Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Janson v. Christensen, 808 P.2d 1222.

308 citing documents.

Pawn 1st, LLC v. City of Phoenix 294 P.3d 147 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. White 295 P.3d 435 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. White 295 P.3d 435 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
State ex rel. Montgomery v. Mathis 290 P.3d 1226 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
State ex rel. Montgomery v. Mathis 290 P.3d 1226 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
(stating that we rely on the plain language of the rule or statute if it is unambiguous).
State v. Loney 287 P.3d 836 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
State v. Loney 287 P.3d 836 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
We look first to the statute’s language because we expect it to be “the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning[.]”
FL Receivables Trust 2002-A v. Arizona Mills, L.L.C. 281 P.3d 1028 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
FL Receivables Trust 2002-A v. Arizona Mills, L.L.C. 281 P.3d 1028 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
(we give effect to the plain language of the statute).
Hess v. Purcell 274 P.3d 520 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
Hess v. Purcell 274 P.3d 520 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
(citing Balestrieri v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Helvetica Servicing, Inc. v. Pasquan 277 P.3d 198 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
Helvetica Servicing, Inc. v. Pasquan 277 P.3d 198 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
Richard Anderson v. Valley Union High School District 22 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
Richard Anderson v. Valley Union High School District 22 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471
State v. Cagle 266 P.3d 1070 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
State v. Cagle 266 P.3d 1070 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
(stating that courts look first at the statute’s language as it is “the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning”).
Sholes v. Fernando Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
Sholes v. Fernando 268 P.3d 1112 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
Sholes v. Fernando Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
Sholes v. Fernando 268 P.3d 1112 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
State Ex Rel. Horne v. Autozone, Inc. 258 P.3d 289 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
State Ex Rel. Horne v. Autozone, Inc. 258 P.3d 289 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
State v. Gray 258 P.3d 242 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
State v. Gray 258 P.3d 242 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
In construing § 13-2804, we are mindful that ‘“the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.’ ”
EDONNA v. Heckman 253 P.3d 627 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
EDONNA v. Heckman 253 P.3d 627 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Quality, ¶ 10 , ( , (alteration in original)).
Turner v. City of Flagstaff 247 P.3d 1011 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Turner v. City of Flagstaff 247 P.3d 1011 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
State of Arizona v. James Charles Ray Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
State of Arizona v. James Charles Ray Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
Thompson v. Pima County 243 P.3d 1024 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
Thompson v. Pima County 243 P.3d 1024 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
“[T]he best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is *45 its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.”
Anderson v. Arizona Game & Fish Department 243 P.3d 1021 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
Anderson v. Arizona Game & Fish Department 243 P.3d 1021 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
In Re BOND IN THE AMOUNT OF $75,000 238 P.3d 1275 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
In Re BOND IN THE AMOUNT OF $75,000 238 P.3d 1275 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
Preston v. Kindred Hospitals West, L.L.C. 236 P.3d 450 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Preston v. Kindred Hospitals West, L.L.C. 236 P.3d 450 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
) (holding that if the language of a rule “is unambiguous, it must be given effect as written.”).
State of Arizona v. John George Ponsart Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
State of Arizona v. John George Ponsart Jr. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
Clear and unequivocal language “is determinative of [a] statute‟s construction,” but if “the statute‟s language is not clear, we determine legislative intent by reading the statute as a whole, giving meaningful operation to all of its provisions, and by considering factors such as the statute‟s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequ
State of Arizona v. Jeffrey Lee Hinden Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
State of Arizona v. Jeffrey Lee Hinden Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
“We look first to the statute‟s language because we expect it to be „the best and most reliable index of a statute‟s meaning.‟”
Progressive Casualty Insurance v. Estate of Palomera-Ruiz 231 P.3d 384 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Progressive Casualty Insurance v. Estate of Palomera-Ruiz 231 P.3d 384 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
h the goal of statutory interpretation is to determine legislative intent, ¶ 8 , we do so by following the “cornerstone” principle that the “best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language, and when the language is clear and unequivocal it is determinative of the statute’s construction.”
STATE EX REL. INDUS. COM'N v. Galloway 230 P.3d 708 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
STATE EX REL. INDUS. COM'N v. Galloway 230 P.3d 708 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
In Re Mh 2008-002659 226 P.3d 394 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
In Re Mh 2008-002659 226 P.3d 394 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
No. 97 v. Houser, ¶ 8 , ( , ).
T.P. Racing, L.L.L.P. v. Arizona Department of Racing 222 P.3d 280 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009