Roundtree v. Page

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

DEBRA ROUNDTREE, AN INDIVIDUAL; STEVEN KIDMAN, AN INDIVIDUAL;
PAGE ACTION COMMITTEE, A REGISTERED POLITICAL COMMITTEE,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.

CITY OF PAGE, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA; KARY
HOLLOWAY, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CITY CLERK; KIM LARSON, IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING DEPUTY CITY CLERK,
Defendants/Appellees.

No. CV-24-0144-PR
Filed July 30, 2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
No. S0300CV202400227
The Honorable Cathleen Brown Nichols, Judge
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One
1 CA-CV 24-0387 EL
Filed July 2, 2024
VACATED

ROUNDTREE, ET AL. V. CITY OF PAGE, ET AL.
Opinion of the Court

COUNSEL:

James E. Barton II (argued), Jacqueline Mendez Soto and Daniella
Fernandez Lertzman, Barton Mendez Soto PLLC, Tempe, Attorneys for
Debra Roundtree, et al.

Christina Estes-Werther, Jon M. Paladini (argued) and Matthew W.
Schiumo, Pierce Coleman PLLC, Scottsdale, Attorneys for City of Page, et
al.

Emily Ward, Fennemore Craig, P.C., Phoenix, Attorneys for Amici Curiae
Daniel R. Luster and Lyle S. Dimblatt

Nancy L. Davidson, League of Arizona Cities and Towns, Phoenix,
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae League of Arizona Cities and Towns

_______________

JUSTICE BOLICK authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE TIMMER, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ, and JUSTICES BEENE,
MONTGOMERY, KING, and BERCH (Ret.) 1 joined.
_______________

JUSTICE BOLICK, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 We hold in this case that an initiative proposed by residents
of the City of Page (the “City”), decreeing that a certain street within the
City shall never be narrowed, is legislative in nature and therefore falls
within the citizens’ right to initiate laws at the local level pursuant to
article 4, part 1, section 1(8) of the Arizona Constitution.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The proposed initiative in this case takes place against the
backdrop of the City’s Streetscape Project (the “Project”). The Project, as

1 Justice Cruz is recused from this matter. Pursuant to article 6, section 3 of
the Arizona Constitution, Justice Rebecca White Berch (Ret.) of the Arizona
Supreme Court was designated to sit in this matter.
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Opinion of the Court

envisioned by the City, the City of Page City Council (the “Council”), and
community members, sought to increase local economic development
following the departure of the City’s largest employer. Among many other
features, the Project aimed to revitalize the City’s downtown, in part, by
reducing the size and number of lanes within a portion of Lake Powell
Boulevard. After six years of extensive planning, the Council approved a
budget that included an appropriation for the Project, and the City began
contracting with firms to engineer and construct its design.

¶3 The Page Action Committee, committee member Debra
Roundtree, and qualified city elector Steven Kidman (collectively, the
“Committee”) opposed the Project’s reduction in the width of Lake Powell
Boulevard, and they drafted an initiative (the “Initiative”) to maintain the
size and lanes of the road:

The citizens of Page, Arizona do hereby find and determine
that it is in the best interest of the citizens to maintain the size
and number of traffic lanes at Laek [sic] Powell Boulevard
from Rim View Drive to Aspen Street as presently existed on
October 1, 2023. And further, that making changes that
degrade the usefulness of this portion of road is wasteful of
the public fisc and harmful to the general welfare.
....
Neither public resources of the City nor outside funds from
any source shall be used in anyway [sic] to facilitate,
encourage, support, or actualize a reduction in the number of
lanes or size of Lake Powell Boulevard between Rim View
Drive and Aspen Street from the current size and number of
lanes.

¶4 The Committee applied for a serial number, collected the
requisite number of signatures, and submitted its signed petition sheets to
the City. The City rejected the Initiative and refused to place it on the ballot,
concluding that it was “not a legislative act,” thus rendering it invalid under
article 4, part 1, section 1(8) of the Arizona Constitution. Consequently, the
Committee filed a special action complaint in the superior court where the
Initiative was also found to be non-legislative in nature. The Committee
appealed.

