Pusd 210 v. Hon. sinclair/lucero

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

PHOENIX UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 210,
Petitioner,

v.

THE HON. JOAN M. SINCLAIR, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF ARIZONA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA,
Respondent,

And

CHRISTOPHER A. LUCERO, A MINOR CHILD, BY AND THROUGH HIS NATURAL
FATHER, CHRISTOPHER J. LUCERO,
Real Party in Interest.

No. CV-24-0307-PR
Filed July 15, 2025

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Joan M. Sinclair, Judge
No. CV2022-005719

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

Order from the Court of Appeals, Division One
1 CA-SA 24-0205
Filed December 4, 2024

VACATED
 PUSD 210 V. HON. SINCLAIR/LUCERO
Opinion of the Court

COUNSEL:

Christopher S. Welker (argued), Brett R. Steele, Richard R. Carpenter,
Welker & Pauole PLC, Phoenix, Attorneys for Phoenix Union High School
District No. 210

Jonathan V. O’Steen, Lincoln Combs (argued), O’Steen MacLeod Combs
PLC, Phoenix, Attorneys for Real Party in Interest Christopher J. Lucero

David L. Abney, Ahwatukee Legal Office, P.C., Phoenix, Attorneys for
Amicus Curiae Arizona Association for Justice/Arizona Trial Lawyers
Association

CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER authored the Opinion of the Court, in which
VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ, JUSTICES BOLICK, BEENE,
MONTGOMERY, KING, and CRUZ joined.

CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 Fourteen-year-old Christopher “CJ” Lucero was hit by a car and
severely injured as he jaywalked across a city-owned street intending to
enter his high school campus and attend classes. We consider whether the
school owed CJ a duty of care as he crossed the street to enter campus. We
hold it did not.
BACKGROUND

¶2 Betty H. Fairfax High School (“BFHS”) is part of the Phoenix
Union High School District No. 210 (the “District”). BFHS is located in
Phoenix on the east side of 59th Avenue just south of West Baseline Road.
On August 3, 2021, the day CJ was injured, there were no crosswalks, school
zone speed limit or warning signs, or traffic lights spanning the portion of
59th Avenue that is adjacent to BFHS. The closest traffic light and
crosswalk were just north of the school at the intersection of West Baseline
Road and 59th Avenue. A vacant dirt lot owned by the City of Phoenix
was located on the west side of 59th Avenue across from BFHS. A
commercial center with shops and restaurants frequently patronized by

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Opinion of the Court

students before and after school was located immediately north of the dirt
lot at the southwest corner of West Baseline Road and 59th Avenue. A
map depicting the area is attached as an appendix to this Opinion.

¶3 The area around BFHS was hectic as students arrived for
school in the morning. In addition to students walking to school, either
directly from home or after being dropped off at the commercial center,
other students drove to BFHS and parked in the school parking lot located
off 59th Avenue. Simultaneously, parents or other family members drove
students to school. Some drivers turned into the school parking lot off
59th Avenue to drop off students. But to avoid the line of cars entering
the parking lot, other drivers pulled into the dirt lot and had students
jaywalk across 59th Avenue to reach the school. BFHS officials did not tell
parents to drop their children off at the dirt lot, but they were aware of this
practice and did nothing to stop it or warn parents or students that the
practice was unsafe.

¶4 In August 2021, CJ was a freshman at BFHS. On the
morning of the accident, he walked to school from his home northeast of
campus. For an unknown reason, rather than staying on the east side of
59th Avenue, CJ crossed to the west side of the street and then walked south
along the dirt lot. 1 When he neared a point across from school, CJ
attempted to jaywalk east across 59th Avenue. Tragically, a northbound
car struck him, and he suffered serious and permanent injuries.

¶5 CJ, through his father, sued the District, claiming it was liable
to him under theories of negligence, gross negligence, and premises
liability. 2 As the case progressed, the District moved for summary
judgment, arguing it owed no duty to CJ because he was not injured by any
risk arising while he was under the school’s custody and control. The trial
court denied the motion. It reasoned that the District was aware that
students were jaywalking across 59th Avenue; that jaywalking “created a
known and tangible risk of harm to those students;” and that “[t]he District
had at least some control over whether to pursue safer options for students
coming and going from school grounds through the [c]ity, or whether to

1 CJ does not remember the accident or why he was on the west side of
59th Avenue.
2 CJ also sued other parties. But here, we are concerned only with his

claims against the District.

