Cited by

85, 93 , 932 A.2d 443, 449 (2007) (“[A] party may relinquish its right to demand strict adherence to a mandatory statutory provision by virtue of its own failure to enforce that right.” (quoting Santiago v. State, 261 Conn. 533, 543 , 804 A.2d 801, 809 (2002))); cf. Valencia Energy Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, ¶¶ 34-35 , (equitable estoppel operates against State in tax matters if State commits affirmative acts relied upon by taxpayer and subsequently takes an inconsistent position).

See Valencia Energy Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, -75, ¶28 , -66 (1998) (instructing that, when a government agent acts within the general parameters of the agent’s authority, even if the agent acts erroneously, the agent’s representations are binding on the governmental entity); see also John C. Lincoln Hosp., 208 Ariz. at 538, ¶ 13 , 96 P.3d

See Valencia Energy Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, ¶¶ 33-34

¶ 66 Equitable estoppel generally applies where (1) “ ‘the party to be estopped commits acts inconsistent with a position it later adopts’ ”; (2) the other party relies on those acts; and (3) the latter party is injured by “‘the former’s repudiation of its prior conduct.’” Whiteco Metrocom, , 983 P.2d at 765 , quoting Valencia Energy Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, , -68 (1998).

¶33 P.2d 1256 (1998), the Lowes contend that estoppel may be applied against governmental agencies and should have been applied here.

General Motors Corp. v. Arizona Dept, of Revenue

Valencia Energy Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, -77, ¶35 , -68 (1998).

elements to equitable estoppel: “ ‘(1) the party to be estopped commits acts inconsistent with a position it later adopts; (2) reliance by the other party; and (3) injury to the latter resulting from the former’s repudiation of its prior conduct.’ ” City of Tucson v. Whiteco Metrocom, Inc., , quoting Valencia Energy Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, , -68 (1998); see also Camelback Del Este Homeowners Ass’n v. Warner

Valencia Energy Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, ¶ 32

Valencia Energy Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, -78, ¶¶ 35-40 , -69 (1998); Luther Constr.

See Valencia Energy v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, ¶ 35

its application will not substantially and adversely affect the exercise of governmental powers.” Valencia Energy Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Rev., ¶ 40

Valencia Energy Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue

¶ 1 In Valencia Energy Co. v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue, 578-79, ¶¶ 34, 41 , 1269-70 (1998), our supreme court held that in rare situations, the Arizona Department of Revenue (“ADOR”) can be equitably estopped from assessing a tax that is legally owed by a taxpayer.

DISCUSSION A. Tax Court Jurisdiction of Claimed Protest of Cities’ Assessments ¶ 9 We view the facts in the light most favorable to the party against which summary judgment was granted, Valencia Energy Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, , 568 ¶ 2, but we review de novo the tax court’s ruling.

the public interest would not be unduly damaged.’ ” Valencia Energy Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, ¶ 33 , (citation omitted) (overruling previous line of tax eases to allow equitable estoppel, in certain limited circumstances, against the Arizona Department of Revenue in tax matters).

Valencia Energy Co. v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue, -77, ¶¶ 35-38 , -68 (1998).

See Valencia Energy Co. v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue, -79, ¶¶ 29-41 , -70 (1998) (ADOR may be subjected to equitable estoppel under limited circumstances).

The Arizona appellate courts’ only reference to the Holmes & Narver test in a , regarding an issue on which the court had not granted review.

e. ¶22 Taking the undisputed facts and all inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to Mrs. Diggs, ¶ 2 , we find that Dr. Valdez voluntarily undertook to provide his expertise to Dr. Johnson, knowing that it was necessary for the protection of Mrs. Diggs and that Dr. Johnson would rely on it.

See Knoell Bros. Constr., Inc. v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue, , abrogated on other grounds by Valencia Energy Co. v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue, , (“where the same words or phrases appear in the same statute, they will be given a generally accepted and consistent meaning unless the legislative intent is clearly expressed to the contrary”) (citing Baker v. Salomon, 31 Ill.

General Motors Corp. v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue, -93 , -88 (App.1996), disapproved on other grounds by Valencia Energy Co. v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue

Stat. Ann. § 631.66 (1979) (no bad faith action against fund because its refusal to accept settlement offer “was an ‘action’ it took ‘in the performance of (its) powers and duties’ under the statute to dispose of the covered claim in question”); cf. Valencia Energy Co. v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue, , (act authorized by statute or undertaken within general parameters of statutory authority does “not become unauthorized simply because the act was performed erroneously”).