In Re Term of Parental Rights as to B.W.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.W.

No. CV-24-0079-PR
Filed July 17, 2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Sigmund G. Popko, Judge Pro Tempore
No. JS520409
REVERSED AND REMANDED

Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One
No. 1 CA-JV 23-0202
Filed March 19, 2024
VACATED

COUNSEL:

Sherri McGuire Lawson, Maricopa County Legal Defender, Jamie R. Heller
(argued), Deputy Legal Defender, Phoenix, Attorneys for Jason M.

Joshua A. Barreda, Bonnie Platter (argued), Barreda Law, PLLC, Gilbert,
Attorneys for Jessica W.

David J. Euchner (argued), Pima County Public Defender’s Office, Tucson;
Suzanne Sanchez, Maricopa County Office of the Public Advocate, Phoenix,
attorneys for Amici Curiae Indigent Defense Agencies

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Autumn Spritzer, Assistant
Attorney General, Tucson, AZ Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Department of
Child Safety

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 IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.W.
Opinion of the Court

JUSTICE BEENE authored the opinion of the Court, in which VICE CHIEF
JUSTICE LOPEZ and JUSTICES BOLICK and KING joined. ∗ CHIEF
JUSTICE TIMMER dissented.

JUSTICE BEENE, Opinion of the Court:
¶1 The juvenile court may terminate a parent-child relationship
if it concludes that the parent has abandoned the child and that termination
of the relationship would be in the best interests of the child. See Brionna J.
v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 474 ¶ 1 (2023); A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). A
parent abandons a child by failing “to provide reasonable support and to
maintain regular contact with the child” and instead only making “minimal
efforts to support and communicate with the child.” A.R.S. § 8-531(1). The
statute further provides that the parent’s “[f]ailure to maintain a normal
parental relationship with the child without just cause for a period of six
months constitutes prima facie evidence of abandonment.” Id.

¶2 This Court granted review to determine the role of “just
cause” within § 8-531(1). This first requires us to delineate the procedure
for establishing abandonment as a ground for termination. Then, we must
define what constitutes “just cause” under § 8-531(1). For the reasons
discussed below, we reverse the juvenile court’s termination order and
remand the matter for reconsideration of the abandonment ground
consistent with this Opinion.

BACKGROUND

¶3 B.W. was born to Mother and Father in early 2015. At the
time, Mother and Father lived separately but continued a non-exclusive
intimate relationship. Mother and Father co-parented B.W., but they
frequently argued about his care.

¶4 In August 2015, this already contentious family dynamic
further soured. While Father’s girlfriend’s husband (“Husband”) was on
the phone with Mother, Husband entered Father’s home with a knife.

∗ Justice William G. Montgomery has recused himself from this matter.
Before his retirement, Justice Robert Brutinel (Ret.) also recused himself
from this matter.
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Opinion of the Court

While Mother was still on the call, Father shot and killed Husband. Mother
later became a key prosecution witness in Father’s homicide trial.

¶5 Although Father was not immediately arrested or charged
with a criminal offense, he retained a criminal defense attorney in October
2015. During this time, Father was not under any court-ordered restriction
that prohibited him from contacting Mother or B.W. However, because
Father’s attorney anticipated that criminal charges would be filed, he
advised Father not to contact Mother regarding B.W. Father’s attorney
believed that any attempt to contact Mother could be interpreted as Father’s
attempt to influence or intimidate a key prosecution witness, thereby
compromising Father’s defense in any future criminal case. Acting on this
advice, Father’s last contact with Mother regarding B.W. was in January
2016.

¶6 In November 2016, Father was arrested and charged with first
degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. After a brief
period in custody, Father was released and ordered to have no contact with
any witnesses in the case. While pending trial over the next several years,
Father—who was not incarcerated for the vast majority of this time—did
not take any further action to parent B.W., who remained in Mother’s
custody. Father was ultimately acquitted on all charges in December 2021.

