Briana Hernandez v. Luis Arturo Loarca

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

BRIANA HERNANDEZ,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

LUIS ARTURO LOARCA,
Defendant/Appellant.

No. CV-25-0161-PR
Filed April 27, 2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable John R. Doody, Judge Pro Tempore
No. FC2024-051159

Opinion of the Court of Appeals,
Division Two
571 P.3d 371 (App. 2025)

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL:

William H. Doyle, Brandon D. Millam, Emily S. Morgan (argued), Doyle
Hernandez Millam, Phoenix, Attorneys for Briana Hernandez

Florence M. Bruemmer (argued), Law Office of Florence M. Bruemmer,
P.C., Anthem, Attorney for Luis Arturo Loarca
 HERNANDEZ v. LOARCA
Opinion of the Court

CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER authored the Opinion of the Court, in which
VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ, JUSTICES BOLICK, BEENE,
MONTGOMERY, KING, and CRUZ joined.

CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 Briana Hernandez and Luis Loarca had a past romantic
relationship that resulted in the birth of their daughter (“Daughter”), who
was ten years old at the time of the events at issue. Their relationship
soured, and the two have spent years embroiled in contentious family court
proceedings concerning Daughter. Relevant here, Hernandez obtained an
order of protection against Loarca based on allegations that he engaged in
domestic violence by harassing her at Daughter’s school, where Hernandez
was also employed. See A.R.S. § 13-3601(A)(2) (including harassment by
one parent against the other as an act of domestic violence). Specifically,
she alleged that Loarca harassed her by making negative statements
concerning her to Daughter’s teacher and the school principal.

¶2 To constitute harassment, a perpetrator’s actions must be
“directed at” the victim. See A.R.S. § 13-2921(E). We address here
whether Loarca’s statements to the teacher and the principal outside her
presence were “directed at” Hernandez and therefore qualified as
harassment. We conclude that statements made to third parties can be
“directed at” the victim when they are designed to provoke an adverse
consequence against the victim. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
here by finding that Loarca’s communications were intended to cause
Hernandez trouble at her job and were therefore “directed at” her.

BACKGROUND

¶3 In the fall of 2023, Hernandez was employed as a
paraprofessional by Phoenix Legacy Traditional School, which Daughter
also attended. Daughter’s teacher told Hernandez that Daughter was
struggling with reading and needed to improve her grades. According to
Hernandez, she later mentioned this conversation to Loarca and
commented that perhaps Daughter needed a more experienced teacher.
Thereafter, Loarca met with Daughter’s teacher at a parent-teacher
conference. Hernandez alleges that during that discussion, Loarca

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misrepresented what she had told him, instead telling the teacher that
Hernandez “despises” her and “did not think she was a good teacher.”
Hernandez learned of this encounter in a later meeting with the teacher,
which the principal arranged so the two could smooth things over. The
teacher was “extremely unhappy” and “quite uncomfortable” during the
meeting. Hernandez explained to the teacher and the principal that
Loarca had miscommunicated her comments, and that ended the matter.

¶4 In March 2024, Daughter transferred to Goodyear Legacy
Traditional School, and Hernandez started working there as a
paraprofessional. Soon after, Daughter came to Hernandez during school
hours concerning a book report Daughter was working on. According to
Hernandez, Loarca had switched the book at the last minute, leaving
Daughter stressed about her ability to complete the assignment on time.
Consequently, Hernandez helped Daughter by giving her notes on the book
and “otherwise helping her finish the report.” Loarca found out. Rather
than discussing the matter with Hernandez, he took Hernandez’s notes and
other information she had given to Daughter and sent it to the school
principal, who supervised Hernandez. As a consequence, the principal
provided Hernandez with a written warning for plagiarism, admonished
Hernandez that she could not use “company time” to help Daughter, and
told her that she should not visit Daughter during school hours.

¶5 In May, the superior court granted Hernandez’s ex parte
petition for an order of protection against Loarca. See A.R.S. § 13-3602(A).
Following a contested hearing at which both parties testified, the court
continued the order in effect. See § 13-3602(L). Notably, the court found
that Loarca’s handling of the matters did not reflect concern for Daughter
or protection of his role as final decision maker in educational matters but
were instead calculated to inflict harm on Hernandez by causing trouble for
her at work.

¶6 The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Loarca’s
actions were not “directed at” Hernandez as required by § 13-2921(E).
Hernandez v. Loarca, 571 P.3d 371, 374 ¶¶ 12–13 (Ariz. App. 2025). In its
view, Loarca’s actions were directed at third parties—the immediate
recipients of his communications. Id. at 375 ¶¶ 17–18. In light of this
resolution, the court did not address Loarca’s additional arguments that the
order of protection improperly modified the family court’s legal
decision-making orders and violated his First Amendment rights. See id.
¶ 19.
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¶7 We granted Hernandez’s subsequently filed petition for
review to decide whether communications made between a defendant and
a third party can be “directed at” the plaintiff under § 13-2921(E). We have
jurisdiction under article 6 section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

DISCUSSION

¶8 We review the trial court’s decision to grant an order of
protection for an abuse of discretion. Michaelson v. Garr, 234 Ariz. 542, 544
¶ 5 (App. 2014). A court abuses its discretion if it misinterprets the law in
reaching its conclusions. See Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz. L.L.C. v. Carman, 253
Ariz. 499, 503 ¶ 8 (2022).

