Sanchez v. Maricopa County

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

JACQUELIN JAMILEX LOPEZ SANCHEZ, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

MARICOPA COUNTY,
Defendant/Appellee.

No. CV-24-0013-PR
Filed July 21, 2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Rodrick J. Coffey, Judge
No. CV2022-092441
AFFIRMED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One
256 Ariz. 495 (App. 2023)
VACATED

COUNSEL:

David L. Abney (argued), Ahwatukee Legal Office, P.C., Phoenix; and
Chase W. Rasmussen, Alexander M. Hyde, Rasmussen Injury Law, Mesa,
Attorneys for Jacquelin Jamilex Lopez Sanchez, Marlin Lopez Sanchez,
Rosario Lopez Sanchez, Iliana Ofelia Sanchez, and Orlando Lopez

Rachel H. Mitchell, Maricopa County Attorney, Pamela A. Hostallero,
Deputy County Attorney, Sean M. Moore (argued), Deputy County
Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys for Maricopa County

Larry J. Wulkan, Peter A. Silverman, Zwillinger Wulkan PLC, Phoenix,
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Association for Justice
 SANCHEZ ET AL. V. MARICOPA COUNTY
Opinion of the Court

JUSTICE MONTGOMERY authored the opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ and JUSTICES
BOLICK, BEENE, KING, and BRUTINEL (RETIRED) joined. *

JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer can
be vicariously liable for the negligence of an employee if the employee is
under the control of the employer at the time an accident occurs. Engler v.
Gulf Interstate Eng’g, Inc., 230 Ariz. 55, 57 ¶¶ 9–10 (2012). In this case, we
must decide whether a county is vicariously liable for the negligence of a
deputy county sheriff who caused an accident while engaged in his law
enforcement duties. In turn, we must also decide whether under the
Arizona Claims Act (the “Act”), A.R.S. §§ 12-820 to –826, a county is the
proper “public entity” for notice of claim purposes pursuant to
§ 12-821.01(A). In reaching our decision, we consider the authority and
duties of a county, a county sheriff, and the sheriff’s deputies, as well as the
relationship between each, under the Arizona Constitution and statutes.

¶2 We hold that, because a county does not control a deputy
county sheriff when carrying out law enforcement duties, it cannot be
vicariously liable for a deputy’s negligence. We further hold that a sheriff
in his official capacity is vicariously liable for any negligence or misconduct
committed by a deputy engaged in law enforcement duties. And,
although the sheriff’s office is a non-jural entity, a claimant may nonetheless
satisfy the requirements of § 12-821.01(A) by filing a notice of a claim
against the sheriff with the county sheriff’s office, which is responsible for
carrying out the sheriff’s administrative functions.

∗ Although Justice Robert M. Brutinel (Ret.) retired before issuance of this
opinion, he participated in oral argument and throughout the preparation
of this opinion.
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Opinion of the Court

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 In June 2021, a deputy of the Maricopa County Sheriff (the
“Deputy”) rear-ended Plaintiffs while driving a vehicle owned by Maricopa
County (the “County”). 1 The Plaintiffs thereafter filed a notice of claim
pursuant to § 12-821.01(A) with the clerk of the Maricopa County Board of
Supervisors (the “Board”). 2 The Plaintiffs subsequently sued the County,
arguing it was vicariously liable for the Deputy’s negligence under the
respondeat superior doctrine. The County moved to dismiss the
complaint under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that it
lacked the requisite control over the Deputy to be held vicariously liable.
The superior court agreed and granted the County’s motion.

¶4 The Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the Deputy is an
employee of the County and, therefore, the County was properly liable for
his negligence. Sanchez v. Maricopa County, 256 Ariz. 495, 497 ¶ 11 (App.
2023). However, the court of appeals held that because the County lacked
the necessary control over deputy county sheriffs, it was not vicariously
liable for the Deputy’s negligence. Id. at 499 ¶ 20. The court further noted
that county sheriffs qualify as public entities under § 12-820(7) for notice of
claim purposes. Id. at 501 ¶ 30.

¶5 We granted review because whether a county can be held
vicariously liable for a deputy county sheriff’s negligence and is
consequently the proper public entity for purposes of § 12-821.01(A) are
issues of first impression for this Court and of recurring statewide
importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the
Arizona Constitution.

