REPUBLICAN NATL COMMITTEE v. FONTES

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE; REPUBLICAN PARTY OF ARIZONA,
LLC; AND YAVAPAI COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

ADRIAN FONTES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ARIZONA SECRETARY OF
STATE,
Defendant/Appellee,

VOTO LATINO, ARIZONA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS,
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, AND ARIZONA DEMOCRATIC PARTY,
Intervenor-Defendants/Appellees.

No. CV-25-0089-PR
Filed July 17, 2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Frank W. Moskowitz, Judge
No. CV2024-050553
AFFIRMED IN PART

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division Two
259 Ariz. 393 (App. 2025)
VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL:

Christopher O. Murray (argued), Julian R. Ellis, Jr., First & Fourteenth
PLLC, Colorado Springs, CO; and Kurt M. Altman, Kurt M. Altman PLC,
Phoenix, Attorneys for Republican National Committee, Republican Party
of Arizona, LLC, and Yavapai County Republican Party
 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE V. FONTES
Opinion of the Court

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Joshua D. Bendor (argued),
Solicitor General, Joshua M. Whitaker, Kara Karlson, Karen J.
Hartman-Tellez, Kyle R. Cummings, Assistants Attorney General, Phoenix,
Attorneys for Arizona Secretary of State Adrian P. Fontes

Laura Winsky Conover, Pima County Attorney, Daniel S. Jurkowitz,
Deputy County Attorney, Tucson, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Pima County
and Pima County Recorder Gabriella Cázares-Kelly

Andrew W. Gould, Alexandria Saquella, Holtzman Vogel Baran
Torchinsky & Josefiak, PLLC, Phoenix; and Elizabeth Price Foley, Holtzman
Vogel Baran Torchinsky & Josefiak, PLLC, Tallahassee, FL, Attorneys for
Amicus Curiae The Honest Elections Project

Kory A. Langhofer, Thomas J. Basile, Statecraft PLLC, Phoenix, Attorneys
for Amici Curiae Arizona State Senate President Warren Petersen and
Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives Steve Montenegro

Mary R. O’Grady, Joseph N. Roth, Joshua J. Messer, Osborn Maledon, P.A.,
Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Hon. Kenneth Bennett, former
Arizona Secretary of State

Brad Miller, Pinal County Attorney, Ian Daranyi, Deputy County Attorney,
Florence; and Joseph A. Kanefield, Brett William Johnson, Ian R. Joyce, Snell
& Wilmer LLP, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Pinal County Board of
Supervisors and Pinal County Recorder Dana Lewis

Brunn (Beau) W. Roysden, III, Katlyn J. Divis, Fusion Law, PLLC, Phoenix,
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Center for Election Confidence, Inc.

James K. Rogers, Senior Counsel, America First Legal Foundation,
Washington, D.C., Attorneys for Amicus Curiae America First Legal
Foundation

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 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE V. FONTES
Opinion of the Court

JUSTICE MONTGOMERY authored the Opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ and JUSTICES
BOLICK, BEENE, KING, and CRUZ joined.

JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 This case concerns whether the Secretary of State
(“Secretary”) must follow the procedures under the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”), A.R.S. §§ 41-1001 to -1093.08, in publishing the
Election Procedures Manual (“EPM”) as mandated by the Legislature
under A.R.S. § 16-452. By decision order, we held that the EPM is not
subject to the APA. This Opinion sets forth our reasoning.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Every odd-numbered year, after consultation with each
county, the Secretary must prescribe rules in an “official instructions and
procedures manual” to achieve “the maximum degree of correctness,
impartiality, uniformity and efficiency” in election procedures.
§ 16-452(A)–(B). The Secretary must submit the EPM to the Governor and
Attorney General for approval by October 1. § 16-452(B). Upon
approval, the EPM must be issued by December 31 of that year. Id. After
being issued, the EPM carries the force of law and violations of the rules are
punishable as a class 2 misdemeanor. § 16-452(C); Ariz. Pub. Integrity All.
v. Fontes, 250 Ariz. 58, 63 ¶ 16 (2020).

¶3 The APA sets forth a comprehensive scheme for developing
and publishing agency rules, including a public notice-and-comment
period. § 41-1001 et seq. Section 41-1002(A) mandates compliance with
its procedures for rules published by any agency unless expressly
exempted. The APA also explains that rules that do not comply with it are
invalid, “unless otherwise provided by law.” § 41-1030(A).

¶4 On July 31, 2023, the Secretary published the 2023 draft EPM
and permitted public comment for fifteen days. On August 15, 2023, the
Republican National Committee (“RNC”) submitted a comment criticizing
several components of the draft EPM. The RNC asserted that the
fifteen-day comment period was too abbreviated for it to adequately review
the manual, evaluate any changes, and comment on those changes. On
September 30, the Secretary submitted a revised draft to the Governor and

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Opinion of the Court

Attorney General for review. The Secretary posted an acknowledgement
that he had solicited public comment but clarified that doing so was purely
voluntary, “[i]n keeping with the good practice of the prior
Administration,” and that suggestions had been incorporated where
appropriate. The Governor and Attorney General approved the revised
EPM and the Secretary issued it on December 30.

