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“We interpret the words of a statute using their ordinary meanings,” and avoid construing a statute in a manner that leads to an absurd result.

See, (“We adopt the modern common law view that an owner of livestock owes a duty of ordinary care to motorists traveling on a public highway in open range.” (emphasis added)); Judson C. Ball Revocable Tr.

See Carrow Co. v. Lusby , , 20, , 749 (1990) ("Legislative intent often can be discovered by examining the development of a particular statute.").

(“Legislative intent often can be discovered by examining the development of a particular statute.”).

See, (stating that an owner of livestock in open range territory owes a duty of care to motorists travelling on a public highway); (stating that abutting property owners must exercise their property rights “with due regard to the safety of the public, and in such a man

See Carrow Co. v. Lusby , , 21, , 750 (1990) ("[A]bsent a manifestation of legislative intent to repeal a common law rule, we will construe statutes as consistent with the common law.").

can [also] be discovered by examining the development of a particular statute.’ ” ¶ 8 , ( , ).

§ 12-2236 does not abrogate common law forms of waiver); (“[A]bsent a manifestation of legislative intent to repeal a common law rule, we will construe statutes as consistent with the common law”); (explaining that if the common law is to be “changed, supplemented, or ab

(“Legislative intent often can be discovered by examining the development of a particular statute.”).

¶ 9 , ( , ) (courts consider the policy behind the law and the evil it was intended to remedy when interpreting statutes).

(“Legislative intent often can be discovered by examining the development of a particular statute.”).

-21, -50 (1990) (in interpreting a law, court examines its language and considers underlying policy and “the evil it was designed to 23 remedy”).

¶15 “Legislative intent often can be discovered by examining the development of a particular statute.”

(“Legislative intent often can be discovered by examining the development of a particular statute.”).

¶ 5 Roberts moved for summary judgment, arguing that, as a matter of law, , it could not be found negligent for merely failing to prevent its cattle from entering the highway.

Co., , , (“Legislative intent often can be discovered by examining the development of a particular statute.”).

“‘Legislative intent often can be discovered by examining the development of a particular statute.’” Paul M., 7 P.3d at 133, quoting Carrow Co. v. Lusby, 167 Ariz. 18, 20

See Carrow Co. v. Lusby, 167 Ariz. 18, 20, (“Legislative intent often can be discovered by examining the development of a particular statute.”).

(absent a clear expression of legislative intent to repeal the common law rule, courts usually construe statutes consistently with common law).

¶ 4 , (“ ‘Legislative intent often can be discovered by examining the development of a particular statute.’ ” ( , )).

(“Legislative intent often can be discovered by examining the development of a particular statute.”).