1 Because the matter comes before us on a motion to dismiss, we assume
the truth of all well-pleaded facts in the complaint. State ex rel. Brnovich v.
Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 250 Ariz. 127, 130 ¶ 7 (2020).
2 Section 12 -821.01(A) provides that claims shall be filed “with the person
or persons authorized to accept service for the public entity.” Pursuant to
Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 4.1(h)(2), service on a county is made on
“the Board of Supervisors clerk for that county.” See Falcon ex rel. Sandoval
v. Maricopa County, 213 Ariz. 525, 256 ¶ 1 (2006) (noting that the county clerk
is authorized to accept service on the county’s behalf).
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Opinion of the Court

II. DISCUSSION

¶6 “We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6).” Shepherd v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 250 Ariz. 511, 513 ¶ 11
(2021). We also review the interpretation of statutes and questions of law
de novo. Staker & Parson Cos. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 257 Ariz. 542, 545 ¶ 7
(2024). And “[w]e interpret statutes ‘according to the plain meaning of the
words in their broader statutory context.’” In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15,
21 ¶ 19 (2024) (quoting S. Ariz. Home Builders Ass’n v. Town of Marana, 254
Ariz. 281, 286 ¶ 31 (2023)).

¶7 Plaintiffs argue that the County is vicariously liable for the
Deputy’s negligence because it exercises control over the Maricopa County
Sheriff (the “Sheriff”) and the Deputy, and the County is the only proper
“public entity” for purposes of complying with § 12-821.01(A) and for
satisfying any judgment against the Deputy. We first consider the issue of
vicarious liability.

A. Vicarious Liability
¶8 Plaintiffs assert that the County is vicariously liable for the
Deputy’s negligence because it exerts control over the Sheriff and the
Deputy under statutory authority and the nature of county governance.
The County argues that it cannot be vicariously liable for the Deputy’s
negligence because it does not control a county sheriff in the exercise of his
law enforcement powers and duties, which are set forth in statute.
Furthermore, counties lack authority over sheriffs, who are elected as
officers separate from county boards. Accordingly, counties also lack the
authority to supervise sheriffs’ deputies. Therefore, the County concludes
that it “cannot and does not exert sufficient control over Sheriffs’ deputies
on the day-to-day execution of their duties to be vicariously liable for their
conduct.”

¶9 Generally, “an employer [is] vicariously liable for the
negligent work-related actions of its employees.” Engler, 230 Ariz. at 57
¶ 9 (quoting Tarron v. Bowen Mach. & Fabricating, Inc., 225 Ariz. 147, 150 ¶ 9
(2010)). But an employer is only vicariously liable for an employee’s
negligence if the employee was subject to the employer’s control or right to
control at the time the negligence occurred. Id. at 57–58 ¶¶ 9–10. Thus,
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Opinion of the Court

the County can only be vicariously liable for the Deputy’s negligence if he
was subject to the County’s control or right to control at the time of the
accident. We therefore turn next to consider the respective duties and
authorities of a county, a county sheriff, and a deputy county sheriff, and
the relationships between them, to determine who had control of the
Deputy.

1. County government and county officers

¶10 Plaintiffs contend that a board controls a county sheriff and
his deputies because, in part, county governance is a “hierarchical
organization” in which a county’s powers are exercised by a board—or
agents and officers acting under a board’s authority. In support, Plaintiffs
cite A.R.S. § 11-201(A)(1), which authorizes a county to sue and be sued,
and § 11-201(A)(3), which provides counties with the authority to make
contracts.

¶11 It is true that a county exercises its powers through “the board
of supervisors or by agents and officers acting under its authority and
authority of law.” § 11-201(A). However, a board has “only those
powers that are expressly or by necessary implication delegated to them by
the legislature.” Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz 486, 488 (1991). And
neither provision of § 11-201 cited—nor any other provision of
§ 11-201—grants a board authority to control a sheriff and his deputies.