¶5 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s findings,
emphasizing that the judiciary may only enjoin the placement of an
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ROUNDTREE, ET AL. V. CITY OF PAGE, ET AL.
Opinion of the Court

otherwise qualified initiative on the ballot if it does not constitute
legislation. Roundtree v. City of Page, No. 1 CA-CV 24-0387 EL, 2024 WL
3273984, at *2 ¶ 10, *3 ¶ 16 (Ariz. App. July 2, 2024) (mem. decision). The
court explained that in deciding whether an initiative is legislative, one
must consider “whether the proposition is (1) permanent or temporary,
(2) of general or specific, limited application, and (3) a matter of policy
creation versus a form of policy implementation.” Id. at *3 ¶ 13 (citing
Wennerstrom v. City of Mesa, 169 Ariz. 485, 489 (1991)).

¶6 As for the first two factors, the court concluded that the
Initiative was “of ‘specific (limited) application’” because, while it was not
subject to any temporal limitation, the Initiative only concerned a 1.4-mile
portion of a 3.4-mile road. Id. ¶ 14. The court also found that the Initiative
failed to satisfy the third factor. Id. ¶ 15. The court determined that the City
already established policy by creating the Project, and that the Initiative
“attempts to control” the implementation of this policy. Id. Because the
Initiative attempts only to control the size and number of lanes within the
Project—an administrative duty of the City—the court reasoned that the
subject matter of the Initiative is administrative rather than legislative. Id.
Thus, the court concluded that the Committee was not entitled to relief. Id.

¶7 This Court granted review on the rephrased question of
whether the Initiative complies with article 4, part 1, section 1(8), as the
constitutional rules governing local citizen initiatives are a matter of
statewide concern. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3)
of the Arizona Constitution.

ANALYSIS

¶8 As the City’s action in excluding the proposed Initiative from
the ballot is based solely on constitutional concerns, this case presents
purely legal issues that we review de novo. See AZ Petition Partners LLC v.
Thompson, 255 Ariz. 254, 257 ¶ 9 (2023).

¶9 The Committee makes two arguments about why the
proposed Initiative falls within the constitutional authority of the City’s
electors. The Committee first argues that article 4, part 1 authorizes
initiatives on any matter, rather than only proposed legislation. Thus,
according to the Committee, the relevant inquiry is not whether the
Initiative is administrative or legislative, but whether general laws
authorized the City to enact a measure. If so, the Initiative complies with
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ROUNDTREE, ET AL. V. CITY OF PAGE, ET AL.
Opinion of the Court

the constitution, even if administrative. Alternatively, if article 4, part 1
only authorizes electors to propose legislation, the Committee argues that
the Initiative is legislative rather than administrative. In particular, the
Committee asserts that if the three-part Wennerstrom test applies to this
determination, as the court of appeals held, Roundtree, 2024 WL 3273984,
at *3 ¶¶ 13–15, the Initiative is legislative because (1) it seeks to enact a
permanent rule; (2) the fact that it affects a single geographic location does
not make it administrative; and (3) it creates rather than administers policy.

¶10 The City argues, in response, that the Arizona Constitution
requires initiatives to be legislative in nature because initiatives must be on
“matters the City is ‘empowered by general laws to legislate.’” See Ariz.
Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(8). The City asserts that the Initiative implements
already established City policy, specifically the Project. Further, the City
contends it already passed an ordinance that gives the city engineer control
over city streets; thus, the Initiative would supplant the city engineer’s
delegated administrative authority, which makes the Initiative
administrative in nature.

¶11 The foundational principle that informs this case is that the
people’s power to make laws is co-equal to their elected representatives’
authority to create legislation. See, e.g., League of Ariz. Cities & Towns v.
Brewer, 213 Ariz. 557, 559 ¶ 9 (2006). But it is not without limit. As
explained below, we agree with the City that initiatives must be legislative
in nature. But because we conclude that the Initiative proposes legislation,
it is a proper matter for the City’s voters to decide.

A.

