Cited by

See City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶¶ 13–14 (2019) (applying noscitur a sociis to interpret the phrase “otherwise dispose of” by relating it to the surrounding terms “sell, lease, assign,” and “mortgage”).

She asserts, therefore, the notice requirement must continue indefinitely, absent Congressional action.3 See Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 590 U.S. ___, 600, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1725 (2020) (court “may not narrow a provision’s reach by inserting words Congress chose to omit”); see also City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, (identifying interpretive canon, “the expression of one item implies the exclusion of others”).

9 NUNEZ v. VALENTE Opinion of the Court exclusio alterius, which means “the expression of one item implies the exclusion of [all] others.” ¶ 13 (2019).

Relatedly, the associated-words canon known as noscitur a sociis provides that “a word’s meaning cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used[.]” City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶ 13 (2019); see also United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008) (“[T]he commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis .

However, special-action jurisdiction is discretionary, ¶ 6 (2019), and is appropriate when no "equally plain, speedy, and adequate" remedy by appeal exists.

Registration, ¶ 23 (2022) (explaining that the doctrines of standing and ripeness ensure, in part, “that issues be fully developed between true adversaries” (quoting City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶ 8 (2019))).

The rule of construction that the listing of specific things implies the exclusion of others, City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶ 13 (2019) (applying canon); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 107 (2012), applies here with special force when we are searching for an extraordinary grant of government power.

City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n

The “one thing” expressed in § 12-1122(A)(2) is “property sought to be condemned [that] constitutes only a part of a larger parcel.” Assuming the canon applies here, it only excludes “property sought to be condemned” that is not “part of a larger parcel.” See City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶ 13 (2019) (stating that the negative-implication canon “is appropriate when one term is reasonably understood as an expression of all terms included in the statutory grant or prohibition”).

See also City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶ 14 (2019) (employing noscitur a sociis to construe “otherwise dispose of” limitedly, and thus consistent with “sell,” “lease”, “assign”, and “mortgage,” other actions listed in A.R.S.

City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶ 6 (2019).

City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶ 10 (2019).

City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶ 10 (2019).

See City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶ 13 (2019) (noting that the interpretative canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius means “the expression of one item implies the exclusion of others”).

City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n

City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶ 14 (2019) (applying the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to infer that the legislature’s decision to include certain terms but not another term was 6 BOYD v. STATE, et al. Opinion of the Court intent

Opinion of the Court Comm’n, ¶ 13 (2019) (“[T]he expression of one item implies the exclusion of others.”).

Arizona courts are not, therefore, “constitutionally constrained” to impose standing minimums, but follow the doctrine of prudential standing, which we apply “as a matter of judicial restraint” to avoid issuing advisory opinions and ensure cases are ripe and “fully developed between true adversaries.” Mills, 253 Ariz. at 423 ¶ 23 (quoting City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶ 8 (2019)); Sears, 192 Ariz. at 71 ¶ 24.

Polaris, 133 Ariz. at 504; see also City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶ 9 (2019) (holding that indirect assertion of regulatory authority provides “sufficient injury to provide standing”).

Nevertheless, we apply the doctrines of standing and ripeness as a matter of judicial restraint to ensure courts “refrain from issuing advisory opinions, that cases be ripe for decision and not moot, and that issues be fully developed between true adversaries.” City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶ 8 (2019) ( ¶ 16 (2005)).

SIMMS v. SIMMS, et al. Opinion of the Court minimums, and this case does not present the doctrine of prudential standing, which cautions Arizona courts to “exercise restraint [and] refrain from issuing advisory opinions” to ensure that “cases [are] ripe for decision” and “issues [are] fully developed between true adversaries.” City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶8 (2019).

See City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶ 10 (2019); Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n v. Brain, ¶ 11 (2014).

City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶ 8 (2019).

Whether to apply the ripeness doctrine in Arizona is a matter of “prudential or judicial restraint.” City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, ¶ 8 (2019) (quoting Dobson v. State ex rel., Comm’n on App. Ct. Appointments, ¶ 9 (2013)).