Cited by

Brnovich v. City of Tucson, where this Court explained that “[w]e generally do not reach out to decide important constitutional issues or to upset established precedent when no party has raised or argued such issues.” ¶ 45 (2017); ¶ 21 (2016) (declining to address issues “[t]he parties did not brief”); ¶ 10 n.2 (2012) (declining to address Arizona constitutional issues “not separately argued”).

¶ 47 (2017) (describing the state’s “broad police power” as protecting “life, liberty, and property” and preserving “the public peace and order” ()).

–95 ¶ 23 (2017) (“Our state constitution identifies the various components of this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”); see also A.R.S.

¶ 35 (2017) (we generally seek to avoid constitutional issues when interpreting and applying statutes).

¶ 45 (2017); see also City of Phx.

¶ 81 (2017) (Bolick, J., concurring), development fees are valid only if the municipality complies with the express statutory requirements of § 9-463.05 in implementing such fees.

¶ 25 (2017) (noting this Court is “authorized and obligated .

¶ 53 (2017) (agreeing with the proposition that a right protected by the state constitution is “a subject of state concern”); id.

–600 ¶ 45 (2017) (explaining that the Court generally abstains from deciding issues not raised or argued by the parties).

Brnovich v. City of Tucson (Tucson IV), ¶ 40 (2017) (phrasing the purpose as “render[ing] the cities adopting such charter provisions as nearly independent of state legislation as was possible” ()).

¶ 39 (2017) ( ¶ 10 (2012)), we review its interpretation de novo as a matter of law, see Twin Cities Fire Ins.

¶ 39 (2017) ( ¶ 10 (2012)), we review its interpretation de novo as a matter of law, see Twin Cities Fire Ins.

Brnovich v. City of Tucson , , 599-600 ¶ 45, , 674-75 (2017) ("We generally do not reach out to decide important constitutional issues or to upset established precedent when no party has raised or argued such issues."); Gallardo v. State , , 87 ¶ 9, , 720 (2014) (noting that we "presume that the legislature

¶ 45 (2017) (“We generally do not reach out to decide important constitutional issues or to upset established precedent when no party has raised or argued such issues.”).

Brnovich v. City of Tucson , , 598, ¶ 39, , 673 (2017) ("Once adopted and approved, a city's charter is, 'effectively, a local constitution.'

Brnovich v. City of Tucson , , ¶ 27, (quoting Seisinger v. Siebel , , ¶ 8, ).

See, ¶ 45 (2017) (“We generally do not reach out to decide important constitutional issues or to 8 ALMA S. V. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY Opinion of the Court upset established precedent when no party has raised or argued such issues.”).

Brnovich v. City of Tucson , , 599 ¶ 45, , 674 (2017) ("We generally do not reach out to decide important constitutional issues or to upset established precedent when no party has raised or argued such issues.").

hird-party action, there is simply no Aitken-type of inequity to ameliorate.” ¶20 The Leijas, on the other hand, argue that “[t]here is no justification for failing to offset the lien amount for an employer’s fault simply because the parties have, with the [insurance] carrier’s consent, settled before trial.” Under the Leijas’ view, a claimant should not “ ¶ 45 (2017) (stating that “[w]e generally do not reach out .