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Opinion of the Court

warn students of the traffic dangers.” A divided panel of the court of
appeals denied the District’s petition for special action relief in an
explanatory decision order.

¶6 We granted the District’s subsequent petition for review
because whether a school owes a duty of care to a student crossing the street
with the intent to enter school grounds is an issue of first impression and of
statewide importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6,
section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

DISCUSSION

¶7 We review the trial court’s denial of the District’s motion for
summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable
to CJ as the nonmoving party. See Perez v. Circle K Convenience Stores, Inc.,
564 P.3d 623, 626 ¶ 6 (Ariz. 2025). Summary judgment was appropriate if
the District showed there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Also, we determine the existence of a duty de novo as a legal question.
Perez, 564 P.3d at 626 ¶ 6.

A. General Principles

¶8 To prevail on his claims, CJ must show that the District owed
him a duty to conform to a particular standard of conduct. See id. ¶ 7
(negligence and premises liability); Garibay v. Johnson, 565 P.3d 236, 246 ¶ 38
(Ariz. 2025) (gross negligence). “Duties are based either on special
relationships recognized by the common law or on relationships shaped by
public policy.” Perez, 564 P.3d at 627 ¶ 7. A special relationship imposes
a duty to protect against harm arising from both the actions of the
individual at risk and the conduct of third parties. See Dinsmoor v. City of
Phoenix, 251 Ariz. 370, 373 ¶ 14 (2021).

¶9 CJ argues the District owed him a duty based on the special
relationship recognized at common law between schools and their students.
Although people generally do not have a duty to protect others from harm,
“the school-student relationship imposes an affirmative duty on schools to
protect students from unreasonable risks of harm.” Id. at 373–74 ¶ 15.
The relationship “parallels aspects of several other special
relationships—[the school] is a custodian of students, it is a land possessor
who opens the premises to a significant public population, and it acts

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Opinion of the Court

partially in the place of parents.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability
for Physical Harm and Emotional Harm § 40 cmt. l (Am. L. Inst. 2012), cited
with approval in Dinsmoor, 251 Ariz. at 374 ¶ 15.

¶10 Schools do not owe a limitless duty to students. Dinsmoor,
251 Ariz. at 374 ¶ 17. As with all duties arising from special relationships,
the duty “applies only to ‘risks that arise within the scope of the
relationship.’” Id. (quoting Boisson v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 236 Ariz. 619, 623
¶ 10 (App. 2015)). And the school-student relationship, like other special
relationships, is generally “bounded by geography and time.” Id. (quoting
Restatement § 40 cmt. f). As we explained in Dinsmoor:

Because the school’s roles forming the basis for the
duty—custodian, land possessor, and quasi-parental
figure—apply when the school supervises and controls
students and their environment, enabling it to identify and
eliminate risks, we are convinced the duty to protect students
exists only while the school is fulfilling these roles. But once
students safely leave the school’s control, the special
relationship ends, and students are simultaneously released
to their parents’ or guardians’ full custodial care. At that
point, the school is relieved of any duty to affirmatively
protect students from any hazards they encounter.

Id. at 375 ¶ 20. “The key consideration is whether a known and tangible
risk of harm arose that endangered the student while under the school’s
custody and control.” Id. at 376 ¶ 24. Thus, we have recognized that
“[i]njury generated outside the school property, outside of curricular or
extra-curricular activities, and from sources unconnected to the school, is
not likely to be the school’s responsibility.” Id. at 375 ¶ 22 (quoting Dan B.
Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 418 (2d ed.
2011)); see also Restatement § 40 cmt. l (commenting that the duty “is only
applicable to risks that occur while the student is at school or otherwise
engaged in school activities”).

