Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Sanchez v. City of Tucson, 953 P.2d 168.

48 citing documents.

Moore v. cottonwood/yavapai Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
Moore v. cottonwood/yavapai Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
Ephraim Dabush v. Seacret Direct LLC 478 P.3d 695 Ariz. 2021
Ephraim Dabush v. Seacret Direct LLC 478 P.3d 695 Ariz. 2021
¶ 10 (1998); ¶ 28 (App. 2008)
Tourtillot v. Yuma County Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Tourtillot v. Yuma County Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
§ 12-820.01 while “low level negligence such as failing to erect a sign” was not), vacated in part on other grounds, Schabel, 186 Ariz. at 166 (explaining that a government entity is absolutely immune for its decision to install a playground, but “the decisions as to what equipment and safety measures to install would not enjoy immunity from legal action”) (citation omitted); Warrington, 187 Ariz. at 252 (holding that “one e
Gonzalez v. Mat Const Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
Gonzalez v. Mat Const Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
1 In deciding the motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” (citations omitted); -10 (1990).
state/ador v. Bosch Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
state/ador v. Bosch Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
at 116, ¶ 17 ( ¶ 7 (1998), and Orme Sch., 166 Ariz. at 309-10).
Courtney Cramer v. Hon. Starr/ munguia/bejarano 375 P.3d 69 Ariz. 2016
Courtney Cramer v. Hon. Starr/ munguia/bejarano 375 P.3d 69 Ariz. 2016
26–27, 962 P.2d at 915-16 (holding that although UCATA “left intact the rule of indivisible injury, relieving the plaintiff of apportioning damage according to causal contribution,” § 12-2506 requires that “the factfinder [in an indivisible injury case] is to compute the total amount of damage sustained by the plaintiff and the percentage of fault of each tortfeasor”); ¶ 25, (noting that under UCATA the state could name non-parties at fault and have the trier of fact 1 The trial court rejected M
Planning Group of Scottsdale, L.L.C. v. Lake Mathews Mineral Properties, Ltd. 230 P.3d 365 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Planning Group of Scottsdale, L.L.C. v. Lake Mathews Mineral Properties, Ltd. 230 P.3d 365 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
¶ 7 , (evidence of party opposing summary judgment is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor; appellate review is de novo); ¶ 8 , (court's consideration of matters ou
Batty v. Glendale Union High School District No. 205 212 P.3d 930 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Batty v. Glendale Union High School District No. 205 212 P.3d 930 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
HUGHES CUSTOM BLDG, LLC v. Davey 212 P.3d 865 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
HUGHES CUSTOM BLDG, LLC v. Davey 212 P.3d 865 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
Tostado v. City of Lake Havasu 204 P.3d 1044 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Tostado v. City of Lake Havasu 204 P.3d 1044 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Unlike the issue of duty, which is a question of law, whether a party exercises control over the land is “a question of fact which ordinarily should be left to the fact finder.” 133, ¶¶ 10, 23 , 173 (1998)(quoting Lewis v. N.J.
Malad, Inc. v. Miller 199 P.3d 623 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
Malad, Inc. v. Miller 199 P.3d 623 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. City of Kingman 176 P.3d 53 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. City of Kingman 176 P.3d 53 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
131—33, ¶¶ 15-22, -73 (1998).
National Bank of Arizona v. Thruston 180 P.3d 977 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
National Bank of Arizona v. Thruston 180 P.3d 977 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
¶ 7 , Orme School, 166 Ariz. at 309-10 , 802 P.2d at 1008-09 .
Grafitti-Valenzuela v. City of Phoenix 167 P.3d 711 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Grafitti-Valenzuela v. City of Phoenix 167 P.3d 711 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
ant city owed a duty to “keep its streets and sidewalks reasonably safe for travel by the public”) (internal citation omitted); Coburn, 143 Ariz. at 52 , 691 P.2d at 1080 (stating that a municipality is “under an obligation for the benefit of those who use the public streets” and holding that the defendant city had a duty to keep its streets reasonably safe for travel); ¶ 10 , (stating, “a municipality owes a duty to the public to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition”).
Bohreer v. Erie Insurance Exchange 165 P.3d 186 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Bohreer v. Erie Insurance Exchange 165 P.3d 186 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
¶ 7 , (evidence of party opposing summary judgment is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn it its favor; appellate review is de novo); Bonner v. Minico, Inc., , (principles of summary judgment apply to factual issues af
Myers v. City of Tempe 128 P.3d 751 Ariz. 2006
Myers v. City of Tempe 128 P.3d 751 Ariz. 2006
¶ 6, (allowing the city to dispute the scope of its duty even though an intergovernmental agreement was the source of the duty).
Acuna v. Hampton And Kroack Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
Acuna v. Hampton And Kroack Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
Co., 169 Ariz. 505, 510, see also Larsen v. Nissan Motor Corp., 194 Ariz. 142, ¶ 5, (under UCATA, “‘each tortfeasor in a personal injury action is liable only for his or her share of fault’”)
Jennifer G. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 123 P.3d 186 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
Jennifer G. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 123 P.3d 186 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
¶14 We review the juvenile court’s entry of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards the trial court should use.
Bridgestone/Firestone North America Tire, L.L.C. v. Naranjo 79 P.3d 1206 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Bridgestone/Firestone North America Tire, L.L.C. v. Naranjo 79 P.3d 1206 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Relying on Sanchez v. City of Tuc *450 son, , the Naranjos further argue that, in the absence of joint liability, their recovery from A.P.S.
West v. State 58 P.3d 28 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
West v. State 58 P.3d 28 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
(nonparty at fault provisions in § 12-2506 “reduc[e] the amount recoverable from the [defendant]”).
Duwa, Inc. v. City of Tempe 52 P.3d 213 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Duwa, Inc. v. City of Tempe 52 P.3d 213 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Gamez v. Brush Wellman, Inc. 34 P.3d 375 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
Gamez v. Brush Wellman, Inc. 34 P.3d 375 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
McDonald v. City of Prescott 5 P.3d 900 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
McDonald v. City of Prescott 5 P.3d 900 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
Larsen v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A. 978 P.2d 119 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
Larsen v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A. 978 P.2d 119 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1998
§§ 12-2501 to 12-2509, “each tortfeasor in a personal injury action is liable only for his or her share of fault.” , citing A.R.S.