Cited by

Bd., that involves “a dispute at the highest levels of state government,” n.1 (1986).

The essential parts of the definition, no matter how the wording may be changed, are the “certain sum,” the “specified object,” and the “authority to spend.” Any act, or part of an act, containing all three of these elements is, and always must be, an “appropriation.” –7 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

n.2 (1992) (declining to address standing in a special action involving constitutional issues of statewide importance where the parties failed to raise the issue).

(interpreting a state statute in conjunction with the federal statute cited therein).

-72, ¶ 25 , -20 (1998); , (waiving standing requirement because suit by senate president against governor involved "dispute at the highest levels of state government” and substantial issues of first impression); , 217 n. 1, , 387 n. 1 (1986) (waiving sta

“The [l]egis *50 lature, in the exercise of its lawmaking power, establishes state policies and priorities and, through the appropriation power, gives those policies and priorities effect.”

¶ 10, (finding that “[t]his Court has original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs against state officers,” including the governor); (same); 540-41, 783-84 (1941) (reviewing in certiorari proceeding gubernatorial removal of Industrial Commissioners and noting that

We exercise our discretion to accept jurisdiction because “this case involves a dispute at the highest levels of state government” requiring “a prompt determination.”

("The Legislature, in the exercise of its lawmaking power, establishes state policies and priorities and, through the appropriation power, gives those policies and priorities effect.").

The Legislature, “in the exercise of its lawmaking power, establishes state policies and priorities and, through the appropriation power, gives those policies and priorities effect.”

See, (reviewing a legislator’s challenge to gubernatorial item vetoes); Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 25 Ariz. 381, 218 P. 139 (1923) (reviewing governor’s veto of the legislature’s tax imposition)

See Rios v. Symington, 172 Ariz. 3, 5 n.2, n.2 (1992) (court expressly declined to address potential standing issues not raised by the parties, but reminded the parties that future attempts to invoke the court’s jurisdiction on similar grounds will be viewed with great circumspection).

Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5(1); P.2d 20 4 Special action jurisdiction is not appropriate to review the language used by the governor in the veto message; it will be appropriate to consider the issue only if and when the executive branch of government undertakes spending to which an objection is properly made.

a certain sum of money for a specified object, in such a manner that the executive officers of the government are authorized to use that money.” -7 , -24 (1992) ( , 257 P. 648, 649 (1927)).

¶ 26 , we accepted jurisdiction notwithstanding the existence of “potential standing issues.” In that case, the President of the State Senate brought a special action challenging the constitutionality of the Governor’s use of the line item veto.

Once the Legislature has acted, however, it becomes the duty of the Executive to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed.’”) ( , ).

As chief executive the governor is the state’s agent, whose duty is to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” , (quoting Ariz. Const. art. V, § 4).