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must show good cause for the nonappearance and a meritorious defense.” Trish A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 19 (2019) (citation modified).

Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 27 (2019).

Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 27 (2019).

Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 27 (2019).

¶ 19 (App. 2021) (citing Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 17 (2019) and Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 172–73 (2012)).

See Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 22 (2019) (requiring motion to set aside termination order to establish a meritorious defense).

P. 60(b)(1)–(6); ¶ 18 (2019) (noting that it is a "'well- settled requirement[] of law' that a motion to set aside a judgment be supported by a meritorious defense" ()).

Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 25 (2019).

See Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 16 (2019).

Ct. 351(c)(2), 352(f); Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, –88, ¶ 14 (2019).

Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 19 (2019).

Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 16 (2019).

is discretionary.” Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 14 (2019).

Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 19 (2019) (courts may set aside waiver findings if parent shows good cause and a meritorious defense).

See, e.g., Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, –101 ¶¶ 33–73 (2019) (Bolick, J., dissenting); Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, –56 ¶¶ 24–39 (2018) (Bolick, J., concurring in result); Brenda D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, –51 ¶¶ 44–54 (2018) (Timmer, J., and Bolick, J., 16

See Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 19 (2019).

And we presume that words “bear the same meaning throughout a text.” Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 17 (2019) (citing Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 170 (2012)).

Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 27 (2019); Adrian E. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

See Shella H. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 13 (App. 2016); see also Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, –88, ¶ 14 (2019) (recognizing that a court’s authority to accelerate a termination hearing is discretionary); ¶ 40 (2004) (“We will not find that a trial court has abused its discretion unless no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.” (c

See Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 30 (2019) (emphasizing importance of “timely stability and permanency” for the child).

See, e.g., Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, –95 ¶¶ 33–48, 100 ¶ 73 (2019) (Bolick, J., dissenting) (“[T]he process our state has constructed creates the very real prospect that parents will lose their children not because they deserve to, but because they are unable to effectively defend their rights in a system that is stacked hopelessly against them.”); Al

Sec., ¶ 16 (App. 2007); see also Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 19 (2019).

See Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 17 (2019) (standard for “good cause” among various Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court “should be consistent because the language of these rules is identical or substantially similar”); see also Scalia & Garner, supra, at 172–73 (“The presumption of consistent usage applies also when different sec

Sec., ¶ 10 (App. 2018) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); see also Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 25 (2019) (applying Mathews three-factor test in termination case).

To prevail on a motion to set aside, a parent must demonstrate “‘good cause’ for their nonappearance and prove a meritorious defense.” ¶ 22 (2019); see Ariz. R.P.