concluded that the

withdrawal of an open-ended offer could implicate the policy

concerns that led to the adoption of Rule 15.8. See Rivera-

Longoria, 225 Ariz. at 575 ¶ 15, 242 P.3d at 174 (observing that

if rule does not apply, “a defendant and his counsel could be

deprived of information that may be material to a pending open-

ended plea offer, whenever the State makes disclosure after

revoking an open-ended plea offer”). There may be some truth to

this observation inasmuch as Rule 15.8 reflects the view that

defendants should receive certain basic disclosures before

having to decide on plea offers made early in the case. See

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.8, cmt. to 2003 amend. But it is difficult
11
to conclude that this observation applies here. Rivera-Longoria

rejected a plea offer months after his arraignment and after at

least some disclosures, but then later argued that Rule 15.8

sanctions should apply to evidence disclosed after the State had

renewed the prior offer and then withdrew it. (There is no

issue before this Court regarding the sufficiency of the State’s

initial Rule 15.1(b) disclosures.)

¶22 More importantly, to the extent the policy concerns

motivating Rule 15.8 are implicated by the withdrawal of open-

ended offers, we think the better approach is to consider

amending the rule rather than construing the “imposi[tion] [of]

a plea deadline” to mean the withdrawal of an offer without a

deadline. Moreover, apart from Rule 15.8, a trial court is

authorized by Rule 15.7(a) to impose “any sanction it finds

appropriate” for a failure to timely make required disclosures.

This rule may provide a basis for sanctions, including the

preclusion of certain evidence, if a prosecutor fails to provide

required disclosures before withdrawing an open-ended offer. We

express no view on whether Rule 15.7 might apply to the facts of

this case.

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 III.

¶23 We vacate the opinion of the court of appeals and

remand this case to the superior court for further proceedings.

_____________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice

CONCURRING:

_____________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice

_____________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Vice Chief Justice

_____________________________________
A. John Pelander, Justice

_____________________________________
Robert M. Brutinel, Justice

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