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Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Velasco, 799 P.2d 821.

51 citing documents.

State of Arizona v. Cooperman 282 P.3d 446 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
State of Arizona v. Cooperman 282 P.3d 446 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
Although the Intoxilyzer produces accurate, even understated, results in most cases, a defendant charged under § 28-1381(A)(1) nonetheless is entitled to introduce reliable evidence challenging the state’s alcohol-concentration evidence in his particular case.9 9 The state also argues, in passing, that the expert’s testimony “is scientifically invali
State of Arizona v. Erica Lea Daughters-White, Sean Aaron Johnson, John Clifton Livingston ... Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
State of Arizona v. Erica Lea Daughters-White, Sean Aaron Johnson, John Clifton Livingston ... Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
-87, -28 (1990) (no requirement scientific process 9 App. 1977); -50, -59 (App. 1987) (trial court properly denied request to examine officer’s personnel file based on conjecture it migh
State v. Campoy 149 P.3d 756 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
State v. Campoy 149 P.3d 756 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
(“Any lack of perfection [in tests used to measure BAC] affects the weight the jury may wish to accord the evidence obtained by [those] test[s], not its admissibility.”).
State v. Esser 70 P.3d 449 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State of Arizona v. John Robert Esser Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
State of Arizona v. John Robert Esser Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
And, as the trial court noted in denying this claim, alcohol breath testing has been found to be generally accepted in the scientific community, thus relieving the state from proving its general acceptance in every prosecution.
State v. Esser 70 P.3d 449 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
And, as the trial court noted in denying this claim, alcohol breath testing has been found to be generally accepted in the scientific community, , thus relieving the state from proving its general acceptance in every prosecution.
State v. O'DELL 46 P.3d 1074 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
State v. O'DELL 46 P.3d 1074 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Fields 35 P.3d 82 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Fields 35 P.3d 82 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
34-35 , -01 (1979) (breathalyzer); -66 , -36 (1984) (“voiceprint” evidence); State v. Superior Court (Blake), -80 , -82 (1986) (horizontal gaze nystagmus testing); -42 , -29 (1988) (phosphoglucomutase (PGM) blood grouping); -87 , -28 (1990) (silica gel blood alcohol test); -82 , -85 (1993) (DNA evidence).
Logerquist v. McVey 1 P.3d 113 Ariz. 2000
Logerquist v. McVey 1 P.3d 113 Ariz. 2000
See, e.g., Hummert, , , ("occupant kinematics” evidence); Bible, , Troutman v. Valley Nat’l Bank, , 518-19 & n. 2, , 815-16 & n. 2 (App.1992) (thermogram diagnostic test); -87 , -28 (1990) (silica gel blood alcohol test); , 241 — 42, -29 (1988) (phosphoglucomutase blood test), cert.
In re Jonah T. 994 P.2d 1019 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
In re Jonah T. 994 P.2d 1019 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
(citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923)).
State v. Superior Court 991 P.2d 258 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
State v. Superior Court 991 P.2d 258 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
(“Under Frye, evidence derived from application of a scientific principle or process is admissible if the principle or process has gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”).
State v. Tankersley 956 P.2d 486 Ariz. 1998
State v. Tankersley 956 P.2d 486 Ariz. 1998
Lind v. Superior Court 954 P.2d 1058 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
Lind v. Superior Court 954 P.2d 1058 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
Ricard v. Arizona Department of Transportation 931 P.2d 1143 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Ricard v. Arizona Department of Transportation 931 P.2d 1143 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
State v. Johnson 922 P.2d 294 Ariz. 1996
State v. Johnson 922 P.2d 294 Ariz. 1996
State v. Bolan 927 P.2d 819 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
State v. Bolan 927 P.2d 819 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Nevertheless, “due process does not require the police to follow the most fair method; it only prohibits methods that are fundamentally unfair.”
State v. Johnson 905 P.2d 1002 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1995
State v. Johnson 905 P.2d 1002 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1995
State Ex Rel. McDougall v. Superior Court 888 P.2d 1389 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
State Ex Rel. McDougall v. Superior Court 888 P.2d 1389 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
We also note that in the trial court, , supported the state’s position or Stock’s position.
State v. SUPERIOR COURT IN & FOR CTY. OF YAVAPAI 878 P.2d 1381 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
State v. SUPERIOR COURT IN & FOR CTY. OF YAVAPAI 878 P.2d 1381 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Norris, however, , , require the police to inform DUI suspects of their right to an independent test.
State v. Bible 858 P.2d 1152 Ariz. 1993
State v. Bible 858 P.2d 1152 Ariz. 1993
Moss v. Superior Court 857 P.2d 400 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
Moss v. Superior Court 857 P.2d 400 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
State v. Vannoy 866 P.2d 874 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
State v. Vannoy 866 P.2d 874 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
the court described in detail the model 5000 intoxilyzer, which is the machine that the state used to test defendant in the instant case.
State v. Youngblood 844 P.2d 1152 Ariz. 1993
State v. Moreno 844 P.2d 638 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1992
State v. Moreno 844 P.2d 638 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1992
Logically read, the subsection mandates duplicate tests only when the reliability of one test result is established by comparing it to another test result, and the two are within a range of “0.02 of alcohol concentration of each other.” Such a range comparison presupposes duplicate or replicate tests, , 489 n. 7, , 830 n. 7 (1990).
Hoskinson v. State of Cal. 812 P.2d 995 Ariz. 1991
Hoskinson v. State of Cal. 812 P.2d 995 Ariz. 1991
Vice Chief Justice Feldman and Justice Cameron voted to grant for the following reasons: The exercise of in personam jurisdiction is based on considerations of due process and on principles of “fundamental fairness.”
State v. Kemp 813 P.2d 315 Ariz. 1991
State v. Kemp 813 P.2d 315 Ariz. 1991
This court has stated that: There is probably no more nebulous and indefinable concept in the law than “due process of law.” Generally speaking, the denial of due process is a denial of “fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice.” , (quoting Oshrin, 142 Ariz. at 111 , 688 P.2d at 1003 ).
State Ex Rel. Hamilton v. City Court of City of Mesa 799 P.2d 855 Ariz. 1990

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