¶7 In March 2022, three months after his acquittal, Father
initiated a family court action seeking to establish his parental rights as to
B.W. Four months later, Mother commenced a juvenile court action seeking
termination of Father’s parental rights based on abandonment. See
§§ 8-531(1), -533(B)(1). Father’s family court proceedings were stayed
pending resolution of Mother’s termination action.

¶8 After a four-day hearing, in which Father testified, the
juvenile court concluded that Father had abandoned B.W. under
§ 8-533(B)(1). It found that Mother had established abandonment as a
ground for termination by showing Father’s absence from B.W.’s life for
longer than the six-month period articulated in § 8-531(1) without just
cause.

¶9 The juvenile court rejected Father’s arguments that he had
“just cause” for his inaction. Though it acknowledged the extraordinary
circumstances in the case, the court found that the unique nature of Father’s

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Opinion of the Court

situation did not justify his failure to “quickly and vigorously” assert his
rights to B.W. “even in the face of obstacles.” The court noted that even
though Father may have been acting in accordance with his criminal
defense attorney’s advice, Father’s reliance on his attorney’s advice did not
“insulate him from the civil consequences of his abandonment of B.W.,”
especially when “no good reasons were offered as to why [Father’s]
available legal options were not explored in either the criminal court or in
a parallel family court proceeding.”

¶10 After finding clear and convincing evidence supporting
abandonment, the juvenile court then concluded that termination of
Father’s parental rights was in B.W.’s best interest and therefore terminated
his parental rights. Father appealed.

¶11 The court of appeals affirmed. In re Termination of Parental Rts.
as to B.W., No. 1 CA-JV 23-0202, 2024 WL 1172862, at *1 ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. Mar.
19, 2024) (mem. decision) (“In re B.W.”). The court rejected Father’s
argument that he rebutted the abandonment presumption by
demonstrating “just cause” under § 8-531(1). Id. at *3 ¶ 17. The court
determined that Father’s failure to pursue legal action to establish his
parental rights and obligations for six years and decision to follow the
advice of his criminal defense attorney, who did not practice family or
juvenile law, did not excuse his inaction. Id. ¶¶ 18–19. The court of appeals
held that Father was “mistaken” in asserting that “just cause” functioned
as “an exception to abandonment.” Id. ¶ 18. The court noted that “Father
had to do something if he wanted to preserve the parental relationship, and
instead he chose to do nothing.” Id. ¶ 19. Accordingly, it concluded that
the juvenile court did not err in finding that Mother established
abandonment under §§ 8-531(1) and -533(B)(1) by clear and convincing
evidence. Id.

¶12 We granted Father’s petition for review to provide guidance
on what constitutes “just cause” under § 8-531(1) and to clarify the
procedure for establishing prima facie evidence of abandonment under the
statute, both recurring issues of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

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Opinion of the Court

DISCUSSION

I.

¶13 Juvenile courts apply a two-step analysis in determining
whether to terminate a parent-child relationship. Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474 ¶ 13 (2022). First, the court must decide whether
clear and convincing evidence supports at least one ground for termination
listed in § 8-533(B). Id. Second, the court must determine whether a
preponderance of evidence supports a finding that termination is in the
child’s best interests. Id.

¶14 We will affirm a juvenile court’s termination order unless it is
clearly erroneous. Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 580 ¶ 10
(2021). A decision is clearly erroneous if, as a matter of law, “no one could
reasonably find the evidence to be clear and convincing.” Brionna J., 255
Ariz. at 479 ¶ 31 (quoting Murillo v. Hernandez, 79 Ariz. 1, 9 (1955)).
Whether abandonment has been established is necessarily a question of fact
for the trial court. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 250
¶ 20 (2000). But statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which
we review de novo. Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 476 ¶ 17.

II.

¶15 Termination of parental rights is governed by § 8-533, which
sets forth various grounds for termination—including abandonment.
§ 8-533(B)(1). Mother’s petition for termination alleged abandonment as
the basis to terminate Father’s parental rights. The statutory definition of
“abandonment” provides:

“Abandonment” means the failure of a parent to provide
reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the
child, including providing normal supervision.
Abandonment includes a judicial finding that a parent has
made only minimal efforts to support and communicate with
the child. Failure to maintain a normal parental relationship
with the child without just cause for a period of six months
constitutes prima facie evidence of abandonment.