¶5 Shortly after the EPM was published, the RNC filed a special
action complaint in the superior court, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. The RNC argued that the Secretary had failed to comply with APA
rulemaking requirements applicable to the 2023 EPM. For relief, the RNC
sought to invalidate the 2023 EPM and enjoin the Secretary from using it
until he complied with the APA. In the alternative, the RNC alleged that
eight provisions of the EPM conflicted with state or federal laws.
Accordingly, the RNC requested that the court declare the allegedly
conflicting EPM provisions were without the force of law and void.

¶6 After filing its complaint, the RNC moved for a preliminary
injunction to prevent the Secretary from using the 2023 EPM for the 2024
election. The Secretary opposed the motion and moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.1
The superior court denied the RNC’s request for a preliminary injunction
and granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss on May 10, 2024.

¶7 The superior court determined that the APA did not apply to
the 2023 EPM. Given the “unless otherwise provided by law” provision of
§ 41-1030(A), the court concluded that the Legislature had, in § 16-452,
“otherwise provided by law” an independent procedure for issuing the
EPM. Additionally, the court found that the challenged EPM provisions
did not conflict with state law, and that the federal law conflict was moot.

¶8 The RNC appealed and the court of appeals reversed.
Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Fontes, 259 Ariz. 393, 396 ¶ 2 (App. 2025). The
court initially stated that there was no dispute that the EPM met the APA’s
statutory definition of rules and that the Secretary and his department are
agencies subject to the APA. Id. at 400 ¶ 19. The court next observed that
a plain reading of § 41-1002 provides that APA rulemaking procedures

1 The Secretary also moved to dismiss the complaint based on the RNC’s
alleged lack of standing. That issue is not before us.
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Opinion of the Court

apply to all subject agencies absent an express exemption. Id. ¶ 21. The
court then noted two ways the Legislature has expressly exempted agencies
from APA procedural requirements. Id.

¶9 First, as provided under § 41-1005—captioned
“Exemptions”—the APA expressly exempts some agencies and rules from
its requirements. Id. Second, implementing statutes for other agencies or
rulemaking procedures may provide for an APA exemption. Id.
However, the court of appeals found that neither the APA nor § 16-452
expressly exempted the EPM from the APA-rulemaking process. Id.
at 400–01 ¶ 22.

¶10 The court of appeals agreed with the RNC’s characterization
of § 41-1030(A) as purely remedial and that it “merely sets out conditions
or requirements for a valid rule.” Id. at 401 ¶ 22. The court also agreed
with the RNC’s contention that the superior court’s reading of § 41-1030(A)
permits “an implied exemption not anywhere expressed.” Id. Therefore,
reading § 41-1002(A) and § 41-1030(A) together, the court held that
§ 41-1030(A) “reiterat[ed]” § 41-1002(A)’s requirement that an exemption
must be express. Id. ¶ 23.

¶11 Harmonizing § 41-1002(A), § 41-1030(A), and § 16-452, the
court of appeals interpreted “unless otherwise provided by law” as
reiterating the express exemption requirement of § 41-1002. Id. Thus,
absent an express exemption, “or otherwise provided with some alternative
to the APA’s procedure that expressly states that it is such an alternative,
then that rule is invalid unless it was made in substantial compliance with
the APA.” Id.

¶12 Next, the court of appeals considered whether the APA and
EPM procedures conflicted. Id. ¶ 24. Acknowledging that there may be
potential impracticalities in adhering to both the APA and EPM, the court
stated that “impracticalities do not equate to conflicts.” Id. at 401–02 ¶ 25.
The court further observed that the Secretary may have to promulgate the
EPM earlier due to the APA, “but they are not inconsistent, do not directly
conflict, and do not create impossible barriers to complying with both.” Id.
at 402 ¶ 25. The court, therefore, concluded that the EPM was subject to
the APA. Id.

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Opinion of the Court

¶13 Finally, the court considered whether the Secretary
substantially complied with APA rulemaking requirements. Id. at 402
¶ 26. In particular, the court considered whether, by providing two weeks
for comment on the proposed EPM, the Secretary fulfilled the purpose of
the APA’s comment period. Id. ¶ 27. According to the court, the fifteen-
day period the Secretary allowed was shorter than the thirty-day notice-
and-comment period mandated under the APA and, thus, failed to ensure
“that those affected by a rule have adequate notice of the agency’s proposed
procedures and opportunity for input into the consideration of those
procedures.” Id. (quoting Carondelet Health Servs., Inc. v. Arizona Health
Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin., 182 Ariz. 221, 226 (App. 1994)).
Consequently, the Secretary needed to comply with the APA’s notice and
rulemaking procedures. Id. ¶ 28.

