Cited by

¶ 9 (1998) (noting that silence regarding a right of action “is not dispositive” and “begins, rather than ends, our inquiry” in holding a right of action existed where a statute lacked affirmative language authorizing a cause of action).

dants, and therefore the superior court’s summary judgment ruling on damages “is also incorrect.” We do not “consider new factual theories raised for the first time on appeal from summary judgment” and examine only whether the Plaintiffs’ claim against the Crest Defendants “w[as] supported under the law of negligence, the only theory advanced in the complaint or motion papers.” ¶ 6 (1998).

¶ 9 , (legislative silence regarding whether statute creates a private cause of action begins, rather than ends, the inquiry).

¶ 1 (1998); Shaw v. CTVT Motors, Inc., ¶ 8 (App. 2013), as amended (Mar.

¶ 1 (1998) (motion for judgment on the pleadings) (citing Thompson v. Better-Bilt Aluminum Prod.

See, (addressing whether passenger had private right of action on taxi’s failure to comply with insurance coverage requirements).

¶ 6, (“Ordinarily, courts should not consider new factual theories raised for the first time on appeal from summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings.”).

¶ 6, (explaining that appellate courts generally will not consider arguments a party has failed to raise in the superior court).

¶ 6, (appellate court will not consider new arguments raised for 5 COHEN v. COHEN Decision of the Court ¶15 In a dissolution case, the court may award fees “after considering the fi

See Best, 217 Ariz. at 504 n.7, ¶ 28, 176 P.3d at 702 n.7; -44, ¶¶ 13-19, -95 (1998) (absent special relationship, insurance agent owes no duty to non- client).

¶ 6 , (appellate court should only consider factual arguments presented to the trial court); Crowe v. Hickman's Egg Ranch, Inc., ¶ 16 , (failure to raise theory in trial court waived argument on appeal).

But Ridgely did not make this argument below, and we will not consider it on appeal.1 (supreme court refused to consider contract theory of recovery when only negligence theory alleged and argued in trial court); (new factual theories waived on appeal from summary judgment if not first raised in tri

240 ¶ 9, (“[T]he legislature’s silence begins, rather than ends our inquiry.”).

4 ¶ 16 , Donnelly recognized a professional’s duties to a non-client where “there was a foreseeable risk of harm to a foreseeable non-client whose protection depended on the actor’s conduct” such that “the contractor was in the care of the architect.” Here, the Carstens alleged that Jam

P.2d 1012 (App. 1990) (party opposing summary judgment must respond with facts showing genuine issue if movant offers evidence demonstrating entitlement to summary judgment); (“Ordinarily, courts should not consider new factual theories raised for the first time on appeal from summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings.”).

at 154, ¶29 , 24 P.3d at 601 (referring to Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers, § 51, and holding that an attorney hired by an insurer to represent an insured also owes a duty of care to the insurer when the interests of the insurer and the insured coincide); ¶15 , (“special circumstances” exist allowing imposition of liability on a professional “to the extent that a foreseeable and specific third party is injured by the professional’s actions”).