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Opinion of the Court

§ 8-531(1). Determining the procedure for establishing abandonment and
the meaning of “just cause” are matters of statutory interpretation.

¶16 “We interpret statutes ‘in view of the entire text, considering
the context and related statutes on the same subject.’” Planned Parenthood
Ariz., Inc. v. Mayes, 257 Ariz. 137, 142 ¶ 15 (2024) (quoting Nicaise v.
Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566, 568 ¶ 11 (2019)). Courts will read each word,
phrase, clause, and sentence in a manner that ensures “no part of the statute
is void or trivial” and will give meaning to the statute’s clear and
unequivocal language. Id. “Under this plain meaning analysis, ‘[w]e look
first to the language of the provision, for if the [statutory] language is clear,
judicial construction is neither required nor proper.’” Id. (alterations in
original) (quoting Perini Land & Dev. Co. v. Pima County, 170 Ariz. 380, 383
(1992)). Additionally, statutory terms are given their commonly accepted
meanings absent legislative definitions or indication from context that a
special meaning was intended. Id. ¶ 16.

III.

¶17 We first clarify the procedure for establishing abandonment.
The plain language of § 8-531(1) provides that “prima facie evidence of
abandonment” is established if a parent fails to maintain a “normal parental
relationship” with the child for six months without “just cause.” Though
this Court has not previously addressed what “prima facie evidence”
means in the context of establishing abandonment, Arizona courts have
held in other contexts that prima facie evidence establishes a presumption.
E.g., State ex rel. Horne v. AutoZone, Inc., 227 Ariz. 471, 479 ¶ 21 (App. 2011)
(explaining “[p]rima facie evidence is not evidence at all but rather is a
presumption of law that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, allows
the trier of fact to presume the existence of a fact based on proof of other
facts”), vacated in part on other grounds, 229 Ariz. 358 (2012). But the effect of
a presumption is limited: “Whenever evidence contradicting a legal
presumption is introduced the presumption vanishes.” Silva v. Traver, 63
Ariz. 364, 368 (1945), overruled on other grounds by Reed v. Hinderland, 135
Ariz. 213, 219 (1983); see Barlage v. Valentine, 210 Ariz. 270, 277 ¶ 27 (App.
2005) (“Prima facie evidence of a particular fact raises a rebuttable
presumption of, but does not conclusively establish, that fact.”).

¶18 Under these principles, a parent establishes “prima facie
evidence of abandonment”—and thereby a presumption—by showing that

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Opinion of the Court

the other parent failed to maintain a normal parental relationship for six
months without just cause. As part of this preliminary burden of
production, the parent seeking termination must allege facts sufficient to
support each of these elements: (1) failure to maintain a normal parental
relationship; (2) for six months; and (3) without just cause. The other parent
may rebut this presumption by showing just cause or by presenting other
evidence that disproves the alleged failure to maintain a normal parental
relationship, at which point the presumption “vanishes.” See Silva, 63 Ariz.
at 368; Golonka v. Gen. Motors Corp., 204 Ariz. 575, 589 ¶ 48 (App. 2003).
Once the other parent presents such evidence, the presumption’s “‘bubble
is burst,’ and the existence or non-existence of the presumed fact must be
determined as if the presumption had never operated in the case.” Golonka,
204 Ariz. at 589 ¶ 48. Thus, a presumption of abandonment established
under § 8-531(1) can be defeated if the parent demonstrates “just cause” for
failing to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child.