¶14 The Secretary petitioned this Court for review, and, in a
decision order filed October 16, 2025, we vacated the court of appeals’
opinion and reinstated pages 1–3 of the trial court’s May 10, 2024 decision,
concluding that the APA does not apply to the EPM. We also stated that
an opinion would follow. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3)
of the Arizona Constitution.

DISCUSSION

¶15 We review orders granting a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim de novo. State v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 253 Ariz. 6, 10 ¶ 8 (2022).
Dismissal is appropriate only if the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief
under any plausible interpretation of the facts susceptible to proof. State
ex rel. Brnovich v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 250 Ariz. 127, 130 ¶ 7 (2020). In
assessing a motion to dismiss, we assume the truth of the well-pleaded facts
in the complaint and resolve all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor. Id.

¶16 Resolving whether the APA applies to the EPM involves
statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Normandin v. Encanto
Adventures, LLC, 246 Ariz. 458, 460 ¶ 9 (2019). We give statutory terms
their ordinary meaning in light of “their broader statutory context.” In re
Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15, 18 ¶ 5 (2024) (quoting Columbus Life Ins. Co. v.
Wilmington Tr., N.A., 255 Ariz. 382, 385 ¶ 11 (2023)). If the statutory text is
clear, we apply its plain meaning, which is dispositive. Id. In construing
a specific provision, we read it in pari materia with related statutory

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Opinion of the Court

provisions to harmonize and give effect to the entire statutory scheme.
Stambaugh v. Killian, 242 Ariz. 508, 509 ¶ 7 (2017). Before analyzing how
the APA and EPM work, we briefly outline their relevant provisions.

A. The Administrative Procedure Act

¶17 The Legislature enacted most of the current version of the
APA in 1986, adopting portions of the 1981 Model State Administrative
Procedure Act. 1986 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 232 (2d Reg. Sess.).
Section 41-1001 provides operative definitions for the APA.

1. Definitions

¶18 Section 41-1001(1) defines an “agency” as “any board,
commission, department, officer or other administrative unit of this state,
including the agency head . . . .” A “rule” is “an agency statement of
general applicability that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy,
or describes the procedure or practice requirements of an agency.”
§ 41-1001(21). And “rulemaking” is “the process to make a new rule or
amend, repeal or renumber a rule.” § 41-1001(22).

2. Applicability

¶19 Under § 41-1002(A), the APA’s rulemaking procedures apply
to all agencies and proceedings unless “expressly exempted.”
Section 41-1002(B) further states that the APA controls over conflicting
statutes “unless the other statute expressly provides otherwise.”

3. Process

¶20 Under § 41-1013(A), a rulemaking agency must file a notice of
proposed rulemaking with the Secretary, and that notice must be published
in the official register within thirty days of filing. The notice must identify
the rule to be amended or adopted and include the text of the new rule.
§ 41-1022. The agency must then accept public comment on the rule for
thirty days after publishing the notice and hold an oral proceeding upon
request. § 41-1023. Once a rule is finalized, the agency must submit it for
review within 120 days. § 41-1024. As relevant here, for agencies headed
by an elected official, such as the Department of State, the APA provides
for Attorney General review instead of review by the Governor’s
Regulatory Review Council. §§ 41-1057(A)(1), -1044. If an agency makes

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a substantial change to a proposed rule, it must restart the
notice-and-comment process. §§ 41-1025, -1022(E). To be valid, a rule
must be adopted in substantial compliance with the APA, consistent with
the statute, and “reasonably necessary to carry out the purpose of the
statute . . . unless otherwise provided by law.” § 41-1030(A).

B. The EPM Statute

¶21 The Legislature enacted the first EPM statute in 1972. 1972
Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 218, § 30 (2d Reg. Sess.). The Legislature initially
styled the EPM “as a guide for the conduct of elections by an approved
electronic voting system.” Id. It required the Secretary, “in concert with
each county board of supervisors or other officer in charge of elections,” to
prescribe election rules at least thirty days before each election in an official
EPM approved by the Attorney General and the Governor. Id. § 41.
Over time, the EPM expanded in recognition of the different challenges
presented by the electoral process. 2

¶22 The nature of the relationship between the Secretary and
county officials, and what is produced by the EPM, has also changed. In
1993, the Legislature recharacterized the interaction between county
officials and the Secretary as one of “consultation.” 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws
ch. 98, § 31 (1st Reg. Sess.). And instead of prescribing “rules and
regulations,” the EPM was described as producing “rules.” Id. In 2019,
the Legislature added the October 1 submission deadline and the
December 31 publication deadline. 2019 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 99, § 1
(1st Reg. Sess.). Residing in article 4, Voting Equipment, chapter 4,
Conduct of Elections, title 16, Elections and Electors, § 16-452 prescribes the
how, the why, and the means for developing and issuing the EPM.