¶12 We can quickly dispose of the Committee’s argument that
article 4, part 1 authorizes initiatives on any matter, rather than only
proposed legislation. See generally Ariz. Const. art. 4, part 1 (titled
“Legislative authority, initiative and referendum”). The broad language
the Committee cites can be found in section 2, which defines the initiative
power and provides that qualified electors “have the right to propose any
measure.” Ariz. Const. art. 4, part 1, § 2.

¶13 We interpret statutory and constitutional provisions not in
isolation, but in context with other provisions covering the same subject
matter, to ensure that the provisions’ meaning is effectuated. See, e.g., In re
Chalmers, ___ Ariz. ___, 2025 WL 1910574, at *3 ¶ 18 (2025) (stating
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ROUNDTREE, ET AL. V. CITY OF PAGE, ET AL.
Opinion of the Court

“[c]ontext is always relevant to statutory interpretation” (emphasis in
original)). Part 1 goes on to specify in section 8, titled “Local, city, town or
county matters,” that qualified electors in such subdivisions of the state
have the power of initiative and referendum “as to all matters” on which
such entities “are or shall be empowered by general laws to legislate.” Ariz.
Const. art. 4, part 1, § 8 (emphasis added). Because section 1(8) expressly
limits the general power of initiative in this specific context, we construe
that power as extending only to legislation the City itself could adopt. See
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts 183 (2012) (“[i]f there is a conflict between a general provision and a
specific provision, the specific provision prevails”); see generally Fleischman
v. Protect Our City, 214 Ariz. 406, 410 ¶ 24 (2007) (“The legislature has
directed that the general laws governing the procedures for ballot measures
shall apply to municipalities and counties ‘except as specifically provided
to the contrary’ in state law.” (quoting A.R.S. § 19-141(A))).

¶14 Put differently, local governments typically possess powers
beyond their legislative authority, specifically executive, administrative,
and quasi-judicial (e.g., zoning determinations). Wennerstrom, 169 Ariz.
at 488. As the title of part 1 portends, and as subsection 8 plainly specifies,
local governments share with their qualified electors only their legislative
power, not such other governance powers. 2

¶15 This Court has repeatedly held that initiatives and referenda
must constitute legislation. See League of Ariz. Cities & Towns, 230 Ariz.
at 560 ¶ 13 (“[W]e will review to determine whether an initiative in fact
constitutes legislation.”); Wennerstrom, 169 Ariz. at 491 (“Arizona’s
Constitution permits qualified electors to refer legislation.” (emphasis in
original)). Nevertheless, the Committee relies on several cases to support
its contention that initiatives need not constitute legislation. See Fann v.
State, 251 Ariz. 425 (2021); Ariz. Chamber of Com. & Indus. v. Kiley, 242 Ariz.
533 (2017); State v. Osborn, 16 Ariz. 247 (1914). However, none of those cases

2 Although we do not turn to secondary sources such as legislative history
where plain meaning is dispositive, as here, see In re McLauchlan, 252 Ariz.
324, 326 ¶ 15 (2022), one constitutional delegate’s crisp observation as to the
meaning of article 4 bears repeating: “What do we have the right to initiate?
Law. Anything else? No. We have the right, as laid down here, to simply
initiate law.” The Records of the Arizona Constitutional Convention of 1910, at
183 (John S. Goff ed., 1991) (emphasis added) (quoting delegate Andrew
Parsons).
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ROUNDTREE, ET AL. V. CITY OF PAGE, ET AL.
Opinion of the Court

construe subsection 8 to allow local initiatives that transcend the legislative
power, and we decline to go beyond the plain language of that provision to
do so today.

B.

¶16 Nonetheless, the citizens’ power to legislate is broad; indeed,
they may exercise their initiative power on any matters over which their
elected representatives “are or shall be empowered by general laws to
legislate.” Ariz. Const. art. 4, part 1, § 8. Arizona Revised Statutes
§ 9-240(B)(3)(a) gives city councils authority over their streets. Therefore,
just as the City may legislate regarding the streets—as it did with the
Project—so too may the City’s qualified electors. Hence our inquiry focuses
on whether the Initiative exercises the people’s legislative power, or instead
is merely an administrative action that lies solely within the City’s domain.