¶19 It is important to note that even if the presumption of
abandonment does not apply, termination may still be proper.
Abandonment can still be proven despite the absence of an abandonment
presumption under § 8-531(1) if the other parent failed to “provide
reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the child,
including providing normal supervision,” for a sustained period.
However, as in the case where abandonment is presumed, if a parent can
show “just cause” for failing to maintain a normal parental relationship
under the circumstances, the claim of abandonment fails as unproven.
Although § 8-531(1) does not expressly reference the role of just cause
outside of a presumption of abandonment, the statute necessarily implies
that just cause may also overcome evidence that would otherwise suggest
abandonment even when the abandonment presumption does not apply.
See Hoyle v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 224, 227 (App. 1989) (“What a statute
necessarily implies is as much a part of the statute as what the statute
specifically expresses.”). By including durational and just cause
components within the presumption, § 8-531(1) necessarily implies that
abandonment occurs when, over a sustained period of time, a parent fails
to provide reasonable support to the child and maintain regular contact
with the child, including normal supervision, and does not establish just
cause. The presumption, with its six-month requirement and “without just
cause” component, is simply an evidentiary shortcut for fulfilling the
definition of abandonment in the first sentence of the statute. Showing the
presumption proves abandonment absent a contrary showing by the other

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Opinion of the Court

parent. It necessarily and logically follows, therefore, that abandonment
includes a sustained period where a parent fails to provide reasonable
support or maintain regular contact, including normal supervision, and the
parent fails to show just cause. Therefore, contrary to the court of appeals’
holding, “just cause” is an exception to abandonment. See In re B.W., 2024
WL 1172862, at *3 ¶ 18.

¶20 We pause here to clarify the procedure the juvenile court
should apply when determining the applicability of § 8-531(1)’s
presumption. As detailed above, when prima facie evidence of
abandonment is presented, it creates a presumption in favor of the parent
seeking termination that the other parent failed to maintain a normal
parental relationship. At that point, the burden of production shifts to the
other parent to rebut the presumption of abandonment. See In re Pima Cnty.
Juv. Action No. S-1182, 136 Ariz. 432, 433 (App. 1983) (concluding father’s
evidence sufficient to “rebut the presumption” of abandonment). The
burden of persuasion, however, never shifts from the parent seeking
termination. See Golonka, 204 Ariz. at 590 ¶ 50 (concluding that “a
presumption is a procedural device that shifts the burden of producing
contrary evidence to the party opposing the presumed fact but leaves the
burden of persuasion on the proponent of the evidence”); see also Ariz. R.
Evid. 301 (“In a civil case, unless a statute or these rules provide otherwise,
the party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of
producing evidence to rebut the presumption. But this rule does not shift
the burden of persuasion, which remains on the party who had it
originally.”).

IV.

¶21 We now turn to interpreting “normal parental relationship”
and “just cause.”

¶22 Although § 8-531(1) does not expressly define “normal
parental relationship,” the plain meaning of “normal parental relationship”
is informed by the first two sentences of the statute. Reading § 8-531(1) as
a whole, “abandonment” signifies the “[f]ailure to maintain a normal
parental relationship.” Because “abandonment” means “the failure of a
parent to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with
the child, including providing normal supervision,” it logically follows that
a “normal parental relationship” exists when a parent provides the support

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Opinion of the Court

and contact with the child that a parent who abandoned the child has failed
to offer.

¶23 Next, we determine the meaning of “just cause” within the
context of abandonment. “Just cause” is not statutorily defined, and this
Court has not previously interpreted this term within the context of
termination actions. Absent a statutory definition, this Court interprets
words in accordance with their ordinary meaning. Chaparro v. Shinn, 248
Ariz. 138, 141 ¶ 14 (2020). Contemporary dictionary definitions may be
used to help define terms within their statutory context. See Garibay v.
Johnson, 565 P.3d 236, 243 ¶ 24 (Ariz. 2025) (“Absent a statutory definition,
we may consider dictionaries and written publications to discern the
word’s common meaning and usage, respectively, at the time the
legislature enacted the statute.”).