2 For example, the 1994 EPM is 124 pages in total. Ariz. Sec'y of State,
State of Arizona Electronic Voting System Instructions and Procedures
Manual (1994) , Arizona Memory Project 1994,
https://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/nodes/view/309156 (last accessed
Jul. 15, 2026). The 2023 EPM is 268 pages. Ariz. Sec'y of State, 2023
Elections Procedures Manual (2023),
http://apps.azsos.gov/election/files/epm/2023/EPM_20231231_Final_E
dits_to_Cal_1_11_2024.pdf (last accessed Jul. 15, 2026).
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¶23 Now, § 16-452(A) directs the Secretary to “consult[] with each
county board of supervisors or other officer in charge of elections” to
“prescribe rules to achieve and maintain the maximum degree of
correctness, impartiality, uniformity and efficiency” regarding “early
voting and voting, and of producing, distributing, collecting, counting,
tabulating and storing ballots.” The Secretary must also “adopt rules
regarding fax transmittal of unvoted ballots, ballot requests, voted ballots
and other election materials to and from absent uniformed and overseas
citizens.” § 16-452(A). Finally, the Secretary must “adopt rules
regarding internet receipt of requests for federal postcard applications” as
prescribed. Id.

¶24 Section 16-452(B) establishes deadlines for submitting the
EPM to the Governor and the Attorney General for final approval and
issuance. Finally, § 16-452(C) classifies a violation of the EPM adopted
pursuant to § 16-452 as a class 2 misdemeanor. We turn next to the
applicability of APA rulemaking procedures to the EPM and the parties’
arguments.

C. EPM and Exemption from the APA

¶25 Under § 41-1002(A), all agencies are subject to the APA unless
expressly exempted. See Ariz. State Univ. ex rel. Ariz. Bd. of Regents v. Ariz.
State Ret. Sys., 237 Ariz. 246, 252 ¶ 27 (App. 2015) (stating that § 41-1002
requires agencies to comply with the APA “in the absence of an express
exemption”).

¶26 The Secretary acknowledges that, by the APA’s definitions,
the EPM is a set of rules and that he and his department meet the definition
of an agency subject to the APA. 3 Nonetheless, he argues that the EPM is
exempt from APA rulemaking requirements. The Secretary bases this
argument on three grounds. First, the Legislature created a unique EPM
process by enacting § 16-452, which satisfies the “otherwise provided by
law” provision of § 41-1030(A), even without an express exemption.

3 Certain sections of the Department of State are, though, explicitly
exempted from the APA’s requirements. For example, § 41-121.02(E)
exempts the Arizona State Library, Archives, and Public Records Office
from the APA. Whether and to what degree the APA otherwise applies to
the Department of State and the Secretary is not before us.
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Second, § 16-452’s requirements conflict so sharply with the APA that it is
impossible to comply with both, and that this incompatibility itself amounts
to an express exemption under § 41-1002(A). And third, § 16-444(B)
expressly exempts the EPM from the APA. 4

¶27 The RNC argues that § 41-1002(A) only recognizes two forms
of express exemption. First, § 41-1005, titled “Exemptions,” lists certain
agencies and proceedings to which “this chapter does not apply.” Second,
the RNC notes that the Legislature has sometimes placed exemption
language in statutes outside the APA itself, by specifying that an agency’s
rules are exempt from “Title 41, Chapter 6.” See, e.g., § 16-974(D)
(exempting the Clean Elections Commission and its rules from the APA);
§ 41-121.02(E) (exempting the Arizona State Library, Archives, and Public
Records). We agree with the RNC that § 16-452 satisfies neither criterion
for an express exemption.

1. Express exemption through conflicting provisions

¶28 To support the argument that the provisions of the EPM and
APA are in such conflict that the EPM is expressly exempted, the Secretary
asserts five conflicts between the APA and EPM. The RNC argues that the
APA applies to every agency and rulemaking procedure “unless expressly
exempted,” and § 41-1002(B) confirms that an agency’s other statutory
duties, including rulemaking obligations, are “in addition to” the APA’s
requirements, unless the other statute “expressly provides otherwise.”
§ 41-1002(A)-(B). The RNC further argues that there is no conflict between
the two statutory schemes and that the EPM merely supplements rather
than supplants the APA. We address each alleged conflict in turn,
drawing reasonable factual inferences in favor of the RNC as the
nonmoving party. Brnovich, 250 Ariz. at 130 ¶ 7.

¶29 The Secretary’s first asserted conflict concerns timing.
Under APA rulemaking, there is no date certain by which agencies must
conclude rulemaking. In contrast, the EPM must be submitted to the
Governor and the Attorney General by October 1 and “issued not later than
December 31 of each odd-numbered year immediately preceding the
general election.” § 16-452(B). But these dates do not necessarily create

4 Our disposition renders consideration of an express exemption under
§ 16-444(B) moot.
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an irreconcilable conflict with the APA. The Legislature may very well
require a rule to be published by a particular date. The subject agency
would then have to satisfy the APA’s procedures before the publication
date. See § 41-1002(B). The Secretary argues, though, that having to start
the EPM process earlier would require drafting to begin in even-numbered
election years instead of the odd-numbered years as required by
§ 16-452(B). However, the statute does not state when EPM development
must begin. It only specifies submission for approval and issuance in
odd-numbered years. Because the December 31 deadline does not make
APA compliance impossible, it does not create an irreconcilable conflict.