¶12 As discussed at oral argument, some federal courts have
relied on A.R.S. § 11-251(1) to conclude that the Board supervises the
Sheriff. See, e.g., United States v. County of Maricopa, 151 F. Supp. 3d 998,
1015 (D. Ariz. 2015) (concluding that “the Board of Supervisors is charged
with supervising the [S]heriff under [§ 11-251(1)]”); United States v. County
of Maricopa, 889 F.3d 648, 651 (9th Cir. 2018) (stating “Arizona statutes also
empower counties to supervise and fund their respective sheriffs” (citing

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Opinion of the Court

§ 11-251(1))). 3 Section 11-251(1) states:

The board of supervisors, under such limitations and
restrictions as are prescribed by law, may . . . [s]upervise the
official conduct of all county officers and officers of all
districts and other subdivisions of the county charged with
assessing, collecting, safekeeping, managing or disbursing
the public revenues, see that the officers faithfully perform
their duties and direct prosecutions for delinquencies, and,
when necessary, require the officers to renew their official
bonds, make reports and present their books and accounts for
inspection.

“Words in statutes, however, cannot be read in isolation from the context
in which they are used.” J.D. v. Hegyi, 236 Ariz. 39, 41 ¶ 6 (2014). As the
court of appeals correctly recognized, § 11-251(1) “does not grant [a county
board of supervisors] plenary power to supervise county officers.”
Sanchez, 256 Ariz. at 498 ¶ 12. Instead, the supervisory power set forth in
§ 11-251(1), when read in context, is directed to supervising the financial
duties of those “charged with assessing, collecting, safekeeping, managing
or disbursing the public revenues.” See id. (quoting § 11-251(1)).

¶13 To read § 11-251(1) to grant a board plenary supervisory
authority over a county sheriff would render many of the provisions in
§ 11-251 and other related statutes superfluous. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 11-219
(“The board may direct the sheriff to attend its meetings to preserve order,
and serve subpoenas, notices or citations.”); § 11-251(25) (giving a county
power to authorize a sheriff to offer rewards for information); § 11-251(26)
(giving a county power to direct a sheriff to transport “insane persons to

3 Curiously, neither court considered Fridena v. Maricopa County, 18 Ariz.
App. 527 (1972), which, as discussed below, addressed a county’s right to
control sheriffs and deputy sheriffs. See In re Kirkland, 915 F.2d 1236,
1238– 39 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) (“When interpreting state law, a
federal court is bound by the decision of the highest state court. In the
absence of such a decision, a federal court must predict how the highest
state court would decide the issue using intermediate appellate court
decisions, decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes, treatises, and
restatements as guidance.”).
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Opinion of the Court

the state hospital”). And “[a] cardinal principle of statutory interpretation
is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word
or provision is rendered superfluous.” Nicaise v. Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566,
568 ¶ 11 (2019). Accordingly, the scope of supervision exercised by a
board over a sheriff pursuant to § 11-251(1) is properly understood as
relating to “fiscal supervision.” Thus, § 11-251(1) is insufficient as a matter
of law to establish a board’s control over a sheriff in the exercise of his
prescribed law enforcement duties.

¶14 Lastly, the mere fact that a county sheriff is a county officer is
insufficient to create a supervisory relationship between a board and a
sheriff. For example, the clerk of a board is an officer of a county, A.R.S.
§ 11-401(A)(8), and is even appointed by a board, A.R.S. § 11-241.
Nonetheless, we have made clear that “[t]he Clerk of the Board of
Supervisors is an officer separate and distinct from the Board, although
appointed by the Board.” Bd. of Supervisors v. Woodall, 120 Ariz. 379, 380
(1978) (internal citation omitted). A sheriff is no less separate and distinct.
See also David R. Berman, Arizona Politics and Government: The Quest for
Autonomy, Democracy, and Development 287 (2024) (discussing arguments for
reforming the number and method of choosing county officers and
characterizing them as “independently elected row officers”).

¶15 We thus disagree with Plaintiffs’ characterization of the
relationship between a board and other county officers as “hierarchical.”
The Arizona Constitution creates county officers who are each separately
and directly elected by voters with no provision subordinating one officer
to another. This includes county sheriffs. Ariz. Const. art. 12, § 3. And
the legislature has provided for specific powers and duties for each officer
that are separate and distinct from those provided to a board. Ariz. Const.
art. 12, § 4; compare §§ 11-201 and -251 (prescribing a board’s powers and
duties) with § 11-441 (prescribing the sheriff’s powers and duties).
Moreover, a county cannot remove a sheriff from office absent specified
circumstances unrelated to the exercise of statutorily delegated law
enforcement authority. See Ariz. Const. art. 8, pt. 1 (concerning recall of
officers); A.R.S. § 11-253(A) (permitting removal for refusal to make
required reports or to give required performance bonds).

