Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Purcell, 934 P.2d 1349.

33 citing documents.

  • Compassionate Care Dispensary, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs. 418 P.3d 978 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    See Williams v. Thude , , 259, , 1351 (1997) (directing statutes be construed so that "[e]ach word, phrase, clause, and sentence of a statute [is] given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial") (quoting City of Phx.
  • Franklin v. Clemett 382 P.3d 802 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    Thus, “whenever and in whatever form the [contributory negligence] defense is permitted to exist, a fact question arises that ’shall, at all times, be left to the jury.’” (emphasis added).
  • Villa v. Furar Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • Doug Clark v. Jimmie Munoz, Jr. 330 P.3d 958 Ariz. 2014
    In civil cases, however, we have “recognize[d] that the ‘fundamental error’ doctrine should be used sparingly, if at all.”
  • Fields v. Elected Officials' Retirement Plan 320 P.3d 1160 Ariz. 2014
    (noting court construes statutes to avoid rendering portions superfluous); (rejecting an interpretation that would render the statute in question “essentially meaningless”).
  • Hon. Fields v. Elected Officials Retirement Ariz. 2014
    (noting court construes statutes to avoid rendering portions superfluous); (rejecting an interpretation that would render the statute in question “essentially meaningless”).
  • Harris Corp. v. Arizona Department of Revenue 312 P.3d 1143 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
    (noting we construe statutes so as to avoid rendering portions of them superfluous); , (interpreting a statute to give each word, phrase and clause meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial).
  • Taylor-Bertling v. Foley 313 P.3d 537 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
    -10 , -63 (App.1989); , (" ‘fundamental error’ doctrine,” permitting lim *399 ited review of alleged errors not raised below, “should be used sparingly, if at all, in civil cases”); Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut.
  • In Re Mh2010-002637 263 P.3d 82 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
  • State v. Gray 258 P.3d 242 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
    See, , (courts avoid statutory construction rendering clause void, inert, redundant, or trivial).
  • Grand v. Nacchio 236 P.3d 398 Ariz. 2010
  • Braillard v. Maricopa County, Maricopa County Sheriff's Office Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
    Thus, this question is not one of proximate cause that could exonerate the defendants from liability as a matter of law but one of “the existence and application of contributory negligence,” on which the jury is “the sole arbiter.”
  • Grand v. Nacchio 217 P.3d 1203 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
    so that no part will be void, inert, redundant or trivial’ ”
  • GRAND v. NACCHIO McMASTER QWEST COMMUNICATIONS Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
    so that no part will be void, inert, redundant or trivial.’”
  • State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Newell 210 P.3d 1283 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
    must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.” ( , )).
  • Egan v. Fridlund-Horne 211 P.3d 1213 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
    *239 Each word and phrase of the statute “must be given meaning so that no part of it will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”
  • Havasupai Tribe of the Havasupai Reservation v. Arizona Board of Regents 204 P.3d 1063 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
    (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) ( , ).
  • In Re Estate of Newman 196 P.3d 863 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
    so that no part will be void, inert, redundant or trivial.” , (quotations omitted, emphasis removed).
  • Dowling v. Stapley 179 P.3d 960 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
    (“Each word, phrase, clause, and sentence [of a statute] must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant or trivial.”) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) ( , ).
  • Deer Valley Unified School District No. 97 v. Houser 152 P.3d 490 Ariz. 2007
    “Each word, phrase, clause, and sentence [of a statute] must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.” (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) ( ).
  • In Re Gina Manny Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
    Williams v. Thude, 188 Ariz. 257, 258, (“‘Each word, phrase, clause, and sentence of a statute must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.’”) (emphasis omitted)
  • Romero v. Southwest Ambulance, rural/metro, City of Tucson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
    P.2d 1096 (App. 1994), aff’d, P.2d 1349 (1997).
  • Armenta v. City of Casa Grande 71 P.3d 359 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
    aff 'd, , : Gross, willful, or wanton conduct is action or inaction with reckless indifference to the result or the rights or safety of others.
  • Arizona Department of Revenue v. Raby 65 P.3d 458 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
    (“Each word, phrase, clause, and sentence [of a statute] must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”) (citation and emphasis omitted); ¶ 19 , (principles of statutory construction also apply to a
  • Gunnell v. Arizona Public Service Co. 46 P.3d 399 Ariz. 2002
    P.2d 1096 (App. 1994), approved and explained in Williams v. Thude (Williams II), 188 Ariz. 257, 260
  • S Development Co. v. Pima Capital Management Co. 31 P.3d 123 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
    review granted in part (1994), aff'd, , Ariz. R. Civ.
  • Englert v. Carondelet Health Network 13 P.3d 763 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
    (“[T]he ‘fundamental error’ doctrine should be used sparingly, if at all, in civil cases.”); Hall v. A.N.R.
  • Jardanowski v. INDUS. COM'N OF ARIZONA 3 P.3d 1166 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
    § 13-603(A), it would have been unnecessary for the legislature to have specified that forfeiture is effective only after conviction, , (construing statute so that no part will be void, inert, redundant or trivial).
  • Badia v. City of Casa Grande 988 P.2d 134 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
  • Luchanski v. Officer J.L. Congrove 971 P.2d 636 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
    “Gross negligence and wanton conduct have generally been treated as one and the same.”
  • Larsen v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A. 978 P.2d 119 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
    (before 1984 adoption of comparative fault, “[a]s a practical matter, ...
  • PhxAz Ltd. Partnership v. Maricopa County 967 P.2d 1026 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
    ¶27 We believe that the recording of the deed is not, by itself, sufficient to require valuation under section 42-146(A) because such a , (“Each word, phrase, clause, and sentence [of a statute] must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.” [citation omitted]).
  • Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix 961 P.2d 449 Ariz. 1998