¶30 The Secretary’s second asserted conflict is similarly
unavailing. He argues that each iteration of the EPM during consultation
with the county election officials would require a new notice-and-comment
period. But any suggested changes resulting from consultations do not
invoke the notice-and-comment requirement. That arises only after the
Secretary issues a notice of proposed rulemaking. § 41-1022.
Accordingly, the Secretary could wait to issue a notice of proposed
rulemaking, thereby invoking the notice-and-comment requirement, until
after his consultations were complete.

¶31 The Secretary’s third asserted conflict is that because the EPM
is published as a standalone manual and the APA requires that compliant
rules be published in the Arizona Administrative Code (“AAC”), the two
procedures conflict. Section 16-452 prescribes when the EPM must be
issued, but it does not specify the manner. That the manual has not been
published in the AAC does not mean it cannot be published there.
Publication requirements, therefore, do not create an irreconcilable conflict
with the APA.

¶32 Fourth, the requirement that both the Governor and the
Attorney General approve the EPM does not conflict with the APA. For
agencies headed by an elected official, the APA itself contemplates
Attorney General review in lieu of review by the Governor’s Regulatory
Review Council. See §§ 41-1057(A)(1), -1044. Section 16-452 simply adds
gubernatorial approval to an existing requirement. Under § 41-1002(B),
such additional procedural steps operate in addition to the APA’s baseline
requirements; they do not displace them.

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¶33 Finally, in the event judicial review of EPM provisions
required any “last-minute” changes, they could be addressed through
emergency rulemaking. See § 41-1026(A) (permitting an agency to make,
amend, or repeal a rule upon “a finding that a rule is necessary as an
emergency measure . . . without the notice prescribed by §§ 41-1021 and
41-1022 and prior review by the council, if the rule is first approved by the
attorney general and filed with the secretary of state.”). Nevertheless, it
deserves acknowledgment that last-minute changes to election rules are
strongly disfavored. See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,
589 U.S. 423, 425 (2020) (noting the “Purcell principle” in emphasizing the
problems caused by courts altering election rules just before an election).

¶34 We also acknowledge that our conclusion that the EPM could
operate within the parameters of the APA is based on reasonable inferences
from a simple statutory comparison. Real-world practicalities might very
well render the two schemes irreconcilable. But given that no one has ever
attempted to issue an EPM under the APA, we lack evidence that it cannot
be done. Moreover, if § 41-1002(A) allowed courts to infer an “express”
exemption whenever the Legislature prescribed an allegedly conflicting
procedure, much of the exemption language in § 41-1005 and
agency-specific statutes would be superfluous. See Sanchez v. Maricopa
County, 260 Ariz. 136, 142 ¶ 13 (2025) (noting that “[a] cardinal principle of
statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and
provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous” (alteration
in original) (quoting Nicaise v. Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566, 568 ¶ 11 (2019))).

¶35 We, therefore, reject the Secretary’s contention that the EPM
is “expressly” exempt from the APA under § 41-1002(A) because of asserted
conflicts between the EPM and the APA statutory schemes. Accordingly,
§ 41-1002(B)’s statement that a conflicting statute “is superseded by this
chapter, unless the other statute expressly provides otherwise” is
inapplicable. However, the differences identified by the Secretary
illustrate the distinct operation of each statutory framework for
promulgating rules versus issuing the EPM. This leads us to consider
whether § 16-452 supplies a rulemaking process “otherwise provided by
law” within the meaning of § 41-1030(A).

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2. “Otherwise provided by law”

¶36 The Secretary suggests that before the 1992 amendment,
which added “unless otherwise provided by law” to § 41-1030(A), the
statutory language meant that rules that did not comply with APA
rulemaking were presumptively invalid. He contends that the 1992
amendment created an exception for statutes that had their own procedural
rulemaking schemes. Thus, in his view, the most plausible reading of
§ 41-1030(A) is that a rule adopted under an alternative statutory procedure
is not invalid merely because it did not comply with APA procedures.

¶37 The RNC argues that § 41-1030(A) is purely remedial and
serves to invalidate a rule that does not comply with APA rulemaking
requirements. According to the RNC, adopting the Secretary’s
interpretation would create a silent, implied exemption that voids § 41-1002
and contradicts case law that statutory silence does not exempt an agency,
citing Ariz. State Univ., 237 Ariz. at 252 ¶¶ 23-24, and Carondelet Health
Servs., Inc., 182 Ariz. 221, 228. With respect to the 1992 amendment, the
RNC argues that the “unless otherwise provided by law” clause reflects the
Legislature’s decision to require all rules, including those expressly
exempted from APA rulemaking, to be published in the AAC. 1992 Ariz.
Sess. Laws ch. 239, §§ 1–2 (2d Reg. Sess.) (mandating publication of exempt
rules). Thus, the clause simply acknowledges that some of the rules now
published in the AAC did not comply with APA rulemaking, because they
were expressly exempt from it.