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Opinion of the Court

¶16 It is therefore clear that the constitutional and statutory
construction of county government reflects a horizontal distribution of
powers and duties with each officer, including the county sheriff,
separately accountable to voters. See also Berman, supra ¶ 14, at 280
(describing the division of executive authority among county officers as a
“plural executive” construct). In sum, the Arizona Constitution does not
provide a board with any general authority to hire, fire, supervise,
discipline, control, or prescribe duties for a sheriff. Given the need to
determine who controls a deputy in the exercise of law enforcement duties,
we next examine the relationship between sheriffs and their deputies.

2. County sheriffs and deputies

¶17 To start, a sheriff alone appoints deputies. See A.R.S.
§ 11-409. Although § 11-409 provides that a sheriff appoints deputies “by
and with the consent of, and at salaries fixed by the board,” that statute does
not suggest that a board appoints a sheriff’s deputies. The court of appeals
has accurately addressed this point:

The fact that the [b]oard must consent to the appointment of
a given employee does not make the [b]oard a separate
appointing authority. This situation is somewhat analogous
to the President’s power to appoint cabinet-level
department heads, ambassadors, and justices of the United
States Supreme Court. U.S. Const. art. II § 2. While the
Constitution requires such appointments to be made “by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,” it is clear
that the President remains the sole “appointing authority.”
Id.
Hounshell v. White, 220 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 14 (App. 2008). Additionally, once a
deputy is appointed, that deputy “possesses the powers and may perform
the duties prescribed by law for the office of the [sheriff].” A.R.S.
§ 38-462(A). Thus, a deputy’s powers and duties are likewise prescribed
by the legislature and do not derive from a county. See Ariz. Const. art. 12,

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§ 4; § 11-441; § 38-462(A).4 Finally, a sheriff, not a county, has disciplinary
authority over his deputies. See A.R.S. § 11-356(A); Hounshell, 220 Ariz.
at 6 ¶ 22 (noting that the legislature has not given the board the “power to
supervise and impose discipline” on “deputies and employees of other
county officers”). 5 In sum, a sheriff exercises control over deputies, not a
county through its board.

¶18 Finally, the fact that the County owns the vehicle that the
Deputy was driving in the accident is insufficient, by itself, to establish
vicarious liability. See Engler, 230 Ariz. at 55 (holding that an employer
was not vicariously liable for an employee’s rental car accident, despite the
employer paying for the rental car). Although an employee driving a
company vehicle might be evidence supporting that an employee was
subject to the employer’s control and acting within the scope and course of
employment, see Alosi v. Hewitt, 229 Ariz. 449, 455 ¶ 34 (App. 2012), a
deputy who drives a county vehicle while carrying out law enforcement
duties is not subject to any county control for the reasons previously
explained. Thus, based on the foregoing, the County lacks statutory
authority to exercise control over the Sheriff or the Deputy in the exercise
of his law enforcement duties, and thus it cannot be held vicariously liable
for the Deputy’s negligence.

¶19 Our conclusion regarding the lack of control by the County is
consistent with the court of appeals’ reasoning in Fridena v. Maricopa
County, 18 Ariz. App. 527, 530 (1972). In Fridena, the court held that the
county was not vicariously liable for a deputy who served a defective writ
of restitution because the county had “no right of control over the [s]heriff

4 There are instances, though, in which the County could conceivably
control a deputy. See § 11-251(26) (providing that a board may “[c]ontract
for the transportation of insane persons to the state hospital or direct the
sheriff to transport such persons”). But the presence of such specific
statutory authorization underscores that no general supervisory authority
exists.
5 Furthermore, a deputy’s appeal of the Sheriff’s disciplinary action
would go to the Maricopa County Merit System Commission, see
§ 11-356(B), which acts independently of the County, see A.R.S. §§ 11-353
and -354.
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or his deputies in service of the writ of restitution.” Id. Subsequent court
of appeals cases and most federal district courts have consistently followed
Fridena’s reasoning. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Maricopa County, 138 Ariz. 143,
146 (App. 1983); Yamamoto v. Santa Cruz Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 124 Ariz.
538, 540 (App. 1979); Hetzel v. County of Pinal, No. CV-23-00218-PHX-ROS,
2025 WL 711953, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 5, 2025); Kloberdanz v. Arpaio, No.
2:13-cv-02182 JWS, 2014 WL 309078, at *4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 28, 2014); Stricker v.
Yavapai County, No. CIV. 11-8096-PCT-PGR, 2012 WL 5031484, at *4 (D.
Ariz. Oct. 18, 2012); Ochser v. Maricopa County, No. CIV 05-2060 PHX RCB,
2007 WL 1577910, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 31, 2007).