¶11 Notably, this Court has declined “to draw a bright-line rule
barring recognition of the school-student duty whenever the student
suffers harm while outside the school’s supervision and control.”
Dinsmoor, 251 Ariz. at 375 ¶ 22. Indeed, “[u]nique circumstances may exist
where a school has a duty to protect students from risks that arise while
under school supervision and control even though such risks result in harm
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Opinion of the Court

when students are outside school supervision and control.” Id. ¶ 23. For
instance, “if a threat of harm exists for students leaving school for the
day—an active shooter in the neighborhood or a tornado, for
example—that risk arises within the school-student relationship, thereby
imposing a duty on the school to protect students.” Id. at 376 ¶ 23.

¶12 In sum, a school owes a duty to protect students when a
known and tangible risk of harm endangers them while under the school’s
custody and control. See id. ¶ 24. That duty exists most often when
students are injured while at school or participating in off-campus
school-sponsored activities. See id. at 375 ¶¶ 20–22. But in rarer
circumstances, the duty exists when a risk arises while a student is under a
school’s custody and control but manifests in injury while the student is
outside the school’s custody and control. See id. ¶ 23.

B. Application Here

¶13 CJ argues the District owed him a duty because he was
entering BFHS when he was struck and injured. He relies substantially on
Dinsmoor, where we observed that a school has a “duty to provide a
reasonably safe means of ingress and egress.” Id. at 376 ¶ 23. He asserts
the District created an unreasonably dangerous ingress and egress by
permitting the ad hoc student drop-off system, which created a backup of
southbound vehicles on 59th Avenue intending to turn left into the school
parking lot and induced many students to jaywalk from the dirt lot to reach
the school. Consequently, he contends, the District’s duty to provide a safe
means of ingress and egress extended to providing “a safe way” to cross
59th Avenue from the dirt lot to the school.

¶14 The District disagrees, arguing that CJ was simply “traveling
to” school on a street and from a dirt lot it did not control when the car
struck him, and he was therefore still outside the school’s custody and
control. Because the risks from traffic and jaywalking while traveling to
school did not arise while CJ was under BFHS’s custody and control, and
thus did not arise within the school-student relationship, the District asserts
it owed no duty to CJ.

¶15 To resolve this dispute, we engage in a limited review of the
pertinent facts. Although we generally determine duty “before the
case-specific facts are considered,” Gipson v. Casey, 214 Ariz. 141, 145 ¶ 21
(2007) (emphasis omitted), we must consider them for the limited purpose

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Opinion of the Court

of “determining when and where the alleged risk of harm arose—within or
outside the scope of the special relationship—not whether the alleged risk
actually constituted an unreasonably dangerous condition,” Perez, 564 P.3d
at 628 ¶ 15 (emphasis in original). This is because, “[l]ogically, a court
cannot determine whether a duty arises from such relationships unless it
considers whether [an alleged risk] arose while, for example, persons were
patronizing an inn, riding a bus, or . . . attending school.” Dinsmoor, 251
Ariz. at 376–77 ¶ 27 (citing Restatement § 40(b) (listing special
relationships)).

¶16 After examining the uncontested facts, we agree with the
District that the risk of harm to CJ—jaywalking across busy traffic on 59th
Avenue—did not arise within the school-student relationship. See id.
at 374 ¶ 17. CJ was not under BFHS’s custody and control at the time he
crossed the street and was struck by the car. See id. ¶ 18 (describing the
school-student relationship duty as “encompassing risks such as those that
occur while the student is at school or otherwise under the school’s control”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Monroe v. Basis Sch., Inc., 234
Ariz. 155, 157–58 ¶ 6 (App. 2014))). CJ had safely left the school’s custody
and control the day before and had not yet returned to it at the time of the
accident. 59th Avenue is not on school grounds; the District did not own
or control the street or the dirt lot; and the District had no authority to install
crosswalks, signs, or other safety features on the street. Also, the District
did not require or suggest that students access the school by crossing the
street from the dirt lot. The risk to CJ arose when he chose to cross 59th
Avenue outside a crosswalk.

¶17 Critically, no facts suggest BFHS failed to provide a
reasonably safe means of ingress and egress. See id. at 376 ¶ 23. In 2021,
BFHS had multiple entrances and exits for pedestrians and vehicles.
Nothing about these entrances and exits created the “tangible risk of harm”
that endangered CJ and resulted in his injuries. See id. ¶¶ 23–24.
Although a risk of harm from jaywalking across traffic existed in front of
the school, it existed everywhere along the routes students take from home
to school. The danger arose not from the configuration of the school’s
entrances and exits but from the fact that crossing a street outside a
crosswalk creates the risk of being hit by a car, particularly when, as here,
the surrounding area is busy with parents, students, and others traveling to
the school and through the area.

