Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Hedlund v. Sheldon, 840 P.2d 1008.

51 citing documents.

State v. Patton Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Patton Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
(“[T]rial judges have inherent power and discretion to adopt special, individualized procedures designed to promote the ends of justice in each case that comes before them.”) (citation omitted).
State v. Tull Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Tull Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State of Arizona v. Mark Goudeau 372 P.3d 945 Ariz. 2016
State of Arizona v. Mark Goudeau 372 P.3d 945 Ariz. 2016
¶92 Additionally, “[t]rial judges have inherent power and discretion to adopt special, individualized procedures designed to promote the ends of justice in each case that comes before them.” ( (Feldman, J., specially concurring)); –04, –67 (1984) (“The trial judge is armed with both discretionary power and rules which he may use to control pro
State v. Carimbocas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Carimbocas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
P.2d 1008 (1992) (affirming the use of dual jury procedure).
BNSF Railway Co. v. Buttrick 268 P.3d 400 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
BNSF Railway Co. v. Buttrick 268 P.3d 400 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
¶ 16 Encouraging us to apply that deferential standard to this ease, Crain emphasizes trial courts’ “ ‘inherent power and discretion to adopt special, individualized procedures designed to promote the ends of justice in each case that comes before them.’ ” -39 , -43 (App.1994) ( , ).
State v. Haney 219 P.3d 274 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State v. Haney 219 P.3d 274 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State of Arizona v. Robert William Harlow Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State of Arizona v. Robert William Harlow Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
“[T]rial judges have ‘inherent power and discretion to adopt special, individualized procedures designed to promote the ends of justice in each case that comes before them’ as long as such procedures are not inconsistent with statutory or constitutional provisions or other rules of the court.” Fernandez, 169 P.3d at 647, see also Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 27 (“No cause shall be reversed for technical error in pleadings or proceedings when upon the whole case it shall appear that substantial justic
State v. Fernandez 169 P.3d 641 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Fernandez 169 P.3d 641 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
(stating that trial judges have “inherent power and discretion to adopt special, individualized procedures designed to promote the ends of justice in each case that comes before them,” as long as such procedures are not inconsistent with statutory or constitutional provisions or other
State of Arizona Ex Rel R Romley v. Hon Ballinger 97 P.3d 101 Ariz. 2004
State of Arizona Ex Rel R Romley v. Hon Ballinger 97 P.3d 101 Ariz. 2004
State v. Prasertphong 75 P.3d 675 Ariz. 2003
State v. Prasertphong 75 P.3d 675 Ariz. 2003
-70 , -8 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Hedlund, v. Sheldon
State v. Hickman 68 P.3d 418 Ariz. 2003
State v. Hickman 68 P.3d 418 Ariz. 2003
State v. Korovkin 47 P.3d 1131 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
State v. Korovkin 47 P.3d 1131 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968)
State v. Greene 967 P.2d 106 Ariz. 1998
State v. Greene 967 P.2d 106 Ariz. 1998
See, , (saving spent bullet from crime); , (wearing a necklace with a charm that had belonged to victim)
State v. Hussain 942 P.2d 1168 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
State v. Hussain 942 P.2d 1168 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
overruled on other grounds
State v. LeBlanc 924 P.2d 441 Ariz. 1996
State v. LeBlanc 924 P.2d 441 Ariz. 1996
State v. McKinney 917 P.2d 1214 Ariz. 1996
State v. McKinney 917 P.2d 1214 Ariz. 1996
State v. Strayhand 911 P.2d 577 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
Espinoza v. Martin 894 P.2d 688 Ariz. 1995
Espinoza v. Martin 894 P.2d 688 Ariz. 1995
In Hedlund v. Sheldon, we held that a trial judge’s decision to impanel dual juries for co-defendants was not a rule of procedure, but rather was “ ‘the exercise of an individual judge’s discretion to use a particular technique in order to meet a specific problem’ in a single case.” , , (Feldman, J., specially concurring), cert.
State v. Tackman 902 P.2d 1340 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
State v. Tackman 902 P.2d 1340 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
4 Even if the constitutional reference were not clear, we would find sufficient basis for Judge Portley’s actions in the court’s “inherent power and discretion to adopt special, individualized procedures designed to pro *239 mote the ends of justice in each case that comes before them.”
Campbell v. Superior Court 871 P.2d 740 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Campbell v. Superior Court 871 P.2d 740 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
Because of this, we have eschewed the type of rule making found in Montgomery , especially where the supreme court “has not promulgated any rules authorizing the procedure [in question]” and where the rule cited “does not include any reference to [the procedure invoked].” , vacated, , (overruling the holding upon which our opinion was based).
State v. Romero 870 P.2d 1141 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
State v. Romero 870 P.2d 1141 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
267 , 83 L.Ed.2d 203 (1984), overruled on other grounds
State v. Huerta 855 P.2d 776 Ariz. 1993
State v. Huerta 855 P.2d 776 Ariz. 1993
State v. Aussie 854 P.2d 158 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
State v. Aussie 854 P.2d 158 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
267 , 83 L.Ed.2d 203 (1984), overruled on other grounds
State v. Schurz 859 P.2d 156 Ariz. 1993
State v. Schurz 859 P.2d 156 Ariz. 1993
267 , 83 L.Ed.2d 203 (1984), , , (death sentence set aside; defendant may well have been more culpable than accomplice who received life imprisonment, but murder was not particularly heinous or cruel).
Wiley v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 847 P.2d 595 Ariz. 1993
Wiley v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 847 P.2d 595 Ariz. 1993
In light of our “healthy respect for stare decisis,’’ , we do not lightly overrule precedent and do so only for compelling reasons, see
State v. Salazar 844 P.2d 566 Ariz. 1992