Cited by

6 STATE OF ARIZONA V. EDWARD LITTLETON MCCAULEY Opinion of the Court ¶16 “A prosecutor has wide latitude in closing argument, but may not make arguments that appeal to the jury’s fear or passion.” State v. Lynch (“Lynch II”), ¶ 48 (2015), rev’d on other grounds, Lynch v. Arizona (“Lynch III”), 578 U.S. 613 (2016).

( rev’d, 578 U.S. 613, 616-17 (2016)), our supreme court indicated that “the legal impropriety of [a] prosecutor’s questions and actions” cannot “rise[] to the level of prosecutorial error” if performed without “the requisite ‘indifference, if not a specific intent, to prejudice’” the defendant.

¶ 53 (2015), overruled on other grounds by Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U.S. 613, 613–17 (2016).

See State v. Lynch (Lynch I), ¶ 65 (2015) (rejecting requirement to give parole ineligibility instruction where executive clemency made future release possible), rev’d, 578 U.S. 613.

¶ 48 (2015), rev’d on other grounds, 578 U.S. 613 (2016) (“The proper response to an improper prosecutorial comment is an objection, motion to strike, and a jury instruction to disregard the stricken comment.”); ¶ 69 (2006) (finding an instruction that the jury must disregard s

licit finding that a reason was non-discriminatory even when the trial court did not expressly rule on the third Batson factor,” Smith, 250 Ariz. at 88 ¶ 73 (cleaned up) ( ¶¶ 63–64 (2003)); ¶ 28 (2002) (affirming the court’s implicit finding under step three in denying the Batson challenge); ¶ 70 (2015) (same), which the court of appeals in Porter acknowledged, see 248 Ariz. at 397 ¶ 16 (“[T]he trial court need not make detailed findings addressing all the evidence before it, and, in Arizona, ma

4 STATE V. CRUZ Opinion of the Court due process violation where court declined to instruct the jury that Arizona law precluded defendant from being considered for parole after serving twenty-five years if sentenced to life in prison); State v. Lynch (Lynch I), ¶ 65 (2015), rev’d Lynch II (stating that “Simmons applies only to instances where, as a legal matter, there is no possibility of parole if the jury decides the appropriate sentence is life in prison” (quoting Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S

Second, by attempting a dramatic moment in which he pulled a baggie of unadmitted rosemary from his pocket to dispose of Olaoye’s defense, the prosecutor “intentionally engaged in improper conduct and did so with indifference, if not a specific intent, to prejudice [Olaoye].” ¶ 6 (2015), rev’d on other grounds, Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2019).

.’” Hulsey, 243 Ariz. at 394, ¶ 122 ( ¶ 51 (2015)).

This includes inviting jurors to place themselves in the victim’s position because doing so plays on the jurors’ fear of the defendant or sympathy for the victim.” ¶ 48 (2015) (citation omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016); see also Morris, 215 Ariz. at 337, ¶ 58.

¶ 6 (2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016).

.” (); ¶ 83 (2015) (concluding cruelty aggravator shown by evidence that victim was conscious and secured to chair, indicating he had “ample time to contemplate his fate”), rev’d on other grounds by Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016).

¶ 70 (2015) (“The trial court found that the State’s proffered reasons for the strikes were race neutral, implicitly ruling that Lynch did not carry his burden of proving purposeful racial discrimination.”), rev’d on other grounds, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016).

Relying on our decision in State v. Lynch (Lynch I), ¶ 65 (2015), the trial court granted Johnson’s request to instruct the jury that parole was not currently available but declined his request to inform the jury that he was never eligible for parole since § 13-751(A) authorized release in the form of executive clemency.

Opening statement is not a time to argue the inferences and conclusions that may be drawn from evidence not yet admitted.” ¶ 9 (2015) ( overruled on other grounds by Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016)).

at 1818-20 (reversing State v. Lynch , , 103 ¶ 65, which found no Simmons error when trial court "properly instructed the jury" that court "could impose a release-eligible sentence if the jury did not return a death verdict").

¶ 33 (2015), overturned on other grounds by Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016).

at 86 ¶ 59; see also State v. Lynch (Lynch II), –97 ¶¶ 28–29 (2015) (illustrating improper commentary towards counsel as suggesting defense counsel fabricated evidence), rev’d on other grounds, Lynch III, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016); – 72 (1990) (no error where prosecutor referred to defense as “smoke screen”).

See, ¶ 65 (2015) (“Lynch I”), rev’d by Lynch II, 136 S. Ct. 1818.

See, ¶ 29 (2015) (citations omitted) (finding prosecutor’s repeated suggestions that defense theories were not credible was not misconduct), rev’d on other grounds, Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016); (finding the characterization of defense as “outrageous” and a “s

See, ¶ 65, rev. Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016).

¶9 Our case law has consistently held “[a] prosecutor[] ha[s] wide latitude in closing arguments and may argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence.” ¶ 28

¶ 12 (2015) ( ¶ 25 (2011)).

The court may also take into 5 We note, in presenting her best-interest argument, Mother’s counsel relies in part on Angel S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, P.3d 578 (App. 2015), which was depublished by Angel S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, P.3d 119 (2015) before the filing of her brief.