DocketDrift

Real-time tracking of state judicial trends.

Outcomes

Public record · Human review · No verdicts asserted

Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Montgomery v. Sheldon, 893 P.2d 1281.

38 citing documents.

  • State of Arizona v. Andres Sanchez 537 P.3d 794 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2023
  • State of Arizona v. Andres Sanchez 537 P.3d 794 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2023
  • State v. Jacott Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
  • State v. Jacott Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
  • Jacob T. Osterkamp v. State of Arizona Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
  • Jacob T. Osterkamp v. State of Arizona Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
    “[F]or a pleading defendant, Rule 32 is „the only means available for exercising the [defendant‟s] constitutional right to appellate review.‟” Petty, 238 P.3d at 640, supp. op., P.2d 1281 (1995) (alteration in Petty).
  • State of Arizona v. Hesam Mohajerin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
  • State of Arizona v. Hesam Mohajerin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
    P.2d 614, supp. op., n.1, n.1 (1995) (observing possibility exists for “wrongful conviction” due to “errors in the guilt determination of even pleading defendants”).
  • State v. Petty 238 P.3d 637 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
  • State v. Petty 238 P.3d 637 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
    ¶ 8 , , supp. op., , , Petty contends on review that, because the first of-right proceeding is “equivalent to a direct appeal” for a pleading defendant, such a defendant is entitled to raise in a successive post-conviction proceeding the claim that Rule
  • State v. Soto 224 P.3d 223 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
  • State v. Soto 224 P.3d 223 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
    supp. op., , 119 n. 1, , 1282 n. 1 (1995) (interpreting state constitutional right to appellate review as “an essential safeguard against wrongful conviction” requiring “a meaningful form of appeal”); -99 , -44 (1993) (record must be sufficient “to aff
  • State v. Ward 118 P.3d 1122 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
  • State v. Ward 118 P.3d 1122 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
  • State v. Resendis-Felix 100 P.3d 457 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
  • State v. Resendis-Felix 100 P.3d 457 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
    ndant’s on-release status, even though defendant had not objected to court’s making finding below, because “a sentence that is improperly imposed can be reversed on appeal despite the lack of an objection”); , (fundamental error for trial court to make sentence-enhancement determination jury was required to make); , (“[A] Rule 32 proceeding is the appeal for a defendant pleading guilty.”); , (because Apprendi presents new rule of constitutional law, its holding will be applied to cases pending o
  • State v. Cazares 72 P.3d 355 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
  • State of Arizona v. Ernesto Luis Cazares Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
  • State of Arizona v. Ernesto Luis Cazares Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
    2 ¶4 Because a defendant who pleads guilty waives the right to appeal directly to an appellate court, Rule 32 is “the only means available for exercising the constitutional right to appellate review.” supp op., P.2d 1281 (1995).
  • State v. Cazares 72 P.3d 355 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
    ¶ 4 Because a defendant who pleads guilty waives the right to appeal directly to an appellate court, Rule 32 is “the only means available for exercising the constitutional right to appellate review.” , , supp op.
  • State v. Rosas-Hernandez 42 P.3d 1177 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
  • State v. Rosas-Hernandez 42 P.3d 1177 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
    ¶ 13 A Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief is “analogous to a direct appeal for a pleading defendant.” , 260 n. 5, , 618 n. 5 (1995), supplemented by
  • Lammie v. Barker 915 P.2d 662 Ariz. 1996
  • Lammie v. Barker 915 P.2d 662 Ariz. 1996
    supp., , and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to grant Lammie a thirty-day extension of time to file a petition for post-conviction relief pro per.
  • State v. Roscoe 910 P.2d 635 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Roscoe 910 P.2d 635 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Shlionsky 911 P.2d 637 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
  • State v. Shlionsky 911 P.2d 637 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
    our supreme court held that A.R.S.
  • State v. Smith 910 P.2d 1 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Smith 910 P.2d 1 Ariz. 1996
    supp., , (1995), the court also held that the trial court committed fundamental error in permitting Smith’s counsel to withdraw before the court of appeals disposed of Smith’s discretionary petition for review.
  • State v. Pruett 912 P.2d 1357 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
  • State v. Pruett 912 P.2d 1357 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
    In keeping with Montgomery’s analogy that a pleading defendant’s first petition for post-conviction is “the appeal for a defendant pleading guilty,” , (supp. op.)
  • State v. Stine 906 P.2d 58 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
  • State v. Stine 906 P.2d 58 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
    supplemented by , and have found none.
  • State v. Krum 903 P.2d 596 Ariz. 1995
  • State v. Krum 903 P.2d 596 Ariz. 1995
  • State v. Smith 904 P.2d 1248 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
  • State v. Smith 904 P.2d 1248 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
    Therefore, the court has created a new avenue to exercise the right to appeal—“a Rule 32 proceeding is the appeal for a defendant pleading guilty____” , (Supp.Op.)