A. Section 13-2921(E) Contemplates That Conduct
Or Communications May Be “Directed At” A
Person Through A Third Party If Designed To
Provoke An Adverse Consequence For That
Person.

¶9 A trial court may issue an order of protection to “restrain[] a
person from committing an act included in domestic violence.” A.R.S.
§ 13-3602(A). A person engages in domestic violence by committing an
enumerated criminal offense against someone with whom the person has a
qualifying relationship, which includes having a child in common.
See § 13-3601(A)(2). One such offense is harassment under § 13-2921.
See § 13-3601(A).

¶10 Section 13-2921(A) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person
commits harassment” by “knowingly and repeatedly” contacting or
communicating with “another person . . . in a manner that harasses.” To
“harass” means to engage in conduct “directed at” a specific person that
“would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed,
humiliated or mentally distressed” and that in fact causes such distress.
§ 13-2921(E). The question here is whether subsection (E) requires
communications be made directly to the victim or whether communications
to third parties may also qualify. We conclude that communications may
be “directed at” a victim even when conveyed to a third party when they
are designed to provoke an adverse consequence against the victim.

¶11 We begin with the statutory text. In re Riggins, 257 Ariz. 28,
31 ¶ 12 (2024). We read that text in context and alongside related
provisions. Id. If the text has a plain meaning, we apply it unless doing
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so would produce an absurd result or a constitutional violation. Id. If the
text is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, we consider
secondary interpretive tools, including legislative history and the
consequences of competing constructions. Id.

¶12 The phrase “directed at” has a plain meaning. In 2022, when
§ 13-2921(E) was last amended, to “direct” meant, in relevant part, to aim
or point toward a person or thing. See Direct, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th
ed. 2019); Direct, Oxford English Dictionary 3.a (3d ed. 2000); Direct,
Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/direct
(last visited Apr. 6, 2026). This definition focuses on the target of the
communication, not its immediate recipient. Accordingly, a
communication may be “directed at” a victim even if conveyed to a third
party, so long as the victim is its intended target. If such communications
are designed to provoke an adverse consequence for the victim that would
seriously alarm, annoy, humiliate, or mentally distress a reasonable person
in the victim’s position, and in fact do so, they constitute harassment.
§ 13-2921(E). In short, § 13-2921(E) regulates conduct based on its target,
not its transmission path.

¶13 Our interpretation is reinforced by subsection (A)(1), which
provides that a person can “harass” by “caus[ing] a communication with
another person,” not only with the victim. (Emphasis added.) By not
limiting the communication’s recipient to the victim, subsection (A)(1)
illustrates that communications may be directed at a victim through
intermediaries. § 13-2921(A)(1).

¶14 The broader statutory scheme supports this interpretation.
Other subsections in § 13-2921 describe conduct that targets a victim
through third parties. For example, subsection (A)(4) covers false reports
about the victim to law enforcement, credit agencies, or social service
agencies. Subsection (A)(5) addresses interference with utility services,
which may involve communications to third-party actors. Reading
subsection (E) to encompass third-party communications thus accords with
the Legislature’s evident intent to prohibit harassing conduct regardless of
the means used to deliver it.

¶15 The court of appeals recently adopted this understanding in
Raber v. Wagner, 571 P.3d 902 (Ariz. App. 2025). There, the defendant
repeatedly sent email messages to the plaintiff’s relatives, work colleagues,
and other contacts, asking them, variously, to speak with the plaintiff on
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her behalf, mediate a parenting dispute, and “knock some sense into” the
plaintiff. Id. at 906 ¶ 12. The court held that § 13-2921 “expressly
contemplates” harassment through third-party communications when
those communications are designed to prompt action directed at the victim.
Id. ¶ 13. Because the defendant sought to initiate actions and
communications aimed at the plaintiff, her conduct was “directed at” the
plaintiff. Id.

¶16 The court of appeals here distinguished Raber on the ground
that Loarca did not explicitly request that third parties take action or
communicate with Hernandez. See Hernandez, 571 P.3d at 374–75 ¶ 15.
That distinction does not withstand scrutiny. Raber did not turn on the
presence of an explicit request for action; it turned on whether the
communications targeted the victim and were intended to provoke an
adverse consequence. See Raber, 571 P.3d at 906 ¶ 13 (“Here, the record
supports a determination that Wagner, through her communications with
third parties including Raber’s relatives and work colleagues, sought to
initiate direct actions toward, and communications with, Raber.”).

