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Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. University Physicians, Inc., 903 P.2d 1101.

22 citing documents.

  • In Re Term of Parental Rights as to M.N. 549 P.3d 200 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • Calcagno v. Ainbinder Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • Compass Bank v. Bennett 375 P.3d 950 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    ¶ 15 The Bennetts argue Baker, , , require a creditor to do something affirmative and final—such as recording a written release of the deed of trust—to *62 waive the security interest and then sue on the note.
  • Compass v. Bennett Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    ¶15 The Bennetts argue Baker, require a creditor to do something affirmative and final -- such as recording an express release of the deed of trust -- to waive the security interest and then sue on the note.
  • KCI Restaurant Management LLC v. Holm Wright Hyde & Hays PLC 341 P.3d 1156 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • John Munic Enterprises, Inc. v. Laos 326 P.3d 279 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
    They maintain “fairness dictates they be informed if the Judgment had been satisfied or extinguished before such obligation to request a valuation hearing should arise.” “Because this issue involves statutory interpretation and application, it is a question of law that we review de novo.”
  • In Re Marriage of Dougall 316 P.3d 591 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
    “The best indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute,” id., and “we will give terms ‘their ordinary meanings, unless the legislature has provided a specific definition or the context of the statute indicates a term carries a special meaning.’”
  • In Re Pinal County Mental Health No. Mh-201000029 240 P.3d 1262 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
  • STATE EX REL. AZ. STR. PEST CONT. v. Taylor 224 P.3d 983 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
  • Industrial Commission v. Old Republic Insurance 219 P.3d 285 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
  • Robson Ranch Quail Creek, LLC v. Pima County 161 P.3d 588 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
  • Cornman Tweedy 560, LLC v. City of Casa Grande 137 P.3d 309 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
  • State of Arizona v. Derek Scott Oaks Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
    “Statutory language is the best indicator of that intent and we will give terms ‘their ordinary meanings, unless the legislature has provided a specific definition or the context of the statute indicates a term carries a special meaning.’” -92 (App. 1999)
  • TANQUE VERDE UNIFIED SCHOOL v. Bernini 76 P.3d 874 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
    "Statutory language is the best indicator of that intent and we will give terms `their ordinary meanings, unless the legislature has provided a specific definition or the context of the statute indicates a term carries a special meaning.'"
  • Bunker's Glass Co. v. Pilkington PlC 47 P.3d 1119 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
  • Thomas v. Thomas 49 P.3d 306 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
    345, , 1103 (App. 1995).
  • Levitan v. State, Registrar of Contractors 33 P.3d 796 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
  • Circle K Stores, Inc. v. Apache County 18 P.3d 713 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
    ¶ 6 , (“[W]e will give terms ‘their ordinary meanings, uniess the legislature has provided a specific definition or the context of the statute indicates a term carries a special meaning.’”) ( , ).
  • Tripati v. State 16 P.3d 783 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
    § 1-213 (1995); , (explaining that statutory language is the best indicator of legislative intent and we will give terms their ordinary meanings).
  • State v. Affordable Bail Bonds 6 P.3d 339 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
    § 1-213 (1995); , (statutory language is the best indicator of legislative intent and we will give terms “their ordinary meanings”).
  • Arizona Department of Revenue v. Great Western Publishing, Inc. 3 P.3d 992 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
    § 1-213 (1995); , (statutory language is the best indicator of legislative intent and we will give terms “their ordinary meanings”).
  • Kessen v. Stewart 990 P.2d 689 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
    Statutory language is the *491 best indicator of that intent and we will give terms “their ordinary meanings, unless the legislature has provided a specific definition or the context of the statute indicates a term carries a special meaning.”