Cited by

at (A)(11) (emphasis added); (limiting application of this provision to rules directly addressing victims).

(“[W]here alternate constructions are available, we should choose that which avoids constitutional difficulty.”).

See, (“[W]here alternate constructions 1 Indeed, as the Commission acknowledged in its brief, “[t]he management interference doctrine serves as a check on the Commission’s power so that [it] will be prevented from becoming the de facto manager of public service corporations instead of taking actions to contro

It “extends only so far as necessary to protect rights created by the VBR” that are “unique and peculiar to crime victims.” Brown, 194 Ariz. at 343 ¶¶ 11–12 (citation omitted); n.2 (1998) (stating that the VBR “did not transfer to the legislature the power to enact all procedural and evidentiary rules in criminal cases”); (adopting VBR proponents’ view that legislative rulemaking authority extends only so far as necessary to protect victims’ VBR-granted rights and does not otherwise infringe the

(we generally seek to avoid constitutional issues when interpreting and applying statutes).

at 128 ¶41, 149 P.3d at 752 (Hurwitz, J., concurring) (stating that interrelatedness requires “a reasonable or logical relationship of the various provisions with each other, and not simply with the broader topic that they cover”); , (finding the provisions of a victims’ rights initiative, as interpreted by this Court, were “a consistent and workable whole on the general topic of victims’ rights and protections” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

at 121, ¶ 6 , 149 P.3d at 745 ; , State ex.

“[T]he scope of legislative rulemaking power under the VBR extends to those rules that define, implement, preserve, and protect the specific rights unique and peculiar to crime victims, as guaranteed and created by the VBR.” Brown, 194 Ariz. at 343 ¶ 11, 982 P.2d at 818; (explaining that the legislature’s rulemaking authority under the VBR extends only to “procedural rules pertaining to victims and not [to] the substantive general subject of the rulemaking power”).

at 221 , 36 P.2d at 554 ; see also Clean Elections, 209 Ariz. at 244 ¶ 9, 99 P.3d at 573 ; , 177 ¶ 12, , , State ex rel.

In a circumstance “where alternate constructions are available, we should choose that which avoids constitutional difficulty.” , (citations omitted); , (“[I]f the statute is susceptible to two interpretations, one of which renders it unconstitutional, we must adopt the interpretation favoring its validity.”) (citation omi

should stand or fall as a whole.” Kerby, 44 Ariz. at 221 , 36 P.2d at 554 ; -89 , -92 (1990) (holding that an initiative providing ten enumerated rights of access, information, and participation to crime victims as well as authorizing the legislature to alter related procedural and evidentiary rules accordingly complied with the single subject requirement); State ex rel.

Power to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court.”) , , ( , ).

Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5(5)

Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen’s Found., , *273 554, , 1057 (1981); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 1993 WL 537923 , 155 Ariz.Adv.Rep.

1 The Supreme Court of Arizona has the “exclusive constitutional authority ‘to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court.’ Ariz. Const, art. 6, § 5(5)____”

Petitioner’s primary argument appears to be that application of § 2.1(A)(5) contravenes the supreme court’s , as it affects rules of criminal procedure not related solely to victim’s rights and thereby violates the separation of powers doctrine.