¶38 When interpreting statutes, we begin with the text. Garibay
v. Johnson, 259 Ariz. 248, 255 ¶ 23 (2025). And the text of a statute is not
only evidence of legislative intent—it is the “law that judges apply.” State
v. Marner, 261 Ariz. 275, 280 ¶ 19 (2026), as amended on reconsideration
(Feb. 26, 2026). The APA does not define the phrase “otherwise provided
by law.” When a term lacks a statutory definition, we may consult
dictionary definitions to determine its common meaning and usage.
Garibay, 259 Ariz. at 255 ¶ 24 (citing Matthews v. Indus. Comm’n, 254 Ariz.
157, 163 ¶ 33 (2022)); see also In re Drummond, 257 Ariz. 15, 18 ¶ 7. Because
the Legislature adopted the phrase in 1992, we interpret it as it would have
been understood at that time. Matthews, 254 Ariz. at 165 ¶ 40; see also
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts 78–83 (2012) (discussing the Fixed-Meaning Canon, which

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requires that words should have the same meaning they had when the text
was adopted).

¶39 No party disputes that “provided by law” refers to a statutory
provision enacted by the Legislature. See Ariz. St. Bd. of Regents ex rel. Ariz.
State Univ. v. Ariz. St. Pers. Bd., 195 Ariz. 173, 175 ¶ 12 (1999) (interpreting
another provision of the APA using the phrase “unless otherwise provided
by law”). We, therefore, focus on the ordinary meaning of the word
“otherwise” in 1992, when the language was added.

¶40 The American Heritage Dictionary defines otherwise as “[i]n
another way; differently.” Otherwise, The American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language (3d ed. 1992) (available at
https://archive.org/details/the-american-heritage-dictionary-of-the-
english-language-third-edition-1st-august-1992/page/n5149/mode/2up).
The 6th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary defines otherwise as “in a
different manner; in another way, or in other ways.” Otherwise, Black’s
Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). These definitions accord and demonstrate
that “otherwise” means “differently” or “in another manner.”

¶41 Additionally, we previously construed the phrase “otherwise
provided by law” in other statutes. In May v. Ellis, this Court interpreted
a provision of the probate code, § 14-6102(A), which contains the phrase
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.” 208 Ariz. 229, 231 ¶ 11 (2004).
We addressed whether that language permitted a decedent’s creditor to
reach life insurance proceeds payable to a designated beneficiary and
concluded that § 14-6102(A) applies only when no contrary law governs.
Id. Because another statute squarely governed the distribution of life-
insurance proceeds, § 14-6102(A) yielded to it. Id. at 232 ¶ 12.

¶42 Although May involved a direct conflict between two statutes,
it turned not on the existence of a conflict but on whether another provision
addressed the subject. Because a separate statute governed the
distribution of life insurance proceeds, the other statute controlled. That
approach comports with the ordinary meaning of “otherwise” and our
jurisprudence: when the Legislature prescribes one method for performing
a function and elsewhere provides a different, specific method for
accomplishing the same task, the latter constitutes a manner “otherwise
provided by law.” Accordingly, we now consider the procedural
differences between the EPM and the APA.

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3. Procedural Differences

¶43 Section 16-452 requires the Secretary to draft the EPM to meet
fixed statutory deadlines for the regular and recurrent biennial review of
rules governing the conduct of elections. APA rulemaking is designed to
create rules for the ongoing administration of programs and procedures for
the public and regulated professions. Requiring full notice-and-comment
rulemaking for each iteration of the EPM would overlay a generally
applicable framework onto a process the Legislature specifically tailored to
meet the recurring and time-sensitive demands of election administration.
Mandating EPM compliance with APA rulemaking requirements risks
undermining the purpose and effect of the Legislature’s time-sensitive
regulation of elections.

¶44 The consultation requirements in § 16-452 further illustrate
the distinct nature of the EPM process. The statute directs the Secretary to
draft the EPM in consultation with county election officials. See
§ 16-452(A). Although the Secretary has invited public comment on draft
EPMs in recent years, that practice is not statutorily required. 5 The
Legislature, thus, prescribed consultation with a defined group of officials,
reflecting a process tailored to election administration rather than the
broadly participatory framework the APA imposes.

