Cited by

Ct., ¶ 10 (App. 1998) (accepting jurisdiction because “[t]he facts [were] not contested, and the legal issue [could] properly be decided on the present record”).

at ¶ 10, or have a sufficient record to decide the claim, ¶ 8 (1998) (Accepting special action of interlocutory orders and pretrial rulings is disfavored because such rulings often lack a full record and to avoid piecemeal appellate review).

¶ 10 (App. 1998) (accepting special action jurisdiction where “[t]he facts [were] not contested, and the legal issue [could] properly be decided on the present record.”).

See, (recognizing strict liability and negligence as causes of action to recover damages); (requiring damages to sustain negligence claim); (requiring damages as element in attorney-malpractice claim).

Piner v. Superior Court (Jones), ¶ 8 (1998).

¶17 Courts generally “do not favor accepting special action jurisdiction to review the propriety of interlocutory orders and pretrial rulings.” ¶ 8 (1998) (citation omitted).

Fund of Ariz. v. Fink , , 614, ¶ 14, , 1193 (App. 2010) ; see also Piner v. Superior Court (Jones) , , 189, ¶¶ 28, 30, , 916 (1998) (adopting Restatement rule that "the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the conduct of each defendant was a cause of the injury, but when a defendant 'seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment ...

Ct., -89, ¶¶ 20-25, 30 (1998) (A.R.S.

¶ 7, (granting review to address significant legal issue despite court of appeals having declined special action jurisdiction).

ed that it would allow Plaintiffs to amend their notice of claim “to include the statement of the district reported in the newspapers of May and June 2012.” ANALYSIS I. Jurisdiction ¶6 Although this court rarely accepts special action jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion for summary judgment, see, ¶ 8, we accept jurisdiction in this case because the matter is one of public significance affecting a political subdivision of the state and involves an issue of law that is likely to arise ag

¶ 10 , (accepting special action jurisdiction when facts uncontested and legal issue could *524 “properly be decided on the present record”).

¶¶ 3-4, 18, 26, -11, 913-14, 915-16 (1998) (sequential car accidents; extent of damage caused by each unknown); -49, 251, -86, 588 (1966) (sequential car accidents; cause in fact and extent of damages caused by each defendant unknown); Summers v

See generally, ¶ 20 , (discussing the indivisible injury rule in Arizona after the legislature adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act).

See Piner v. Superior Court ( Jones ), ¶ 10

(accepting special action jurisdiction when facts uncontested and legal issue could “properly be decided on the present record”).

UCATA permitted a defendant who had paid more than its allocated share to seek contribution from the other defendants but, as our supreme court pointed out, “Arizona’s negligence law still produced harsh results when one defendant was insolvent, thus leaving the others unable to obtain contribution.” ¶21

See Piner v. Superior Court , , (accepting special action jurisdiction of issue of first impression); see also Orme Sch.

(special action jurisdiction proper, in part, because “[t]he facts are not contested, and the legal issue can properly be decided on the present record”); ChartOne, (“[Q]uestions of law .

Arizona law, however, requires a trier’s fault allocation in each action to total one hundred percent.14 ¶¶ 32-33, (illustrating that allocation of fault under A.R.S.

The Naranjos have recovered all their compensatory damages resulting from the accident and, thus, have been made “whole.” , quoting § 12-2506(A) (‘When the tortious conduct of more than one defendant contributes to one indivisible injury, the entire amount of damage resulting from all contributing causes is the total amount ‘of damages recoverable by the plaintiff.’”); Dobbs, supra, § 390, at 1091 *452 (“