Cited by

If it does, we “ask[] whether ‘authority of law’ justifies the intrusion.” Id.; (holding that the right to refuse medical treatment, though a private affair, “is not absolute” and may yield to state interests).

(right to refuse medical treatment protected by both state and federal constitutions); -36 (1986) (federal constitution provides “benchmark of minimum constitutional protection”).

–23 (1987) (“In representing the interests of [a] ward, [a GAL] will perform both procedural and substantive duties.”); Brittner, 246 Ariz. at 297, ¶ 10 (“[W]e do not parcel out therapeutic service from evaluation and reporting to the court nor do we limit immunity only for services related to the judicial process

¶20 Cleckner argues Client 1 had a constitutionally guaranteed “bodily autonomy” and an “ability to make informed choices about her health care or refuse care altogether.” Assuming, without deciding, that Client 1 had such a right, –15 (1987) (“[t]he right to refuse medical treatment is a personal right sufficiently ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’” under the United States Constitution and “the Arizona Constitution also provides for a right to refuse medical treatmen

“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” -16 , -83 (1987) (quoting Union Pac.

“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” –16, –83 (1987) (quoting Union Pac.

Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (“[A] competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest [under the Fourteenth Amendment] in refusing unwanted medical treatment.”); –15, – 82 (1987) (deciding that common law and Arizona Constitution article 2, § 8 Right to Privacy encompasses a person’s “right to chart his or her own plan of medical treatment”).

at n. 2, 56 P.3d at 32 , n. 2 ( , (allowing person in chronic vegetative state to choose termination of treatment over life)).

And, in addressing an automobile search, our supreme court long ago stated that article II, § 8, “although different in its language, is of the same 7 In his reply brief, P.2d 674 (1987), Johnson asserts Arizona’s “right to privacy has also been held to bestow greater rights than the federal constitution in the area of medical treatment.” Although the Arizona supreme court observed in Rasmussen that, “[u]nlike the federal constitution, the Arizona Constitution expressly provides f

(noting “the fundamental right of every adult of sound mind to determine what should be done to his [or her] body”).

levant conduct” that could affect sentence); United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2 d 654 (9th Cir. 1991 ) (suggesting clear and convincing evidence might be required to prove sentencing factors that result in extrao rdinary adju stments 12 to sentence); 23, (higher evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence applies to “exceptional civil matters” involving “‘personal interests more important than those found in the typical civil dispute’”).

clear and convincing” should be standard for determining “relevant conduct” that could affect sentence); United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654 (9th Cir.1991) (suggesting clear and convincing evidence might be required to prove sentencing factors that result in extraordinary adjustments to sentence); , , (higher evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence applies to “exceptional civil matters” involving “‘personal interests more important than those found in the typical civil dispute’

(applying pxlvacy guarantee to decide that an individual in a chronic vegetative state had a right, through a guardian, to refuse treatment and choose death); , 458 n. 2, ¶ 13, , 32 n. 2 (2002) (commenting

Although "preponderance of the evidence" is the standard typically employed in civil cases, , for three reasons we conclude that "clear and convincing evidence" is the appropriate standard to use in judicial bypass cases.

Although “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard typically employed in civil eases, , for three reasons we conclude that “clear and convincing evidence” is the appropriate standard to use in judicial bypass cases.

State v. B Bar Enterprises, Inc., , 101 n. 2, , 980 n. 2 (1982).

In this regard, , the Arizona case that established a legal guardian’s authority to determine whether to continue medical treatment for an incompetent adult ward, of assistance to our resolution of the issues in this case.

Second, , stands for the proposition that Adelle Ruberg has a constitutional right “to chart ...