Cited by

Riebe Enters., Inc., (deciding issues not addressed by the court of appeals “[i]n the interest of judicial economy”); n.2 (1990) (noting that “[p]rinciples of judicial economy” supported deciding an issue that had been briefed and argued).

(stating where one issue is dispositive, a court need not reach other issues presented on appeal).

n.2 (1990) (finding “[p]rinciples of judicial economy,” including the potential for the issue to arise again, that facts “squarely presented” the problem, and that it was “specially briefed, argued, and thoroughly explored,” justified addressing the constitutional issue).

(stating where one issue is dispositive, a court need not reach other issues presented on appeal).

“a negligent actor whose conduct was a cause of injury was the sole cause of the injurious event”); -02, -22 (1990) (statute may not provide that “antecedent conduct” of person injured is absolute bar to recovery of damages from person otherwise liable for the injury under either statutory or common law principles); -25, -92 (1990) (same); Sonoran Desert Investigations, Inc., v. Miller, P.3d 754 (App. 2006) (same).

he plaintiff had expressly or impliedly consented to the defendant’s negligent conduct, the legal result [being] that the defendant is simply relieved of the duty which would otherwise exist.’” 1800 Ocotillo, SANDERS v. ALGER Opinion of the Court at 227, (second alteration in Schwab).

(same); n.2, n.2 (1990) (reaching constitutional issue where issue had been briefed and principles of judicial economy dictated, despite availability of non-constitutional grounds).

¶ 24 After considering and rejecting a proposal to simply abolish the defense of assumption of risk, the delegates instead decided to mitigate its harsh effects by providing in Article 18, Section 5 that the defense will be both a question of fact and reserved to the jury in “all cases whatsoever.” Hall v. A.N.R.

3 ¶ 8 The respondent judge found § 12-712(B) unconstitutional, , and other authorities addressing the mandate of article XVIII, § 5.

See, e.g., Estate of Reinen v. N. Ariz. Orthopedics, Ltd., ¶ 18 , (applying Article 18, Section 5 to a medical malpractice case); -24 , -91 (1990) (applying Article 18, Section 5 in suit for defendant’s negligent furnishing of alcohol to man who subsequently shot plaintiff in defendant’s parking lot); , (applying Article 18, Section 5 to a case in which the

422 n. 2, , 1089 n. 2 (1990); Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 2 v. Phoenix Employee Relations Bd.

422 n. 2, , 1089 n. 2 (1990); Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 2 v. Phoenix Employee Relations Bd.

our supreme court struck down a statute that attempted to relieve tavernkeepers of dram shop liability to persons who knowingly remain in the danger zone of an intoxicated tavern patron.

-25 , -92 (1990) (holding A.R.S.

held that § 4-312(A), which immunizes licensees from actions brought by adult consumers or their families, was unconstitutional as a violation of Ariz. Const, art. 18, § 5.

Subsequent to the trial in this case, the Arizona Supreme Court held section 4-312(A)

7 Assuming, without deciding, that the City’s point is relevant