Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Pritchard v. State, 788 P.2d 1178.

106 citing documents.

Fry v. Garcia 138 P.3d 1197 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
(“[A] presumption exists in favor of retention of jurisdiction, and a divestiture of jurisdiction cannot be inferred but must be clearly and unambiguously found.”).
Salerno v. Espinoza 115 P.3d 626 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Salerno v. Espinoza 115 P.3d 626 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
State v. Fell 97 P.3d 902 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
Distinguished State v. Fell 97 P.3d 902 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
There, , was retroactively applicable because Pritchard had held that the time limits in A.R.S.
John C. Lincoln Hospital v. Maricopa County 96 P.3d 530 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
John C. Lincoln Hospital v. Maricopa County 96 P.3d 530 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
However, , in which our supreme court held that meeting the time element regarding the filing of a notice pursuant to A.R.S.
Martineau v. Maricopa County 86 P.3d 912 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Martineau v. Maricopa County 86 P.3d 912 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
We address this issue because, if the County is correct, Appellants failed to satisfy a “mandatory” and “essential” prerequisite to their cause of action, , (interpreting the 1984 revision of former A.R.S.
Kosman v. State 16 P.3d 211 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
Kosman v. State 16 P.3d 211 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
(holding that notice of claim statute is procedural rather than jurisdictional and that disputed issues of fact regarding excusable neglect must be resolved by jury).
Young v. City of Scottsdale 970 P.2d 942 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
Young v. City of Scottsdale 970 P.2d 942 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
later made clear, however, the filing of a claim, though mandatory, is a procedural rather than a jurisdictional requirement and, “[l]ike a statute of limitations, this procedural requirement is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling.” ¶ 11 Brooks and Dassinger were reconc
Mohave Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Byers 942 P.2d 451 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Mohave Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Byers 942 P.2d 451 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix 933 P.2d 1251 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix 933 P.2d 1251 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
“[T]he right to sue the state is not a statutory grant, as is the case in several other states; rather, it is a common law rule in Arizona that the government is liable for its tortious conduct and immunity is the exception.”
Valencia Energy Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 938 P.2d 474 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Valencia Energy Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 938 P.2d 474 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Schabel v. DEER VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL 920 P.2d 41 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Schabel v. DEER VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL 920 P.2d 41 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Florez v. Sargeant 917 P.2d 250 Ariz. 1996
Galati v. Lake Havasu City 920 P.2d 11 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Galati v. Lake Havasu City 920 P.2d 11 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
James L. *134 Conlogue, Note, A Separation of Powers Analysis of the Absolute Immunity of Public Entities, 28 Ariz.L.Rev.
Goss v. City of Globe 883 P.2d 466 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1994
Goss v. City of Globe 883 P.2d 466 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1994
the legislature rejected language that would have deleted references to the common law.
Weekly v. City of Mesa 888 P.2d 1346 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Weekly v. City of Mesa 888 P.2d 1346 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
§ 12-820, Historical and Statutory Note ("it is hereby declared to be the public policy of this state that public entities are liable for acts and omissions of employees in accordance with the statutes and common law of this state”) , (common law in Arizona is that government is liable for its tortious conduct and immunity is the exception).
State v. C & H NATIONWIDE, INC. 876 P.2d 1199 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1994
State v. C & H NATIONWIDE, INC. 876 P.2d 1199 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1994
§§ 12-820 through 12-826, , so also we believe is the decision to shift the state’s liability to a third party.
Hayes v. Continental Insurance 872 P.2d 668 Ariz. 1994
Hayes v. Continental Insurance 872 P.2d 668 Ariz. 1994
Zimmer v. Peters 861 P.2d 1188 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
Zimmer v. Peters 861 P.2d 1188 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
Ulibarri v. Gerstenberger 871 P.2d 698 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
Ulibarri v. Gerstenberger 871 P.2d 698 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
Nation v. Colla 841 P.2d 1370 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Nation v. Colla 841 P.2d 1370 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
should not be given retroactive application in the present case.
Hauskins v. McGillicuddy 852 P.2d 1226 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Hauskins v. McGillicuddy 852 P.2d 1226 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
In Pritchard v. State, our supreme court held that “[bjecause we held that § 12-821 is not jurisdictional but is analogous to a statute of limitations, disputed issues of fact must be resolved by the jury, not the trial court.”
Estate of Bohn v. Waddell 848 P.2d 324 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Estate of Bohn v. Waddell 848 P.2d 324 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
(legislative divestiture of superior court jurisdiction must be clear and unambiguous)
Menendez v. Paddock Pool Construction Co. 836 P.2d 968 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
Menendez v. Paddock Pool Construction Co. 836 P.2d 968 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
Howland v. State 818 P.2d 1169 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
Howland v. State 818 P.2d 1169 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
Neville v. Vingelli 826 P.2d 1196 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
Neville v. Vingelli 826 P.2d 1196 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
Bills v. Arizona State Board of Education 819 P.2d 952 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
Bills v. Arizona State Board of Education 819 P.2d 952 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
First, the Board argues, , that Bills waived these substantive issues because he failed to file a cross appeal as to them.