¶20 We acknowledge, as does amicus, that the duties under
consideration in Fridena involved the exercise of a judicial function.
Nonetheless, we approve of and adopt the basic principle set forth: “When
duties are imposed upon a county [sheriff] . . . by law rather than by the
county, the latter will not be responsible for their breach of duty or for their
nonfeasance or misfeasance in relation to such duty.” Fridena, 18 Ariz.
App. at 530 (citation omitted). Here, it is undisputed that the Deputy was
carrying out statutorily imposed law enforcement duties under the Sheriff’s
exclusive control at the time of the accident. As such, the County cannot
be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. We thus turn to
Plaintiffs’ argument that the County must be subject to liability because it
is the only proper “public entity” for purposes of filing a notice of a claim
as required under § 12-821.01(A).

B. Notices Of Claim And § 12-821.01(A)

1. Applicable statutes

¶21 The Arizona Constitution provides that “[t]he legislature
shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought
against the state.” Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 18. Accordingly, the Act sets
forth the procedures a plaintiff must follow to bring an action against public
entities or public employees:

Persons who have claims against a public entity . . . or a
public employee shall file claims with the person or persons
authorized to accept service for the public entity . . . or public
employee as set forth in the Arizona rules of civil
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procedure . . . .

§ 12-821.01(A). This is also known as a “notice of claim.” City of Mesa v.
Ryan, 258 Ariz. 297, 300 ¶ 9 (2024). The notice of claim requirement
permits the “public entity [or public employee] to investigate the claim,
assess liability, consider settlement before litigation, and budget for
possible future litigation.” Id.

¶22 The various governmental actors identified in § 12-821.01(A)
are defined in § 12-820. A “‘[p]ublic entity’ includes this state and any
political subdivision of this state.” § 12-820(7). A “‘[p]ublic employee’
[is] an employee of a public entity.” § 12-820(6). And an “‘[e]mployee’
includes an officer, director, employee or servant, whether or not
compensated or part time, who is authorized to perform any act or service,
except that employee does not include an independent contractor.”
§ 12-820(1).

2. Public entities and claims

¶23 Plaintiffs’ argument that the County is the proper public
entity against whom a notice of claim must be filed, and therefore also the
employer who must be vicariously liable for the Deputy’s negligence, relies
on the requirements of § 12-821.01(A) and the definitions in § 12-820.
First, Plaintiffs contend that only “political subdivision[s] of this state” can
be public entities that employ public employees. Therefore, they assert
that the county sheriff’s office cannot be a public entity because it is a county
department, rather than a political subdivision. 6 Consequently, Plaintiffs
conclude that a county sheriff’s office cannot employ a deputy county
sheriff as a “public employee.”

¶24 Second, Plaintiffs reason that a county sheriff is not a public
entity because, as a county officer, the sheriff is the public employee of a
public entity—a county. The Plaintiffs thus deduce that the County must
be the public entity that employs the Deputy—a public employee.
Therefore, Plaintiffs conclude that the County is vicariously liable for his

6 Plaintiffs further argue that a sheriff’s office cannot be a public entity
because it is a non-jural entity. This point is more fully discussed below,
see supra ¶¶ 23– 34.
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negligence and was the proper “public entity” for service of a notice of
claim. 7 In contrast, the County argues that § 12-821.01 is irrelevant
because Plaintiffs’ vicarious liability claim fails as a matter of law.