¶24 When the legislature initially enacted § 8-531(1) in 1970,1 and
when it subsequently recodified the current version of the statute in 1994,
“just cause” was defined as “a cause outside legal cause, which must be
based on reasonable grounds” and “[f]air, adequate, reasonable cause” that
is “regulated by good faith.” Just Cause, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed.
1961); Just Cause, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1989); Just Cause,
Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1969) (defining “just cause” as “[a] legal
cause; a fair cause relied upon in good faith”). These definitions align with
standard dictionary definitions of “just” and “cause” separately. “Just”
refers to something that is “legal or lawful,” “reasonable,” “justified,” and
“in accordance with law and justice.” Just, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed.
1961); Just, Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary (1966). “Cause” refers to
“a reason or motive for action or condition.” Cause, Webster’s Third New
Int’l Dictionary (1966). Essentially, “just cause” refers to a reasonable and
justifiable reason for an action—or in our case, inaction. We conclude that
parents have “just cause” when they had a reasonable and fair justification
for not maintaining a normal parental relationship with the child and relied
on that justification in good faith.

¶25 In determining whether “just cause” exists, the juvenile court
should continue to examine whether the parent is acting to maintain a

1 In 1970, § 8-531(1), defining “abandonment,” was initially codified at
A.R.S. § 8-546(1) and was subsequently recodified to be a part of § 8-531 by
the passage of H.B. 2462, 41st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1994).
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normal parent-child relationship. See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249–50 ¶ 18,
250 ¶ 22. However, this is only one factor that should be considered in
evaluating a parent’s ability to perform their parental obligations. Id. This
Court in Michael J. stated that when “circumstances prevent the . . . father
from exercising traditional methods of bonding with his child, he . . . must
vigorously assert his legal rights to the extent necessary.” Id. (first alteration
in original) (quoting In re Pima Cnty. Juv. Severance Action No. S-114487, 179
Ariz. 86, 97 (1994)). While the father must actively assert his legal rights to
the extent necessary, the juvenile court must also consider additional facts
and circumstances that may have fairly and reasonably impacted his
understanding of what conduct was feasible and any resulting
consequences. In Michael J., the father was serving a lengthy prison
sentence but faced no obvious legal impediments or consequences for
engaging with his child to the degree possible during his incarceration. See
id. at 247 ¶ 3, 251 ¶ 24. However, in cases that present additional factors
that may impact a parent’s ability or belief as to his ability to assert his
rights, the juvenile court must also consider these factors when determining
whether a parent failed to maintain a normal parental relationship.

¶26 Accordingly, in making the “just cause” determination, the
juvenile court should examine what a parent has done to facilitate a normal
parental relationship in accordance with Michael J., but it must also consider
that the parent’s conduct—or ability to “do something”—may be affected
by a parent’s reasonable, good faith belief that circumstances exist that
preclude the parent from exercising traditional methods of maintaining a
normal parental relationship.

V.

¶27 Applying the definition of “just cause” to the case before us,
Father does not dispute that sufficient evidence created a presumption
under § 8-531(1) that he abandoned B.W. Rather, Father contends that he
did not take any action to parent B.W.—such as contacting Mother,
pursuing modification of his pretrial release conditions to see his child, or
filing an action in family court to establish parenting time—because his
criminal defense attorney advised him that these acts would likely
jeopardize his chance of prevailing at his criminal trial. Father
acknowledges that he failed to maintain a normal parental relationship
with his child for more than six years. However, he argues that the

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Opinion of the Court

termination should be reversed because he rebutted the abandonment
presumption by showing “just cause” under the statute.

¶28 The juvenile court rejected Father’s argument that he had
“just cause” for his inaction. As previously noted, the court determined
that Father failed to act “quickly and vigorously even in the face of obstacles
to establish a parent-child relationship.” It concluded that even with the
ongoing first degree murder prosecution, Father’s reliance on his criminal
defense attorney’s advice “does not insulate him from the civil
consequences of his abandonment.” The court of appeals agreed and held
that “reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that Father
failed to show ‘just cause’ for his decision to forgo the parental
relationship.” In re B.W., 2024 WL 1172862, at *3 ¶ 18.

¶29 The record on appeal is unclear as to what specific advice
Father received from his criminal defense attorney, the nature of Father’s
pretrial release conditions, and the attendant circumstances that may have
influenced what he believed he could do to maintain a normal parental
relationship with B.W. given his perceived legal jeopardy. In light of this
imprecise factual background, we remand the matter to the juvenile court.
Although we express no opinion on the merits of the question on remand,
the court should consider the definition of “just cause” as explained in this
opinion in determining whether a reasonable person in Father’s place,
acting in good faith reliance on his criminal defense attorney’s advice,
would have decided not to maintain a normal parental relationship with
his child.

