Cited by

BROWN v. ARIZONA NATURES, et al. Decision of the Court than Brown’s counsel requested in his closing,” but adding that “ANW cannot point to anyplace in the record to support a claim that the jury award was the result of passion or prejudice or that it deviates materially from reasonable compensation.” In challenging that ruling on appeal, arguing “[t]he trial court ignored the direction set forth in Soto.” ¶35 ANW concedes the verdict was not the result of passion or prejudice.

(appellate court grants “significant latitude to trial courts in ruling on new trial motions”).

¶13 Although Pitt cites other jury verdicts, suggesting the verdict here is excessive, comparable verdict information is “only marginally relevant and the trial court should not treat other damage awards as conclusive in assessing whether the jury made a just award.” ¶ 22 (2017).

¶28 Our supreme court has urged superior courts to “sparingly exercise discretion in modifying a jury’s verdict,” while also recognizing that courts play “a role akin to a thirteenth juror.” ¶ 8 (2017).

The superior court has discretion, however, to “reduc[e] an excessive verdict to the realm of 16 KUNASEK v. JOHNSON, et al. Decision of the Court reason.” Desert Palm, 236 Ariz. at 581, ¶ 38 (citation omitted); ¶ 9 (2017) (remittitur proper if a verdict “reflects an exaggerated measurement of damages” (citation omitted)).

¶ 8 (2017) ( ¶ 14 (2017)); (noting trial judges have "a special perspective of the relationship between the evidence and the verdict which cannot be recreated by a reviewing court from the printed record").

“Because a jury plays a vital role in our civil justice system, a trial court may not simply substitute its judgment for the jury’s.” § 7 (2017).

Desert Palm, 236 Ariz. at 582, ¶ 38; ¶ 9 (2017).

¶ 8 (2017) (recognizing that a trial judge plays a role akin to a "ninth juror" when ruling on a motion for new trial).

The supreme court vacated our decision in Ahmad I

The court must grant a motion for new trial based on insufficient damages if “the damage award is tainted by ‘passion or prejudice,’ or is ‘shocking[ly] or flagrantly outrageous.’” ¶ 9 (2017) (citation omitted).

¶18 We agree with Corwin that under Arizona law in ruling on a motion for a new trial, the trial judge “sits as a thirteenth juror” and “must be convinced that the weight of the evidence sustains the verdict.” Fischer, 242 Ariz. at 44, ¶ 14 (citation omitted); ¶ 8 (2017) (recognizing that “a trial judge plays a role akin to a thirteenth juror .