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Opinion of the Court

¶18 CJ places too much weight on our statement in Dinsmoor that
“a school’s duty to provide a reasonably safe means of ingress and egress
does not evaporate if a student is injured off campus while trying to enter
school property to attend classes.” Id. ¶ 23. We made that statement in
the context of illustrating unique circumstances where a risk arises while
the student is under school supervision and control but the risk results in
an off-campus injury. See id. Indeed, we cited Stephens v. Bashas’ Inc., 186
Ariz. 427, 430–31 (App. 1996), which concluded that a grocer had a duty to
use reasonable care in maintaining ingress into its delivery dock to avoid
causing injury to a delivering truck driver who attempted to enter the dock
but was required by the dock’s configuration, and told by a security guard,
to park on a public street before opening his doors and backing in to unload
goods. See Dinsmoor, 251 Ariz. at 376 ¶ 23. The risk to the driver
emanated from the ingress and egress constructed by the grocer at the dock,
although the injury occurred off-premises. See Stephens, 186 Ariz. at 431.

¶19 Here, such unique circumstances do not exist. The fact that
traffic backed up on 59th Avenue due to many drivers wanting to turn left
into the school parking lot did not make ingress and egress at the school
unreasonably dangerous. We agree with the weight of authority holding
that a landowner does not owe a duty to invitees struck by vehicles while
trying to cross a public roadway to reach the landowner’s premises. See
Ferreira v. Strack, 636 A.2d 682, 686 (R.I. 1994) (collecting cases and finding
that a church had no duty to control traffic on a public road crossed by
churchgoers after a service). The rationale for this view is threefold: a
landowner does not own an abutting road and therefore lacks the ability to
control it; the landowner has no control of the vehicle that strikes a
pedestrian; and it is the government’s duty to protect the public while on a
public road. See id.

¶20 We also are not persuaded that the area of 59th Avenue
between the dirt lot and the school were part of the school’s entrances and
exits. The school’s entrances and exits consisted of the areas immediately
leading into and out of school property, not the streets leading to those
areas. And BFHS did not affirmatively direct parents to drop students at
the dirt lot, which may have imposed a duty on it to ensure reasonably safe
passage for students crossing the street. See Alhambra Sch. Dist. v. Superior
Court, 165 Ariz. 38, 42 (1990) (concluding that a school district assumed a
duty of reasonable care for operating a marked crosswalk it established);
see also Warrington v. Tempe Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 3, 187 Ariz. 249, 253
(App. 1996) (finding that a school district official had a duty to a
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seven-year-old student who was hit by a car while walking home from a
bus stop the district placed on a busy street). Also, the fact the District
knew that some students jaywalked from the dirt lot to the school did not
impose a duty on it to protect students from unreasonable risks of harm
from crossing the street. See Quiroz v. ALCOA Inc., 243 Ariz. 560, 563 ¶ 2
(2018) (“[F]oreseeability is not a factor in determining duty.”); cf. Nicoletti v.
Westcor, Inc., 131 Ariz. 140, 144 (1982) (rejecting argument by shopping
center employee, injured after attempting a shortcut exit through
decorative foliage, that the owner owed her a duty because it “knew or
should have known” that employees were crossing the planter; this
knowledge did not bring the planter within the area of the business’s
invitation to the public).