¶17 The City and the court of appeals’ decision rely on
Wennerstrom to conclude that the Initiative is administrative rather than
legislative. There, the Court considered whether the City’s actions that local
citizens proposed to refer to the ballot were legislative or administrative.
Wennerstrom, 169 Ariz. at 488. The actions at issue were a City ordinance
conceptually approving street widening and approving a project for which
the voters had authorized funds. Id. at 486–87. The Court concluded the
conceptual approval was not legislative because “the Council had not yet
finally decided to act.” Id. at 490 (emphasis in original). The second was
administrative in nature because it “merely carries out the purpose
declared by a prior legislative act,” specifically the voter authorization of
bonds that had “declared a public purpose (road improvement and
construction) and provided the ways and means for its accomplishment.”
Id. at 490–91.

¶18 The City here argues that the Initiative is likewise
administrative because the City has already created the public policy (the
Project), the Initiative proposes only a limited alteration and therefore does
not create new general policy, and City engineers are responsible for
carrying out the overall project.

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ROUNDTREE, ET AL. V. CITY OF PAGE, ET AL.
Opinion of the Court

¶19 The City overreads Wennerstrom and its applicability to this
case. First, the three-part test distilled from Wennerstrom is not dispositive.3
Like many tests courts use to determine constitutional compliance, this test
is a means to determine constitutionality rather than an end in itself.
Wennerstrom recognized the rule that “an act that declares a public purpose
and provides for the ways and means of its accomplishment is legislative.”
169 Ariz. at 489 (citing Pioneer Tr. Co. v. Pima County, 168 Ariz. 61, 65 (1991)).
An act is “administrative,” by contrast, if “it merely pursues a plan already
adopted by the legislative body itself, or some power superior to it.” Id.
at 489 (quoting 5 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 16.55 (3d.
rev. ed. 1989)). The factors the Court applied in Wennerstrom helped
determine whether the City’s actions that were the subject of the
referendum were legislative or administrative.

¶20 Significantly, Wennerstrom construed a proposed referendum,
not an initiative. Although the same general rule applies in both contexts,
with a proposed referendum the court must determine whether the
predicate government action was legislative or administrative, which
resolves whether it can be referred to the ballot; whereas with an initiative
the question is whether the voters are proposing a legislative or
administrative act.

¶21 Though those inquiries sound similar, there are marked
differences. In the referendum context, the nature of the government’s
predicate action is dispositive of whether the matter can be referred; in the
initiative context, the government’s actions are irrelevant to whether the
matter can be initiated. So long as the matter qualifies as legislative, it can
be the subject of an initiative. And given that the citizens’ legislative power
is coextensive with their elected representatives’, the power to initiate
legislation is necessarily equally broad.

¶22 Thus, the Wennerstrom factors, although helpful, are not
readily adaptable to the initiative context. Instead, to determine whether
an initiative is legislative in nature, the proper focus is on the initiative’s
context. It does not matter whether the purpose of the initiative is to

3 We say “distilled from” because the three-part test attributed to
Wennerstrom by the court of appeals, Roundtree, 2024 WL 3273984, at *3 ¶ 13,
and elsewhere, see, e.g., Redelsperger v. City of Avondale, 207 Ariz. 430, 433
¶ 15 (App. 2004), does not appear as an express three-part test in
Wennerstrom.
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Opinion of the Court

supplant or revoke a policy. For instance, it does not matter whether the
City adopted a policy and assigned its implementation to city engineers.
Indeed, the City may not through its own actions thwart the citizens’ right
to initiate legislation, for the citizens are free, as is the City, to change its
policy. See Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ducey, 233 Ariz. 1, 6 ¶ 16 (2013)
(stating that “one legislature may not enact a statute that irrevocably binds
successor legislatures”). The sole determinant of compliance with
section 1(8) is whether the initiative proposes legislation.

