Cited by

“We take judicial notice of the records of the Secretary of State.” n.1 (1993).

See e.g., Korte, 199 Ariz. at 174, ¶ 3; Harris, 193 Ariz. at 412, ¶ 16; ¶ 13 (App. 2013), as amended (Feb.

n.1 (1993) (stating that this Court may take judicial notice of public records filed with the Secretary of State).

at 412-13, ¶¶ 15-17 , 973 P.2d at 1169 -70 ( , (“Our concern with timeliness stems in part from the notion that disputes concerning election and petition matters must be initiated and heard in time to prepare the ballots for absentee voting to avoid rendering an action moot.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

McLaughlin filed this action almost sixteen weeks before the printing deadline for the Secretary of State’s publicity pamphlet and, therefore, did not “deprive judges of the ability to fairly and reasonably process and consider the issues.” Mathieu v. Mahoney, 174 Ariz. 4 456, 461, see Korte, 199 Ariz. at 174-75 ¶ 3, 16 P.3d at 201-02 (rejecting laches defense when proposition challenge was filed almost eight weeks before the deadline for mailing the publicity pamp

McLaughlin filed this action almost sixteen weeks before the printing deadline for the Secretary of State’s publicity pamphlet and, therefore, did not “deprive judges of the ability to fairly and reasonably process and consider the issues.” see Korte, 199 Ariz. at 174 -75 ¶ 3, 16 P.3d at 201-02 (rejecting laches defense when proposition challenge was filed almost eight weeks before the deadline for mailing the publicity pamphlet, “allowing] sufficient time to render a decision”).

§ 1973ff-1 (2003), and required the Court to decide this matter on an unnecessarily accelerated basis, see Lubin, 213 Ariz. at 497-98 ¶¶ 9-11, 144 P.3d at 511-12 ( 460, 85 (1993) (citation omitted), for proposition that delay may cause courts to “steamroll through .

See, e.g., Sotomayor, 199 Ariz. at 83, ¶7 , 13 P.3d at 1200 (holding unreasonable petitioners’ failure to file a special action until the day before the voter information pamphlet printing deadline); , (finding unreasonable filing the complaint days before the absentee ballot printing deadline).

81, ¶ 9, (two-month delay barred claims because litigants in election cases must pursue such cases with all deliberate speed to preserve quality of judicial decision making); ¶¶ 17-18, -70 (1998) (finding unreasonable six-week delay even though claim filed within statutory limitations period); P.2d 81 (1993) (finding laches applied where plaintiff delayed more than one year after petitions circulated and claims litigated twenty-four hours after complaint filed, thereby prejudicing defendants).

¶ 15, Mathieu v. Mahoney, 174 Ariz. 456, 458-59, -84 (1993)

See, (noting that the “concern with timeliness stems in part from the notion that ‘disputes concerning election and petition matters must be initiated and heard in time to prepare the ballots for absentee voting to avoid rendering an action moot’”) (quoting Kromko v. Superior Court, 168 Ar

456, 458-59, -84 (1993).

The doctrine of laches has recently been applied in one election case, , and rejected in another

Moreover, “[c]ourts should not be forced to make hasty legal decisions in such important areas simply because the parties bringing such cases had difficulty, as here, in finding lawyers.”

“The delay must be unreasonable under the circumstances, including the party’s knowledge of his or her right, and it must be shown that any change in the circumstances caused by the delay has resulted in prejudice to the other party sufficient to justify denial of relief.” , (holding challenge to initiative barred by laches because plaintiffs waited one year to take any action).

(claim involving initiative measure’s alleged violation of single subject provision); , (claim involving disposition of military pension benefits in a reopened dissolution decree)