¶45 Judicial review of the EPM is likewise distinct from the
process to challenge APA rulemaking, which this case illustrates.
Plaintiffs would have faced additional procedural hurdles if the APA
applied. The APA channels disputes through the petition procedure in
§ 41-1033, which, although not a jurisdictional exhaustion requirement
under subsection (M), can delay judicial review and narrow the issues
through the agency’s response. Cf. Samaritan Health Sys. v. Ariz. Health
Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin., 198 Ariz. 533, 537 ¶ 19 (App. 2000)
(explaining the limited applicability of immediate judicial review under
§ 41-1034). Further, defects in notice, publication, or other procedures may

5 This does not foreclose participation by members of the public. They
remain free to communicate with county election officials regarding the
EPM, and those officials may relay such input to the Secretary during the
consultation that § 16-452(A) requires. But the statutory scheme contains
no affirmative requirement for a formal notice-and-comment period.

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be excused if the agency substantially complied with the APA, reducing the
likelihood that procedural challenges result in invalidation rather than
other possible relief. See § 41-1030(A). Together, these procedural
limitations illustrate that imposing APA rulemaking requirements in their
entirety on the EPM would introduce challenges that litigants would not
otherwise confront under its governing statute.

¶46 The history of legislative enactments and amendments also
reflects the distinct treatment of the APA and the EPM. Since the 1992
revisions to the APA, the Legislature has amended § 16-452 and related
EPM provisions five times without reference to the APA. 6 The Legislature
has likewise amended § 41-1030(A) itself seven times since 1992, variously
imposing new procedural requirements or expanding avenues for
challenging agency rules. But the Legislature has never altered the “unless
otherwise provided by law” clause. 7 And although several APA
amendments were enacted during the same legislative session in which
EPM statutes were amended, the Legislature never so much as hinted that
§ 16-452’s process and the APA were in any way interrelated. The
Legislature has treated the APA and EPM, throughout their respective

6 See, e.g., 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 98, § 31 (1st Reg. Sess.) (altering the
role of the county election officers from collaborators to consultants); 2003
Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 38, § 1 (1st Reg. Sess.) (adding responsibilities for
transmitting ballots to overseas and military voters); 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws
ch. 173, § 4 (2d Reg. Sess.) (establishing procedures for joining the early
voter list); 2014 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 45, § 8 (2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring
initiative circulators to register under EPM requirements); 2019 Ariz. Sess.
Laws ch. 99, § 1 (1st Reg. Sess.) (adding the October and December
deadlines now codified in § 16-452).
7 See, e.g., 1994 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 363, § 20 (2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring
compliance with Articles 4, 4.1 and 5); 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 251, § 5
(1st Reg. Sess.) (adding § 41-1030(B)); 1998 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 57, § 36
(2d Reg. Sess.) (modifying the substantial compliance standard in part and
limiting agency rulemaking authority); 2002 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 334, § 6
(2d Reg. Sess.) (removing the requirement to substantially comply with
§ 41-1036); 2015 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 104, § 3 (1st Reg. Sess.) (authorizing a
private cause of action to enforce § 41-1030(A)); 2021 Ariz. Sess. Laws
ch. 161, § 5 (1st Reg. Sess.) (adding § 41-1030(C)); 2022 Ariz. Sess. Laws
ch. 265, § 5 (2d Reg. Sess.) (adopting the current language of § 41-1030(A)).
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statutory existence, as separate schemes sailing on their own charted course
to their own respective destinations.

¶47 Therefore, we conclude that § 16-452 establishes a
comprehensive, distinct, and self-contained process for developing the
EPM as a rulemaking process “otherwise provided by law” within the
meaning of § 41-1030(A). The EPM is, therefore, not invalid for failing to
comply with the APA’s procedures.

4. Other Arguments

¶48 The RNC contends that reading § 41-1030(A) this way renders
§ 41-1002(A) superfluous. We disagree. Section 41-1002(A) and
§ 41-1030(A) operate at different stages and serve distinct functions.
Section 41-1002(A) establishes when the APA applies and requires that any
exemption from its procedures be expressly stated—either in § 41-1005 or
in agency-specific statutes. Section 41-1030(A), by contrast, addresses
whether a rule’s validity can be sustained notwithstanding APA
noncompliance. Section 41-1002(A) determines the default framework,
whereas § 41-1030(A) provides that the Legislature may establish
alternative comprehensive procedures that can result in valid rules that
would otherwise be invalid. This reading gives effect to the Legislature’s
1992 amendment of § 41-1030 while harmonizing both provisions.

¶49 The RNC further argues that the absence of an express
exemption in § 16-452, like that found in § 16-974(D) for the Clean Elections
Commission, means the EPM must follow APA rulemaking. Notably, the
initiative that created the Commission did not establish separate
rulemaking procedures for it. See Citizens Clean Elections Act,
Proposition 200 (1998). Instead, the people expressly exempted rules
enacted by the Commission from the APA. § 16-974(D). 8 Here, the

8 That text reads:

The commission’s rules and any commission enforcement
actions pursuant to this chapter are not subject to the approval
of or any prohibition or limit imposed by any other executive
or legislative governmental body or official. Notwithstanding
any law to the contrary, rules adopted pursuant to this
chapter are exempt from title 41, chapters 6 and 6.1.
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Legislature provided a comprehensive procedure for the EPM in the first
instance. The cases cited by the RNC for a similar argument concerning
silence in a statute are equally unavailing.