¶17 Just as making a false report to law enforcement or a credit or
social service agency is designed to provoke adverse consequences against
a victim without any explicit request for action, see § 13-2921(A)(4), so too
can other communications made to third parties that target a victim.
Limiting § 13-2921(E) to cases involving express solicitations would create
an arbitrary loophole, permitting harassment through third-party
communications designed to provoke adverse consequences so long as the
speaker avoids expressly asking for those consequences. We see no
principled basis for concluding, for example, that a person’s false statement
to a wife that her husband is having an affair is not “directed at” the
husband, but becomes so only if the speaker adds that the wife should act
against him. In both instances, the communication is designed to provoke
an adverse consequence against the husband.

¶18 Importantly, not all communications to third parties that
reveal unflattering information about another person are “directed at” that
person. In LaFaro v. Cahill, 203 Ariz. 482 (App. 2002), for example, the court
of appeals considered whether a defendant’s statements describing the
plaintiff as a “bigot,” “fascist,” and “homophobe,” made to a third party
but within the plaintiff’s earshot, were “directed at” the plaintiff for
purposes of Arizona’s civil harassment statute, A.R.S. § 12-1809(T)(1)(a),

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which closely parallels § 13-2921(E). 1 See LaFaro, 203 Ariz. at 486 ¶ 13.
The court did not rule out that some third-party communications may be
“directed at” another person but concluded that the statements there were
directed at the third party, not the plaintiff. See id. & n.3. We agree. We
further note that, unlike in Raber, the defendant’s comments in LaFaro were
not intended to provoke adverse consequences for the plaintiff, even if they
may have diminished the third party’s opinion of the plaintiff.

¶19 In sum, § 13-2921(E) turns on the target of the conduct or
communication designed to provoke an adverse consequence against the
victim, not to whom the communication is conveyed. Thus,
communications may be “directed at” a victim even when made to a third
party. But the statute is not boundless. It reaches only those third-party
communications that target the victim to provoke an adverse consequence
and otherwise satisfy the statute’s requirements.

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err By Finding That
Loarca’s Statements Were “Directed At”
Hernandez.

¶20 Turning to the record here, we cannot say the trial court
abused its discretion by finding that Loarca directed his communications
with the teacher and the principal at Hernandez to provoke an adverse
consequence against her. Loarca argues that this case is more like the
situation in LaFaro than the one in Raber because Hernandez was unaware
of the communications when made, and he made the communications
solely to advance Daughter’s interests and protect his role as decision
maker for Daughter’s education, not to provoke a consequence against
Hernandez. The trial court, however, reached a different conclusion after
assessing the parties’ credibility and testimony at the evidentiary hearing.
It found that despite Loarca’s professed reasons for communicating with
the teacher and the principal, his actions were in fact intended to inflict
suffering on Hernandez.

¶21 The record supports that finding. First, Loarca’s statement
to the teacher that Hernandez despised her and considered her incompetent
supports the conclusion that he targeted Hernandez to provoke an adverse
consequence in her workplace. Nothing about those comments furthered

1 We cite to the current version of the civil harassment statute because it
has not materially changed since the opinion in LaFaro.
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Daughter’s educational interests and thus appeared intended to undermine
the parties’ professional relationship. Indeed, the principal convened a
meeting to address the resulting conflict.

¶22 Second, Loarca’s report to the principal that Hernandez
improperly assisted Daughter with the book report likewise supports the
inference that he sought to create problems for Hernandez with her
supervisor. He made no effort to resolve the issue with Hernandez or
Daughter’s teacher before going directly to the principal. As the trial court
found, Loarca effectively accused a staff member of dishonesty and
plagiarism, making it likely that the principal would take adverse action
against Hernandez. Thus, we cannot say the trial court abused its
discretion.

¶23 Finally, we point out that § 13-2921(E) is broadly written, and
courts may struggle with applying it in some situations. Unlike its civil
counterpart, § 13-2921(E) does not exclude from the definition of harassing
behavior conduct or communications made for legitimate purposes.
Compare § 13-2921(E) (requiring “conduct [that] in fact seriously alarms,
annoys, humiliates or mentally distresses the person”), with
§ 12-1809(T)(1)(a) (requiring “conduct [that] in fact seriously alarms,
annoys or harasses the person and serves no legitimate purpose”).
Because the trial court here found that Loarca did not make his
communications for a legitimate purpose, we need not address this
distinction. The Legislature, however, may wish to consider whether
complaints made for legitimate purposes, even though designed to provoke
an adverse consequence against another person, should nevertheless fall
within the statute’s reach. A broad application of this statute may also
implicate the free-speech protections of our state and federal Constitutions,
but that issue is not currently before us.

CONCLUSION

¶24 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the court of appeals’
opinion and remand the case back to that court to decide the remaining
issues it did not yet decide.

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