Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Purcell, 934 P.2d 1349.
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Compassionate Care Dispensary, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs.
418 P.3d 978
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
See Williams v. Thude , , 259, , 1351 (1997) (directing statutes be construed so that "[e]ach word, phrase, clause, and sentence of a statute [is] given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial") (quoting City of Phx.
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Franklin v. Clemett
382 P.3d 802
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Thus, “whenever and in whatever form the [contributory negligence] defense is permitted to exist, a fact question arises that ’shall, at all times, be left to the jury.’” (emphasis added).
- Villa v. Furar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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Doug Clark v. Jimmie Munoz, Jr.
330 P.3d 958
Ariz. 2014
In civil cases, however, we have “recognize[d] that the ‘fundamental error’ doctrine should be used sparingly, if at all.”
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Fields v. Elected Officials' Retirement Plan
320 P.3d 1160
Ariz. 2014
(noting court construes statutes to avoid rendering portions superfluous); (rejecting an interpretation that would render the statute in question “essentially meaningless”).
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Hon. Fields v. Elected Officials Retirement
Ariz. 2014
(noting court construes statutes to avoid rendering portions superfluous); (rejecting an interpretation that would render the statute in question “essentially meaningless”).
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Harris Corp. v. Arizona Department of Revenue
312 P.3d 1143
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
(noting we construe statutes so as to avoid rendering portions of them superfluous); , (interpreting a statute to give each word, phrase and clause meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial).
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Taylor-Bertling v. Foley
313 P.3d 537
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
-10 , -63 (App.1989); , (" ‘fundamental error’ doctrine,” permitting lim *399 ited review of alleged errors not raised below, “should be used sparingly, if at all, in civil cases”); Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut.
- In Re Mh2010-002637 263 P.3d 82 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
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State v. Gray
258 P.3d 242
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
See, , (courts avoid statutory construction rendering clause void, inert, redundant, or trivial).
- Grand v. Nacchio 236 P.3d 398 Ariz. 2010
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Braillard v. Maricopa County, Maricopa County Sheriff's Office
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
Thus, this question is not one of proximate cause that could exonerate the defendants from liability as a matter of law but one of “the existence and application of contributory negligence,” on which the jury is “the sole arbiter.”
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Grand v. Nacchio
217 P.3d 1203
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
so that no part will be void, inert, redundant or trivial’ ”
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GRAND v. NACCHIO McMASTER QWEST COMMUNICATIONS
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
so that no part will be void, inert, redundant or trivial.’”
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State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Newell
210 P.3d 1283
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.” ( , )).
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Egan v. Fridlund-Horne
211 P.3d 1213
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
*239 Each word and phrase of the statute “must be given meaning so that no part of it will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”
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Havasupai Tribe of the Havasupai Reservation v. Arizona Board of Regents
204 P.3d 1063
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
(alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) ( , ).
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In Re Estate of Newman
196 P.3d 863
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
so that no part will be void, inert, redundant or trivial.” , (quotations omitted, emphasis removed).
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Dowling v. Stapley
179 P.3d 960
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
(“Each word, phrase, clause, and sentence [of a statute] must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant or trivial.”) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) ( , ).
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Deer Valley Unified School District No. 97 v. Houser
152 P.3d 490
Ariz. 2007
“Each word, phrase, clause, and sentence [of a statute] must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.” (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) ( ).
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In Re Gina Manny
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
Williams v. Thude, 188 Ariz. 257, 258, (“‘Each word, phrase, clause, and sentence of a statute must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.’”) (emphasis omitted)
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Romero v. Southwest Ambulance, rural/metro, City of Tucson
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
P.2d 1096 (App. 1994), aff’d, P.2d 1349 (1997).
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Armenta v. City of Casa Grande
71 P.3d 359
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
aff 'd, , : Gross, willful, or wanton conduct is action or inaction with reckless indifference to the result or the rights or safety of others.
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Arizona Department of Revenue v. Raby
65 P.3d 458
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
(“Each word, phrase, clause, and sentence [of a statute] must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”) (citation and emphasis omitted); ¶ 19 , (principles of statutory construction also apply to a
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Gunnell v. Arizona Public Service Co.
46 P.3d 399
Ariz. 2002
P.2d 1096 (App. 1994), approved and explained in Williams v. Thude (Williams II), 188 Ariz. 257, 260
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S Development Co. v. Pima Capital Management Co.
31 P.3d 123
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
review granted in part (1994), aff'd, , Ariz. R. Civ.
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Englert v. Carondelet Health Network
13 P.3d 763
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
(“[T]he ‘fundamental error’ doctrine should be used sparingly, if at all, in civil cases.”); Hall v. A.N.R.
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Jardanowski v. INDUS. COM'N OF ARIZONA
3 P.3d 1166
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
§ 13-603(A), it would have been unnecessary for the legislature to have specified that forfeiture is effective only after conviction, , (construing statute so that no part will be void, inert, redundant or trivial).
- Badia v. City of Casa Grande 988 P.2d 134 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
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Luchanski v. Officer J.L. Congrove
971 P.2d 636
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
“Gross negligence and wanton conduct have generally been treated as one and the same.”
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Larsen v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A.
978 P.2d 119
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
(before 1984 adoption of comparative fault, “[a]s a practical matter, ...
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PhxAz Ltd. Partnership v. Maricopa County
967 P.2d 1026
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
¶27 We believe that the recording of the deed is not, by itself, sufficient to require valuation under section 42-146(A) because such a , (“Each word, phrase, clause, and sentence [of a statute] must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.” [citation omitted]).
- Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix 961 P.2d 449 Ariz. 1998