Cited by

¶9 ¶ 13 (2011), the Defendants contend that this court lacks jurisdiction because Harvey filed his notice of appeal while his motion for a new trial was pending in the superior court and failed to file a supplemental notice of appeal after the court ruled on his motion.

P. 54(c), and was not separately appealed, we lack jurisdiction to consider the County’s challenge to that award, (subject to an exception inapplicable here, “notice of appeal filed in the absence of a final judgment .

¶7 Generally, if a party files a notice of appeal before a final judgment—such as while a determination of the amount of attorney’s fees remains pending—the notice is “ineffective.” –24, ¶¶ 12–14 (App. 2012); ¶ 13 (2011).

¶ 13 (2011) (stating a premature notice of appeal does not need to be dismissed “if no decision of the court could change and the only remaining task is merely ministerial” (quoting Smith v. Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, ¶ 37 (2006)).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 12-2101(A)(1); ¶ 6 (2011).

P. 54(a) (defining “judgment” to include “a decree and an order from which an appeal lies”); ¶ 6 (2011) (noting a dissolution decree is a final, appealable judgment).

¶¶ 12-13, (quoting Smith v. Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, ¶ 37, ); ¶ 13, (“[O]utside the slim exception announced in Barassi, premature notices of appeal are ineffec

¶ 13 (2011) (quoting Smith v. Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, ¶ 39 (2006)).

P. 54(a) (defining “judgment” to include “a decree and an order from which an appeal lies”); ¶ 6 (2011) (noting a dissolution decree is a final, appealable judgment) (citing A.R.S.

See ARCAP 9.1 (2014); ¶ 13 (2011)

¶ 13, (providing that a prematurely filed notice of appeal is nonetheless effective if the trial court has made a final decision and the only remaining task is merely ministerial); –93 ¶¶ 4–5, –20 (App. 2010) (providing that although our

¶14 Finally, BNSF argues the supreme court’s P.3d 624 (2011), allows parties to file delayed appeals even when an extension is improperly granted under Rule 6(b).

3 CAMASURA v. CAMASURA Opinion of the Court 1187, 1195 (2006) (stating the Barassi exception applies when “no decision of the court could change and the only remaining task is merely ministerial”); 107, ¶¶ 8–9, 13, (characterizing the Barassi exception to the final judgment rule as a “limited” or “slim” exception); ARCAP 9.

¶ 13 (2011) (premature notice of appeal is effective if court made final decision and all that remains is ministerial task of entering formal judgment); see also ARCAP 9(c).

is ‘ineffective’ and a nullity.” ¶ 13 (2011); see Arizona Revised Statutes section 12-2101(A)(1).

We review a hearing officer’s admission of evidence 2 P.3d 624 (2011), ADC asserts that the notice of appeal Nyswaner filed was premature because of his pending motion for reconsideration in superior court.

¶9 The Boyles argued below, as they do here, that the trial court erred in awarding Rule 68 sanctions because “[t]he document which Ford served on [them] did not comply with Rule 68.” The Boyles assert Ford’s offer “nowhere expressed an offer to allow 1 (notice of appeal filed while party’s time- extending motion pending before the trial court, “is ‘ineffective’ and a nullity”).

¶ 13, (confirming the “limited exception to the final judgment rule that allows a notice of appeal to be filed after the trial court has made its final decision, but before it has entered a formal judgment, if no decision of the court could change and the only remaining task is merely mi

at 414, ¶ 8, 286 P.3d at 163 ( ¶ 13, ).

With limited exceptions not applicable here, a notice of appeal filed before the entry of final judgment is “a nullity.” ¶ 13, see A.R.S.

2 Although we generally lack jurisdiction over a premature appeal, jurisdiction is proper where the premature notice of appeal was “filed after the trial court has made its final decision, but before it has entered a formal judgment, if no decision of the court could change and the only remaining task is merely ministerial.” ¶ 13, (citation omitted).