¶30 Our dissenting colleague suggests that “[t]he record is clear
and adequately supports the finding that Father abandoned B.W.” Infra
¶ 36. The dissent then states that the record clearly demonstrates that
Father’s criminal defense attorney advised him not to contact Mother in any
way, that Father’s release conditions only prevented him from contacting
witnesses and not B.W., and that “Father ultimately chose inaction” despite
receiving advice regarding alternate legal options from his family law
attorney. Infra ¶¶ 38–40. However, while the record reflects the general
nature of the advice Father received, it does not indicate what alternate
legal options Father’s family law attorney provided or whether these
options may have conflicted with his criminal defense attorney’s
instructions not to have any contact with Mother. Further, although the
pretrial release order did not prohibit Father from contacting B.W., it is

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Opinion of the Court

difficult to imagine how Father could contact B.W.—who was a young child
at the time—without any contact with Mother. It is also unclear whether
Father knew he could have moved to modify his release conditions to
permit him to contact B.W. through Mother. Additional circumstances may
have also affected Father’s understanding of what he could legally and
reasonably do to assert his parental rights.

¶31 The dissent would conclude that there was no just cause here
because “Father chose to do nothing” despite the availability of “other
avenues” of asserting his parental rights. Infra ¶¶ 46, 48–49. This reliance
on Michael J.’s requirement that a parent “do something” is inapposite
because, unlike the father in Michael J. who faced no legal impediments to
his ability or perceived ability to “do something,” Father’s conduct may
have been affected by a reasonable, good faith belief that he was precluded
from taking action. Additionally, as noted above, the record does not detail
what additional avenues were available, whether Father fully understood
how to pursue these steps, or whether the advice from his two attorneys
conflicted. The dissent also notes that “Father’s own actions undermine his
claim that he was hamstrung by his reliance on defense counsel’s advice”
because he sometimes disregarded this advice to ask Mother about visiting
B.W. Infra ¶ 46. However, Father contacted Mother against his attorney’s
advice before he was criminally charged. We believe that disregarding his
attorney’s advice before he was criminally charged should not conclusively
preclude a finding of just cause predicated on Father’s reliance on his
attorney’s advice after he was charged with first degree murder. A juvenile
court may conclude that, after he was charged, Father reasonably decided
not to jeopardize his defense in a now-pending criminal proceeding upon
realizing that a conviction would further hinder his ability to establish a
parental relationship.

¶32 Because the juvenile court did not have the benefit of the
definition of just cause articulated in this Opinion, it could not have
addressed what Father reasonably believed he could do to establish and
nurture a parental relationship with B.W. Instead, the juvenile court was
left to focus entirely on possible courses of action Father could have taken
in hindsight. As noted above, when determining whether a parent had just
cause, a juvenile court must now consider the parent’s reasonable, good
faith belief that circumstances exist that preclude the parent from exercising
traditional methods of maintaining a normal parental relationship.

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Therefore, remanding this case is appropriate to allow the court to consider
the facts in the record and apply this Opinion’s definition of just cause.

¶33 In balancing the parent’s liberty interest in “the care, custody,
and management” of their children with the state’s interest in protecting
the stability of the parent-child relationship, our interpretation of § 8-531(1)
continues this Court’s adherence to the important constitutional precept
that parental rights “do[] not evaporate simply because” the parent has “not
been [a] model parent[].” Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 579 ¶ 8, 581 ¶ 17 (quoting
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)). The circumstances and
resulting conduct surrounding a fractured parent-child
relationship—occurring either by choice or through neglect—should be
thoroughly examined by the juvenile court before it terminates a parent’s
rights because “[f]ew forms of state action are both so severe and so
irreversible.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759. We believe § 8-531(1) requires such
an application as a matter of textual meaning and constitutional principle.