¶25 Plaintiffs’ arguments fail because they rest upon the false
premise that § 12-821.01(A) provides for claims against a public entity.
Section 12-821.01(A) addresses “persons who have claims against a public
entity.” (Emphasis added); see also Sanchez, 256 Ariz. at 501–02 ¶ 31. As
the plain language of the subsection demonstrates, the statute does not
create a claim against the County just because it is a “public entity”
according to § 12-820(7). See Sanchez, 256 Ariz. at 501–02 ¶ 31. Rather,
§ 12-821.01(A) is a procedural provision that directs how persons who
already have claims provide a public entity with notice of their claims.
Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 97 v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 295 ¶ 6 (2007)
(stating that the notice of claim statute “describ[es] the proper method and
time frame for filing claims”). Thus, Plaintiffs’ arguments are unavailing
because § 12-821.01(A) cannot create liability. Rather, the facts of
Plaintiffs’ underlying vicarious liability claim determine which
governmental actor must be served with a notice of claim pursuant to
§ 12-821.01(A).

¶26 We next consider Plaintiffs’ contention that they must be able
to file a notice of claim with the County because it is the only jural “public
entity” that can employ the Deputy. Plaintiffs’ argument is predicated on
Arizona courts having held that sheriffs’ offices are non-jural entities. See,
e.g., Braillard v. Maricopa County, 224 Ariz. 481, 487 ¶ 12 (App. 2010).

¶27 It is axiomatic under Arizona law that “[g]overnmental
entities have no inherent power and possess only those powers and duties
delegated to them by their enabling statutes.” McKee v. State, 241 Ariz. 377,
384 ¶ 28 (App. 2016) (quoting Braillard, 224 Ariz. at 487 ¶ 12). “Thus, a
governmental entity may be sued only if the legislature has so provided.”
Id. (quoting Braillard, 224 Ariz. at 487 ¶ 12); see Kimball v. Shofstall, 17 Ariz.
App. 11, 13 (1972) (observing that “[n]either the constitution nor the statutes

7 Plaintiffs raised additional points based on the County’s contracting
authority, but because the arguments are not pertinent to our analysis, we
decline to address them.
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provide that the State Board [of Education] is an autonomous body with the
right to sue and to be sued”). As noted by the Plaintiffs, a county sheriff’s
office does not have the authority to sue or be sued. See Braillard, 224 Ariz.
at 487 ¶ 12. We therefore agree with Plaintiffs that a sheriff’s office cannot
be a “public entity” for notice of claim purposes under § 12-820.01(A).
That leaves the Sheriff.

¶28 Plaintiffs contend that filing a notice of claim with the Sheriff
“would have accomplished nothing” because the Sheriff is a “public
employee,” which requires that the Sheriff be employed by the County—a
“public entity”— pursuant to § 12-820(1), (6), and (7). Plaintiffs also posit
that a human being cannot be a public entity.

¶29 Section 12-820(7) provides that a “‘[p]ublic entity’ includes this
state and any political subdivision of this state.” (Emphasis added.) We
have held that the term “includes” is a “term of
enlargement, . . . encompass[ing] items that were not specifically
enumerated.” Tracy v. Superior Court, 168 Ariz. 23, 35 (1991); see A.R.S.
§ 1-215(14) (“‘Includes’ or ‘including’ means not limited to and is not a term
of exclusion.”). Therefore, § 12-820(7) does not necessarily preclude a
county sheriff from constituting a public entity.

¶30 As we have seen, a sheriff can be, and has been, sued for his
deputies’ misconduct. See, e.g., Ryan v. Napier, 245 Ariz. 54, 58 ¶ 7 (2018)
(recognizing that a claimant brought a vicarious liability claim against a
sheriff predicated on his deputy’s negligence); McCutchen v. Hill, 147 Ariz.
401, 404 (1985) (stating that a sheriff is “liable for the acts of his
deputies . . . ‘[i]f the act from which the injury resulted was an official act’”
(quoting Chaudoin v. Fuller, 67 Ariz. 144, 149–50 (1948))), abrogated on other
grounds by, Cal-Am Props. Inc. v. Edais Eng’g Inc., 253 Ariz. 78, 83 ¶ 18 n.1
(2022); Boies v. Cole, 99 Ariz. 198, 205 (1965) (“A sheriff may not be held for
punitive damages for the acts of his deputy unless he has directed,
participated in, acquiesced or ratified those acts.” (emphasis added)); Miles
v. Wright, 22 Ariz. 73, 82 (1920) (“It is necessary, therefore, in an action
against the sheriff, as such, for damages for a false imprisonment by his
deputy, that the complaint show by proper allegations that the deputy’s act
was an official act.”); A.R.S. § 38-463(A) (“Every officer is liable on his
official bond for any official negligence or misconduct on the part of his

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deputies . . . .”).