¶50 The RNC further asserts that our caselaw forecloses the
Secretary’s reading of § 41-1030(A), pointing to Arizona State University and
Carondelet Health Services, Inc. Each case, the RNC asserts, holds that an
implementing statute’s silence does not exempt an agency from the APA’s
rulemaking requirements. See Ariz. State Univ., 237 Ariz. at 252 ¶¶ 23–24;
Carondelet, 182 Ariz. at 228. We agree that both cases stand for that
proposition. Neither, however, controls the question before us, because
neither involves the circumstance of when a statute is not merely silent, but
affirmatively prescribes a distinct and comprehensive process for the
agency to follow.

¶51 In Arizona State University, the Arizona State Retirement
System (“ASRS”) charged a participating employer for an actuarial
unfunded liability under A.R.S. § 38-749, a statute that, as the court
observed, “does not explain how to determine when a termination
incentive program results in an actuarial unfunded liability or how to
calculate ‘the amount of the unfunded liability.’” 237 Ariz. at 249 ¶ 6.
Confronted with that gap, the ASRS adopted an internal policy that selected
one of two available calculation methods—choosing the method it did
because it was “less onerous for employers.” Id. at 251 ¶ 21. The court
held that the policy was a rule, and although § 38-749 “says nothing about
rulemaking, the statute’s silence does not exempt the System from the
APA’s rulemaking procedure.” Id. at 252 ¶ 23. Section 38-749 supplied
no procedure of its own, so the agency’s chosen methodology had to be
promulgated as a rule; otherwise, it would have no effect. Id. ¶ 24. The
operative fact was the statute’s silence as to any exemption or procedure.

¶52 Carondelet is similar in that a 1989 session law directed the
agency to “recalculate, if necessary, the adjusted billed charge factor,”
182 Ariz. at 224, but, as the court of appeals found, “it d[id] not set forth the
calculations to be made and le[ft] much to AHCCCS’ discretion,” id. at 228.
The agency responded with an unpublished internal methodology that it
never promulgated as a rule and that, in the court’s words, was “[a]t no
time . . . publicly articulated so that hospitals and other interested parties
could readily examine them.” Id. at 228–29. Holding that “[a]ll agencies
are subject to the APA unless they are expressly exempted,” the court

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rejected the agency’s submission that “from its silence” one could infer “the
[L]egislature never envisioned the need for an explanatory rule.” Id.
at 228. Again, the statute prescribed no process, and the agency filled the
vacuum on its own without an APA exemption.

¶53 The present case is, thus, readily distinguishable. The EPM
is not the product of a statute that says nothing and leaves the Secretary to
improvise an unpublished methodology. The Legislature has prescribed
in § 16-452 a detailed and distinct process governing the EPM’s
adoption—consultation with the election officers of every county,
submission of a draft to the Governor and Attorney General by a fixed
statutory date, approval by both officials, and issuance of the completed
manual by December 31 of each odd-numbered year. The Secretary’s
argument is, therefore, not that legislative silence created an implied
exemption—the contention rejected in both Arizona State University and
Carondelet—but that the Legislature has “otherwise provided by law” an
alternative process within the meaning of § 41-1030(A). Neither decision
addressed that clause. In each, the court resolved the question under the
express-exemption mandate of § 41-1002(A), see Ariz. State Univ., 237 Ariz.
at 252 ¶ 24; Carondelet, 182 Ariz. at 228, and invoked § 41-1030(A) only to
identify the consequence of defective rulemaking—invalidity.

¶54 The distinction is sharpest in Carondelet. The court there
bolstered its conclusion by observing that the Legislature had “specifically
exempted [the agency] from the requirements of the APA in other areas,”
reasoning that it “would have so stated” had it intended an exemption for
the session law. 182 Ariz. at 228. That inference governs claims of
exemption. The Secretary does not contend that § 16-452 exempts the EPM
from the APA. He contends that § 16-452 is the alternative rulemaking
process that § 41-1030(A) itself contemplates. Carondelet’s reasoning about
how the Legislature signals an exemption thus does not reach the distinct
authorization on which the Secretary relies.

¶55 Arizona State University and Carondelet are inapposite to the
facts of this case, and we decline the RNC’s invitation to extend them
beyond the facts in which they arose.

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DISPOSITION

¶56 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the court of appeals
opinion and reinstate pages 1–3 of the trial court’s May 10, 2024 decision.
We further remand to the court of appeals to address RNC’s alternative
claims challenging eight specific provisions of the EPM that the RNC
contends violate state and federal law 9.

9 On remand, the court of appeals concluded that, based on the record, the

RNC lacked standing to seek a declaratory judgment regarding the
challenged provisions and affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of RNC’s
complaint. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Fontes, No. 2 CA-CV 2024-0241, 2025
WL 3511098, at *6 ¶¶ 19–20 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2025).

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