CONCLUSION

¶34 We reverse the juvenile court’s order terminating Father’s
parental rights to B.W. and remand for a new determination applying the
standards set forth in this Opinion. We vacate the court of appeals’
memorandum decision.

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Chief Justice Timmer, Dissenting

TIMMER, C.J., dissenting.

¶35 Although I agree with the majority’s articulation of the
applicable framework for assessing abandonment under A.R.S. § 8-531(1),
I respectfully disagree that a remand is warranted.

¶36 My colleagues do not identify any legal error made by the
juvenile court in finding that Father lacked just cause for not maintaining a
normal parental relationship with B.W. during Father’s lengthy criminal
proceedings. In fact, consistent with the majority’s own definition of “just
cause,” see supra ¶¶ 24–26, the juvenile court carefully examined Father’s
ability to “do something” in light of his reliance on defense counsel’s
advice. Despite this, the majority finds the record too ambiguous to
determine whether reasonable evidence supports the court’s judgment,
necessitating remand. See supra ¶ 29. I disagree. The record is clear and
adequately supports the finding that Father abandoned B.W. Accordingly,
I would affirm the judgment terminating his parental rights.

A. The Record Is Clear

¶37 The majority concludes that the record is “unclear as to
[1] what specific advice Father received from his criminal defense attorney,
[2] the nature of Father’s pretrial release conditions, and [3] the attendant
circumstances that may have influenced what he believed he could do to
maintain a normal parental relationship with B.W. given his perceived legal
jeopardy.” See supra ¶ 29. But the extensive evidentiary
record—comprising five days of testimony and exhibits—provides clarity
on each of these points.

¶38 First, there is no ambiguity regarding defense counsel’s
advice. The attorney testified that he consistently advised Father not to
contact Mother in any way—whether to arrange visitation, send gifts or
money, or otherwise reach out—lest he be accused of attempting to
influence a key prosecution witness. Father confirmed that this was the
advice he received and added that the attorney also advised him against
pursuing enforcement of his parenting rights in court.

¶39 Second, the testimony confirmed that while Father’s pretrial
release conditions barred him from contacting witnesses, including Mother,
they did not prevent contact with B.W., nor did they bar him from seeking

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Chief Justice Timmer, Dissenting

family court intervention to establish contact. Also, there was no protective
order in place preventing Father from contacting B.W.

¶40 Third, Father testified extensively about “the attendant
circumstances” surrounding his decision to disengage from B.W. while the
criminal case was pending. He relied on defense counsel’s stark warning
that contact with Mother could result in criminal liability, also believing
that Mother was intent on physically harming him. He acknowledged
consulting a family law attorney associated with his defense counsel and
who knew about the defense attorney’s advice. The family law attorney
nevertheless offered legal options Father could pursue to see B.W., yet
Father ultimately chose inaction, which he described as the most difficult
decision of his life. He later told a social study provider that he refrained
from parenting efforts not just to heed legal advice, but because he feared
incarceration would later harm any bond with B.W. he managed to form.

¶41 The majority does not identify what more is needed to clarify
the evidence presented to the juvenile court. Notably, the judge expressed
no confusion and accepted as true that Father followed his defense
attorney’s advice. And the only way to gain more factual clarity is to reopen
the evidentiary proceedings and give Father an undeserved second bite of
the apple at showing just cause for not providing reasonable support for
B.W. or maintaining regular contact with him, including normal
supervision, for more than six years. In my view, nothing will be
accomplished by a remand.

B. Reasonable Evidence Supports The Judgment

¶42 Whether Father abandoned B.W. pursuant to § 8-531(1) is a
factual question for the juvenile court. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 250 ¶ 20 (2000). This Court defers to such findings if
supported by reasonable evidence. See Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255
Ariz. 471, 478 ¶ 30 (2023). That standard is met here.

¶43 I agree with the majority that just cause exists if a parent has
“a reasonable and fair justification” for their inaction and relies on that
justification in good faith. See supra ¶ 24. The critical inquiry here is
whether Father’s reliance on defense counsel’s advice justified his failure to
financially support B.W. or maintain contact with him for more than six
years.