¶21 Thus, we agree with the District that CJ was not entering BFHS
at the time of the accident; he was traveling to a school entrance. This is a
distinction with a meaningful difference. A school does not have a duty to
protect students from dangers that arise when the school is not exercising
custody or control over the student. See Dinsmoor, 251 Ariz. at 376 ¶ 24.
Consequently, the general rule is that a school “has no duty to conduct or
supervise school children in going to or from their homes.” Monroe, 234
Ariz. at 158 ¶ 7 (quoting 5 James A. Rapp, Education Law, § 12.10[5],
at 12-296.5 (Matthew Bender & Co., 2013)) (cleaned up), cited with approval
in Dinsmoor, 251 Ariz. at 374–75 ¶¶ 18–20; see also Young v. Salt Lake City Sch.
Dist., 52 P.3d 1230, 1231 ¶ 3, 1233 ¶ 11 (Utah 2002) (concluding that a school
did not owe a duty to a young student riding his bicycle to a school
conference when he was hit by car in crosswalk adjacent to the school); Pratt
v. Robinson, 349 N.E.2d 849, 854 (N.Y. 1976) (“We see no basis, either in
statutes or common law, for the creation of a school’s duty to protect its
students from hazards which may [beset] them once they are on their way
home and outside the control of the school.”), cited with approval in
Dinsmoor, 251 Ariz. at 374 ¶ 18.

¶22 CJ urges us to follow cases recognizing a duty owed by
landowners to invitees injured while trying to enter or leave the premises.
Although we agree that the landlord-invitee and school-student
relationships parallel each other concerning the duty to provide a safe
ingress and egress, see Dinsmoor, 251 Ariz. at 374 ¶ 15, we are not persuaded
to reach a different decision.

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¶23 The cases CJ cites are distinguishable because in each one the risk
of harm arose on the landowner’s premises, although the injuries occurred
off-premises. As explained, see supra ¶ 18, the grocer in Stephens had a
duty to the truck driver injured on the adjoining street because the driver
had attempted to enter the grocer’s loading dock, but the dock’s
configuration required him to first park on the street before backing in and
unloading a delivery. See 186 Ariz. at 430–31. In O’Rielly Motor Co. v.
Rich, 3 Ariz. App. 21, 23, 26 (1966), a car dealer owed a duty to a customer
to provide him a suitable exit after the customer was accidentally locked
inside a car dealership and was injured after jumping from an exterior fence
to escape. In Udy v. Calvary Corp., 162 Ariz. 7, 12 (App. 1989), the court
held that a landlord owed a tenant-child, who ran into a busy road next to
the unfenced premises, a duty to take reasonable precautions on the rented
premises to keep the child safe. In contrast to these cases, the risk of harm
to CJ did not arise from any defect on school grounds or while he was under
BFHS’s custody and control.

¶24 We find the circumstances here most analogous to those in
Monroe, which we cited with approval in Dinsmoor. See Dinsmoor, 251 Ariz.
at 374–75 ¶¶ 18–20. In Monroe, a truck struck and injured Jennifer, a
fifth-grade student, in a busy intersection about a block from her school as
she bicycled home. 234 Ariz. at 156–57 ¶¶ 1–2. Jennifer claimed the
school was “negligent for failing to post a crossing guard at the
intersection” and had “negligently located its school in close proximity to
the subject intersection.” Id. at 157 ¶ 3. The court disagreed, citing the
general rule that a school has no duty to supervise children coming and
going from school. Id. at 158 ¶¶ 7, 9. Because Jennifer had left the
school’s custody to travel home, the school had “[no] protective obligation
and lacked the special, student-school relationship” required to find a duty,
regardless of the busy intersection’s close proximity to the school. Id. ¶ 9.

¶25 In conclusion, the trial court here mistakenly focused on the
danger of jaywalking, the District’s knowledge that some students
jaywalked across 59th Avenue, and whether the District could have warned
of the danger or sought safety measures from the city. For purposes of
identifying a duty, the key question is whether the risk of harm that resulted
in the accident arose while BFHS supervised and controlled CJ. See
Dinsmoor, 251 Ariz. at 375 ¶ 23. It did not. To hold otherwise would
unreasonably expand not only the school-student relationship, but the
landowner-invitee relationship, too. Every business would have a duty to
customers jaywalking across a public road to reach the business premises.
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No authorities justify such an expansion. The trial court therefore erred by
denying the District’s motion for summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

¶26 CJ’s accident was tragic and had profound consequences.
Still, the District owed no duty of care because the risk that caused his
injuries did not arise within the bounds of the school-student relationship.
We therefore vacate the court of appeals’ decision order and reverse the
trial court’s order denying the District’s motion for summary judgment.
We remand to the trial court with instructions to enter summary judgment
in favor of the District.

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APPENDIX

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