Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Zamora v. Reinstein, 915 P.2d 1227.

279 citing documents.

John D. Kaufmann v. State of Arizona Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
Cicoria v. Cole 215 P.3d 402 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Cicoria v. Cole 215 P.3d 402 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State v. Larson 214 P.3d 429 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State v. Larson 214 P.3d 429 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
“We first consider the statute’s language because we expect it to be the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning.” , (citations and internal quotations omitted).
State of Arizona v. Payne Nelson Daniels Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
State v. Payne 225 P.3d 1131 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
State v. Payne 225 P.3d 1131 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
But, if “the statute’s language is not clear, we determine legislative intent by reading the statute as a whole, giving meaningful operation to all of its provisions, and by considering factors such as the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.”
State of Arizona v. Payne Nelson Daniels Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
But, if “the statute’s language is not clear, we determine legislative intent by reading the statute as a whole, giving meaningful operation to all of its provisions, and by considering factors such as the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.”
State v. Starr 213 P.3d 214 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State v. Starr 213 P.3d 214 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
In re MH 2008-000097 210 P.3d 1244 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
In re MH 2008-000097 210 P.3d 1244 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Jones v. Paniagua 212 P.3d 133 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Jones v. Paniagua 212 P.3d 133 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Depending on the need for clarity, this court employs a multitude of factors to determine legislative intent: "[t]he statute's context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.”
Backus v. State 203 P.3d 499 Ariz. 2009
Backus v. State 203 P.3d 499 Ariz. 2009
When analyzing statutes, our primary “goal is ‘to fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote [the statute].’” ( ).
Havasupai Tribe of the Havasupai Reservation v. Arizona Board of Regents 204 P.3d 1063 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Havasupai Tribe of the Havasupai Reservation v. Arizona Board of Regents 204 P.3d 1063 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Thomas 194 P.3d 394 Ariz. 2008
State v. Thomas 194 P.3d 394 Ariz. 2008
Our primary “goal is ‘to fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote [the statute].’” Zamora v. Reinstein, 185 Ariz. 272, 275, ( ).
Yollin v. City of Glendale 191 P.3d 1040 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Yollin v. City of Glendale 191 P.3d 1040 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
DeVries v. State 198 P.3d 580 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
DeVries v. State 198 P.3d 580 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
8 ¶ 16 When, as here, a statute’s language is not clear, we are to determine “legislative intent by reading the statute as a whole, giving meaningful operation to all of its provisions, and by considering factors such as the statutes’ context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.”
State v. Aguilar 178 P.3d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
State v. Aguilar 178 P.3d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
But, if “the statute’s language is not clear, we determine legislative intent by reading the statute as a whole, giving meaningful operation to all of its provisions, and by considering factors such as the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.”
State v. Hasson 177 P.3d 301 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Hasson 177 P.3d 301 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Thomas 175 P.3d 71 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Thomas 175 P.3d 71 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
In construing a statute, our goal is “to fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it.” , (internal quotations omitted).
Bentley v. Building Our Future 172 P.3d 860 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Bentley v. Building Our Future 172 P.3d 860 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
¶ 12 In construing a statute, the starting point is the language of the statute itself “because we expect it to be ‘the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning.’” , (citations omitted)
State v. Stanley 172 P.3d 848 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Stanley 172 P.3d 848 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
STATE EX REL. BRANNAN v. Williams 171 P.3d 1248 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
STATE EX REL. BRANNAN v. Williams 171 P.3d 1248 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes 169 P.3d 115 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes 169 P.3d 115 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Sharma 165 P.3d 693 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Sharma 165 P.3d 693 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Olquin 165 P.3d 228 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State ex rel. Thomas v. Duncan 165 P.3d 238 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State ex rel. Thomas v. Duncan 165 P.3d 238 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
¶ 7 When construing a statute, “[w]e first consider the statute’s language.” , , (“[I]n interpreting the meaning of a statute ...
State v. Olquin 165 P.3d 228 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Aranda v. Cardenas, M.D. Nes Arizona Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
Aranda v. Cardenas, M.D. Nes Arizona Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
“When an ambiguity exists, however, we attempt to determine legislative intent by considering ‘the statute’s context, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose.’” Hourani v. Benson Hosp., 211 Ariz. 427, ¶ 7
Lincoln v. Holt 156 P.3d 438 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Lincoln v. Holt 156 P.3d 438 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
State v. Slayton 154 P.3d 1057 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007