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 IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.W.
Chief Justice Timmer, Dissenting

¶44 We evaluate Father’s conduct—not his subjective intent—and
ask what a reasonably prudent person in his circumstances would have
done. See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 250 ¶ 18. Applying that test, I agree with
the court of appeals that reasonable evidence exists to support the juvenile
court’s finding that Father’s decision to forego a parental relationship with
B.W. for so long, even in the face of his defense attorney’s advice, was
unjustified. See In re Termination of Parental Rts. as to B.W., No. 1 CA-JV
23-0202, 2024 WL 1172862, at *3 ¶ 18 (Ariz. App. Mar. 19, 2024) (mem.
decision).

¶45 Father indisputably failed to provide any financial support
for B.W.—even through a third party—or maintain even minimal contact
with him for more than six years. He sent no cards, gifts, or messages. Even
assuming a temporary pause in contact may have been prudent early in the
criminal investigation, that does not justify Father’s long-term failure to
pursue lawful avenues for maintaining a connection with his son.
Although Father was in a tough spot, B.W. was far too young to wait more
than six years for Father’s legal troubles to resolve before having a father in
his life.

¶46 Father’s own actions undermine his claim he was hamstrung
by his reliance on defense counsel’s advice. He disregarded that advice at
times by contacting Mother to ask about visiting B.W. Moreover, he sought
advice from a family law attorney and was told there were “things he could
do” to assert his rights. Instead of exploring those steps, however, Father
chose to do nothing.

¶47 The majority dismisses these actions because Father followed
his criminal defense attorneys’ advice after formal charges were filed. See
supra ¶ 31. It theorizes that “[a] juvenile court may conclude that, after he
was charged, Father reasonably decided not to jeopardize his defense in a
now-pending criminal proceeding upon realizing that a conviction would
further hinder his ability to establish a parental relationship.” See supra
¶ 31. But the juvenile court here had all this evidence before it and did not
reach that conclusion. The majority fails to explain why we should not
defer to the juvenile court on that point. See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 30.
Indeed, the court may have given little weight to Father’s decision to follow
the defense attorney’s advice after charges were filed, because charges were
not filed until more than a year after the attorney first gave the advice. That

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 IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.W.
Chief Justice Timmer, Dissenting

left approximately fifteen months during which Father—without any
pending charges—still chose to do nothing after last seeing B.W.

¶48 Although Father faced a difficult situation, with Mother a key
prosecution witness and serious charges pending, his reliance on his
defense strategy cannot justify years of disengagement. He had other
avenues—such as requesting a DNA test, registering with the putative
father registry, or initiating a paternity action—that required no direct
contact with Mother and posed no credible risk he would be accused of
witness tampering. And as the juvenile court explained, Father could have
explored ways in either the family court or the criminal court to have a
relationship with his son without contacting Mother or being accused of
attempting to influence or intimidate her.

¶49 We have repeatedly emphasized that a parent “must act
persistently” to establish and maintain a relationship with his child; “must
vigorously assert his legal rights to the extent necessary”; and “do
something, because conduct speaks louder than words or subjective
intent.” See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 250 ¶ 22 (quoting In re Pima Cnty. Juv.
Severance Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 97 (1994)). Here, Father did
nothing. Considering the unexplored pathways to “doing something” that
would not have involved contacting Mother or risking the success of his
defense of the criminal charges, I cannot say the juvenile court’s finding was
in error. See In re Yuma Cnty. Juv. Ct. Action No. J-87-119, 161 Ariz. 537,
539–40 (App. 1989) (finding no just cause for father failing to maintain a
normal parenting relationship even though mother hid child and severed
ties where father made no effort to find the child), cited with approval in
Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. at 99; cf. Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,
202 Ariz. 76, 80 ¶¶ 15–17 (App. 2001) (finding that parents’ election not to
participate in reunification services due to alleged conflict with Fifth
Amendment rights and on advice from attorneys defending them in
prosecution for murdering another child did not excuse parents’ inaction).

¶50 I would affirm the judgment terminating Father’s rights to
B.W. Therefore, with great respect for my colleagues, I dissent.

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