¶31 Properly understood, “[a] suit against a state official in his or
her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit
against the official’s office.” See Citizens for Growth Mgmt. v. Groscost, 199
Ariz. 71, 74 ¶ 15 (2000) (citation omitted); see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 17(e) (“A
public officer who sues or is sued in an official capacity may be identified
as a party by the officer’s official title, rather than by name . . . .”); Ariz. R.
Civ. P. 25(d) (noting that an “officer’s successor is automatically substituted
as a party” where the “officer who is a party in an official capacity . . . ceases
to hold office while the action is pending”). And there is a distinction
between the administrative office created to conduct the business of the
Sheriff and the constitutional office held by the Sheriff. See Sharp v.
Maricopa County, No. CV 08-2316-PHX-DGC (JRI), 2009 WL 647349, at *2 (D.
Ariz. Mar. 12, 2009) (noting that in a suit against the Sheriff and the
Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, the office “is simply an administrative
creation of the sheriff to allow him to carry out his statutory duties”); Gobea
v. Penzone, No. CV-24-00457-PHX-JAT (CDB), 2024 WL 1619364, at *3 (D.
Ariz. Apr. 15, 2024) (“A sheriff’s office is simply an administrative creation
of the county sheriff to allow him to carry out his statutory duties and is not
a ‘person’ amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983.”); A.R.S. § 11-413 (requiring
the office of a county officer to be open for a specified period each week
except for the criminal division of the sheriff’s office, which “shall be open
at all times”). Thus, the Sheriff is a “public entity” and can be sued in his
official capacity.

¶32 As discussed, the Deputy was carrying out law enforcement
duties under the control of the Sheriff at the time of the accident, rendering
the Sheriff vicariously liable for the Deputy’s negligence. Accordingly, the
Plaintiffs have a claim against the Sheriff in his official capacity. Thus,
under the facts of this case, the Sheriff is the “public entity” with whom a
notice of claim can be filed. See A.R.S. § 11-454.

¶33 And because the Sheriff’s Office carries out the administrative
functions for the Sheriff, the notice of claim for the Sheriff may be filed with
his office. Indeed, notices of claim against the Sheriff are filed with the
Legal Liaison Section, Compliance Division of the Sheriff’s Office, which is
also a different location than where notices of claim against the County and

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 SANCHEZ ET AL. V. MARICOPA COUNTY
Opinion of the Court

other respective County officers must be filed. See Maricopa County Risk
Management, Notice of Claim Form,
https://www.maricopa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/16046/ClaimsForm
(last visited July 11, 2025). Notably, filing a notice of claim with the
Sheriff’s Office does not make that office the “public entity.” Rather, it
simply accepts filing on behalf of the Sheriff, who is the “public entity.”

¶34 Thus, the superior court was correct to grant the County’s
motion to dismiss regardless of § 12-821.01(A).

C. Financial Responsibility For Judgments

¶35 Plaintiffs and amicus argue that the County must be the
public entity in cases such as this because to hold otherwise would mean
that “a plaintiff’s only recourse against a sheriff’s deputy who causes an
injury is against the deputy himself.” We disagree.

¶36 A.R.S. § 11-444(A) provides that “[t]he sheriff shall be allowed
actual and necessary expenses incurred by the sheriff . . . for transacting all
civil or criminal business . . . and such expenses shall be a county charge.”
Additionally, expenses incurred in litigation concerning the duties of a
county officer are considered a county charge. See Maricopa County v.
Biaett, 21 Ariz. App. 286, 290 (1974) (concluding, in reliance on A.R.S.
§ 11-601(2), that attorney fees resulting from litigation concerning the scope
of duties of the county recorder’s office were a county charge). A money
judgment entered against a county sheriff due to the negligence of one of
his deputies acting within the course and scope of his statutory powers and
duties is a county charge and payable consistent with § 11-444. Thus, our
decision does not absolve the County from its financial responsibility to
satisfy money judgments and the costs of injunctive actions incurred by the
Sheriff.

III. CONCLUSION

¶37 For the foregoing reasons, although we agree with the court
of appeals’ conclusion, we vacate its opinion to replace its reasoning with
our own. We affirm the judgment of the superior court.

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