¶23 An example might help. Suppose a city hires a manager and
certain voters object. An initiative that fires the city manager would be
administrative in nature, as it does not set policy and the means of
implementation. But an initiative setting the terms and qualifications for
the city manager would be legislative in nature, regardless of what policies
the City previously had adopted, and therefore, properly subject to
initiative. See, e.g., Williams v. Parrack, 83 Ariz. 227, 231 (1957) (holding that
a proposed initiative setting fire department job classifications and salaries,
and repealing prior ordinances, “clearly . . . is legislative”).

¶24 Other opinions from this Court recognize this line of
demarcation. In Saggio v. Connelly, 147 Ariz. 240, 240 (1985), voters
demanded that an election be held to disincorporate the City of Apache
Junction. The Court examined the proposed initiative to “determine
whether it is, in fact, legislation.” Id. at 241. “Legislation, whether by the
people or the legislature, is a definite, specific act or resolution.” Id. The
demand for an election did not constitute legislation, the Court held,
because “[i]t does not enact anything.” Id.

¶25 Applying Saggio, the Court ruled in Fritz v. City of Kingman,
191 Ariz. 432, 434–35 ¶¶ 15–16 (1998), that re-zoning decisions that
implement the city’s general plan, though “use-specific decisions,” were
legislative rather than administrative in nature and thus subject to
referendum. A general plan, the Court explained, “need not provide the
ways and means of its own accomplishment and thus is not a self-executing
document,” but instead requires subsequent actions for its effectuation. Id.
at 434 ¶ 15. Such actions create a new rule and therefore are legislative. See
id. at 435 ¶ 19.

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C.

¶26 Thus, the question presents: does the Initiative propose a law?
Unquestionably, it does.

¶27 The Initiative expressly creates public policy—preserving
Lake Powell Boulevard as it existed on October 1, 2023; and the means of
accomplishing that policy—preventing the use of public funds to narrow
the specified portion of the road. The fact that this reflects a change in public
policy does not alter its legislative character. Nor is it administrative in
nature, for like all legislation, it controls administrative implementation. See
Roberts v. State, 253 Ariz. 259, 270 ¶ 43 (2022) (“The legislature must first
make the policy choice, then it may delegate to [the executive branch] the
power to implement it.”).

¶28 The Council’s ability to delegate its authority over the streets
to the engineer flows from its statutory empowerment to “exercise
exclusive control over the streets, alleys, avenues and sidewalks of the
town.” § 9-240(B)(3)(a). But that doesn’t mean the Council has surrendered
its ability to legislate in this area. For example, the Page Code of Ordinances
delegates substantial authority to the Police Chief to regulate traffic. See
Page, Ariz. Code ch. 71, §§ 71.01 to 71.07. But § 71.15 prohibits “[p]arking,
loading or unloading passengers in or along the entry road to Horseshoe
Bend, also known as Page Parkway” and “[l]oading or unloading
passengers in or along U.S. Highway 89 within 1,500 feet of the intersection
of Page Parkway and U.S. Highway 89.” Similarly, here, the Council could
delegate authority to the engineer and then pass an ordinance setting policy
for a specific area, which simply means that the engineer must carry out
projects in that area consistent with the ordinance.

¶29 Just as this Court’s decision in Fritz referred to a single
re-zoning decision as a legislative action because it permanently changed
the previously applicable rule, the fact that this Initiative is use-specific and
narrow in scope does not alter its legislative character. No further
legislative action is necessary to effectuate it. Unless legislatively displaced
at some future time, it is a forever limitation on the use of public funds to
narrow Lake Powell Boulevard. 4

4Any challenge to the substance of the proposed enactment must be made
only after the initiative passes. See, e.g., League of Ariz. Cities & Towns, 213
Ariz. at 559–60 ¶ 10.
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¶30 The proposed Initiative falls within the legislative authority
of the qualified electors, and therefore the measure may proceed to the
ballot.

CONCLUSION

¶31 We grant the Committee’s request for attorney fees pursuant
to A.R.S. § 12-348(A)(4).

¶32 The decision of the court of appeals is vacated. The decision
of the trial court is reversed, and we remand to the trial court to enter
appropriate relief for the Committee.

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