Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Dunn v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona, 866 P.2d 858.

35 citing documents.

Vande Krol v. superstition/benchmark Ariz. 2025
Vande Krol v. superstition/benchmark Ariz. 2025
Comm’n, (“The workers’ compensation laws should be construed with a view toward advancing the purpose of placing the burden of injury and death upon industry.”).
Thomas P. Morrissey v. Logan Stan Garner 461 P.3d 428 Ariz. 2020
Thomas P. Morrissey v. Logan Stan Garner 461 P.3d 428 Ariz. 2020
DeVries v. State 211 P.3d 1185 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
DeVries v. State 211 P.3d 1185 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Conmm’n, , (explaining how conflicting provisions in Article 18, Sections 6 and 8 of our Constitution “work together”).
Harper v. CANYON LAND DEVELOPMENT, LLC 200 P.3d 1032 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Harper v. CANYON LAND DEVELOPMENT, LLC 200 P.3d 1032 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Carbajal v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF ARIZONA 190 P.3d 737 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Western Water Works v. Industrial Commission 144 P.3d 535 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Western Water Works v. Industrial Commission 144 P.3d 535 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Facilitec, Inc. v. Hibbs 59 P.3d 803 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Facilitec, Inc. v. Hibbs 59 P.3d 803 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Jardanowski v. INDUS. COM'N OF ARIZONA 3 P.3d 1166 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
Stout v. State Compensation Fund 3 P.3d 1158 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
Jardanowski v. INDUS. COM'N OF ARIZONA 3 P.3d 1166 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
1892 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), but recognizing that civil penalty may constitute double jeopardy); see generally Dunn v. Industrial Comm’n, , (interpreting A.R.S.
Stout v. State Compensation Fund 3 P.3d 1158 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
See Dunn v. Industrial Comm’n
Aranda v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 989 P.2d 157 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Aranda v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 989 P.2d 157 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Indeed, we have a duty to construe a statute so as to render it constitutional if possible, , Dunn v. Industrial Comm’n, , and the party challenging the law bears a heavy burden of establishing the contrary.
Kotterman v. Killian 972 P.2d 606 Ariz. 1999
Kotterman v. Killian 972 P.2d 606 Ariz. 1999
rdinary meaning.” , , (“When the words of a constitutional provision are not defined within it, the meaning to be ascribed to the words is that which is generally understood and used by the people.”); Dunn v. Industrial Comm’n, , (requiring court to give clear and unambiguous statutory language its plain meaning unless doing so would lead to absurd results).
Kisco, Inc. v. Industrial Commission 949 P.2d 49 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
Kisco, Inc. v. Industrial Commission 949 P.2d 49 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
In 1994, our supreme court revisited this question in Dunn v. Industrial Comm’n, , overruling Magma and its progeny.
Diaz v. Magma Copper Co. 950 P.2d 1165 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
Diaz v. Magma Copper Co. 950 P.2d 1165 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
Federico v. Industrial Commission 923 P.2d 848 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Federico v. Industrial Commission 923 P.2d 848 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Dunn v. Industrial Comm’n
Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Tolliver 903 P.2d 1101 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Tolliver 903 P.2d 1101 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
See Dunn v. Industrial Comm’n, , (“We must construe the statute to avoid irrational results”).
Hayes v. Continental Insurance 872 P.2d 668 Ariz. 1994
Hayes v. Continental Insurance 872 P.2d 668 Ariz. 1994
See Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz County Fair & Rodeo Ass’n, , (constitutional question avoided because unnecessary to resolve appeal); Dunn v. Industrial Comm’n, , (same).
Blazek v. Superior Court 869 P.2d 509 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Blazek v. Superior Court 869 P.2d 509 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
“[C]lear and unambiguous language is given its plain meaning unless absurd or impossible consequences will result.” Dunn v. Industrial Comm’n, , (Jan.
Rico v. Industrial Commission 866 P.2d 865 Ariz. 1994
Rico v. Industrial Commission 866 P.2d 865 Ariz. 1994
We answer this question in the affirmative because, as we hold in the companion case of Dunn v. Industrial Comm’n, , dependency determinations under AR.S.