Cited by

Co. of Cal., ); see also Beaudry, 203 Ariz. at 92 ¶ 22.

Co. of Cal., (rejecting proposed contract interpretation in part because no rational property seller would agree to such a term).

Co., for the proposition that contracts should be construed using a “common sense approach” that takes into account “all surrounding circumstances” rather than “only the text of the agreement.” In Burkons, the 6 TRAILHEAD v. PHOENIX, et al.

We review the amount of a fee award for an abuse of 1 We note that the superior court based its conclusion on our supreme court’s for the proposition that A.R.S.

Co. of Cal., –51 (1991)).

Co. of Cal., expert testimony is required to establish the standard of care, and that because Mago did not provide any such expert testimony, summary judgment was proper.

Co. of Cal., (holding that tort damages are available for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing only if the parties have a special relationship and restricting recovery to contract damages would promote breach); (holding that punitive dama

& Loan Ass’n v. SunAmp Sys., Inc., (-51 (1991)); see also Fishman v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 247 F.3d 300, 302-03 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Common sense is as 4 Although Allstate contends it “did not have a direct contractual relationship” with Watts, it agrees that each party was “bound by the rules and services administered and offered by AF.”

¶17 in arguing that Chicago Title should have sought clarification from the parties in the face of any ambiguity amongst the various documents placed in escrow.

Co. of Cal., (citing Rawlings, 151 Ariz. at 158-59, 726 P.2d at 574-75).

Co. of Cal., D’Ascoli, 94 Ariz. at 234, 383 P.2d at 121-22.

Co. of California, , Maganas, 135 Ariz. at 576 , 663 P.2d at 569 ; Berry, 124 Ariz. at 352 , 604 P.2d at 616 .

Co., -51 , -16 (1991) (same); Potter v. U.S. Specialty Ins.

Co., , ); see also Wells Fargo Bank, 201 Ariz. at 491, ¶ 64 , 38 P.3d at 29 (absent a “special relationship,” bad faith claims sound in contract, not tort).

Co. of Cal., , (“[I]f the facts actually known to the escrow agent present substantial evidence of fraud, there is a duty to disclose [to the parties].”).

Co. of Cal., -53 , -18 (1991) (imposing a duty to disclose when circumstances would lead a reasonable escrow agent to perceive fraud, as well as a duty to be cognizant not only of the escrow instructions but also of the documents placed in escrow and to seek clarification of any ambiguity from the principals).

Co. of Cal., -51 , -16 (1991); see also Darner, 140 Ariz. at 393 , 682 P.2d at 398 ; cf. Gottsfield, supra, at 389-90 & n. 83 (citing numerous cases decided before Melson).